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 Abstract 
In the 1960s, modernization theory became an important analytical tool to conceptualize 
change in the Third World. As opposed to rebuilding societies that had already attained 
industrialization as was done with the Marshall Plan, modernization theorists focused on creating 
a total theory that encapsulated the entire arc of development from a traditional agricultural 
society to a modern industrial society. Aware that a colonial relationship subordinating nations 
on the periphery to the West was impossible, modernization theorists sought to create an 
amicable bond based on consent. Modernization theory served as the underlying logic of the 
Alliance for Progress, Peace Corps, and the Strategic Hamlet Program in Vietnam. This thesis 
argues that although modernization theory certainly had novel aspects, notably its social and 
psychological elements, much of the theory simply consisted of the coalesced logic, 
assumptions, and methods acquired from three previous American experiences with 
development, particularly the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), Point Four Program, and 
occupation of Japan after World War II. I argue that thought concerning development from the 
1930s through the 1960s should be seen as a continuum rather than view modernization theory in 
the 1950s and 1960s as completely novel. Modernization theorists both intentionally and 
unknowingly incorporated into modernization theory the logic, assumptions, and methods 
developed in previous development schemes. 
Chapter Two examines how the democratic decentralized structure of the TVA became 
embedded in post-World War II thought about development as an alternative to communist 
models of development. The chapter also explores TVA director David Lilienthal’s and 
modernization theorists’ emphasis on technology as both harbingers of modernization and 
evidence of modernity.  Chapter Three investigates how Chester Bowles, the director of the Point 
Four Program in India, and modernization theorists used Keynesian economics in their 
development model, arguing that modernization could be induced by government spending in 
agriculture, education, infrastructure, and health and sanitation. Chapter Three also explores how 
Bowles and modernization theorists used an evolutionary theory of development derived from 
America’s past to guide their development in the Third World. Chapter Four examines the 
 
 similarity between what officials of the Japanese occupation and modernization theorists 
considered traditional and modern.  The chapter also explains that both groups believed in the 
universal applicability of the principles of American society.   
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
In his freshman year at Yale, Walt Whitman Rostow declared his intention to create a 
theory of development to counter Karl Marx.  Over the next twenty-five years Rostow developed 
his theory, resulting in the publication in 1960 of his summum, The Stages of Economic Growth: 
A Non-Communist Manifesto.  Rostow was part of a group of intellectuals who, in the 1960s, 
became known collectively as the modernization theorists. Inclusion in the group came by 
contributing to a theory of development known as modernization theory.  Among the ranks were 
political scientists such as Lucian Pye and Cyril Black, sociologists including Daniel Lerner and 
Talcott Parsons, university presidents such as Clark Kerr, and economists such as Rostow and 
Max Millikan. The central goal of the modernization theorists was to construct a theory of 
development that encapsulated all economic, political, social, psychological, and cultural 
changes that occurred during transition from a traditional to a modern society. Although each 
modernization theorist constructed a unique theory of development, they all centered on the same 
fundamental principles. All posited that societies develop along a universal path from an 
agrarian-based traditional society and converge as industrially based modern societies. All 
agreed that the transition entailed change in technology, bureaucratic institutions, and social and 
political structures.1 In addition, all believed that the modernization process could be accelerated 
by concerted intervention.  
The historiography of modernization theory is a difficult subject because the line 
differentiating primary from secondary sources is imprecise. Many of the scholars who 
attempted to historicize modernization theory were themselves scholars with their own theories 
of development, taking part in the debate, initiated by modernization theorists. An early group of 
critics, often linked to the New Left in the United States, became known as the dependency 
theorists. Dependency theorists, such as Raúl Prebisch, Paul Baran, and Andre Gunder Frank, 
took issue with modernization theorists’ argument that all nations were destined to converge on a 
                                                 
1 Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 3. 
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universal end state.2 Dependency theorists argued that all countries were part of a common 
economic system that produced different outcomes or “positions” for different countries. Not all 
countries could become like the contemporary First World because industrialized countries had 
achieved their prosperity at the expense of counties that produced primary products. Without 
another set of countries to play the role they had played in the development of the West, the 
current Third World had little chance of becoming equally industrialized.3  
Conservative critics such as Samuel Huntington, often mistaken for a modernization 
theorist, accepted dependency theorists’ disbelief in development as an inevitable and convergent 
process, but went further by rejecting the “modernity” described by modernization theorists. 
Huntington has pointed out that, in modernization theory, “Increased participation is the key 
element of political development.”4 Huntington, in contrast, described the level of political 
modernization as “the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures,” or amount 
of control the centralized government exerted over its people.5 Absolute control by the 
government was Huntington’s modernity. By his definition, increased participation actually 
caused “political decay” because it often produced ethnic conflicts and civil wars, reducing 
government control and political stability. Huntington’s argument that modernization could both 
progress and regress challenged modernization theorists’ supposition that development was a 
one-way road leading toward modernity. Modernization theorists’ modernity based on full 
political participation became anathema to Huntington and his concept of modernity. Rather than 
promote democracy, he actively defended the usefulness of military dictatorships in the Third 
World.6 
Huntington is identifiable as a scholar that both criticized modernization theory and 
proposed his own theory on development; however, in the twenty-first century, historians 
                                                 
2 Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (London: Penguin, 1957); Andre Gunder Frank, “The 
Development of Underdevelopment,” Monthly Review 18:4 (1966); Raúl Prebisch, The Economic Development of 
Latin America and Its Principal Problem (New York: United Nations, 1950). 
3 Gilman, 234-237. 
4 Samuel P. Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay,” World Politics 17:3 (April 1965): 
388. 
5 Ibid., 393. 
6 Huntington fully developed his themes in Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1968). 
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produced a wealth of new scholarship attempting to understand modernization theory within the 
post-World War II context, without attempting to formulate their own theories of development. 
The two most important works were Michael Latham’s Modernization as Ideology (2000) and 
Nils Gilman’s Mandarins of the Future (2003).7 Latham’s major contribution was to identify 
modernization theory as an ideology, “a broader worldview, a constellation of mutually 
reinforcing ideas that often framed policy goals through a definition of the nation’s ideals, 
history, and mission.”8 Latham objected to scholars such as Gabriel Kolko who argued that 
America’s confrontation with the Third World was little more than an “overwhelming pursuit of 
its national interests, economic above all,” and marginalized policymakers’ “declarations of 
belief” by describing them as cant.9 Latham also objected to scholars such as George F. Kennan, 
Hans Morgenthau, and John Lewis Gaddis, who focused on the “state as a central actor” globally 
pursuing and exercising power. Latham has pointed out that these scholars often referred to 
“national interests,” “vital interests,” and “international realities,” evaluating policymakers by 
their success protecting America from “clear, external threats.”10  Modernization as Ideology is a 
reaction against scholars who divorced or insulated presidential administrations from American 
culture and claimed that policymakers reacted to objective and clearly defined threats.  In 
agreement with anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who argued that ideologies are the “rational 
ordering of cultural symbols to determine behavior in any given circumstance,” Latham argued 
                                                 
7 Other important works include: David Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, and Michael Latham, 
eds., Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2003); David Engerman, Modernization from the Other Shore: American Observers and the 
Costs of Soviet Economic Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Christian Appy, ed., Cold 
War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1966 (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2000); Ron Theodore Robin, The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the 
Military-Intellectual Complex (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); and Mark Haefele, “Walt Rostow, 
Modernization, and Vietnam: Stages of Theoretical Growth.” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard, 2000). 
8 Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the 
Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 12. 
9 Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World (New York: Pantheon, 1988), 12, 128; quoted in Latham, 12. 
William Appleman Williams and Walter LaFeber were other historians that emphasized policymakers’ economic 
concerns over all other criteria. In America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006, 10th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 
2006). LaFeber claimed: “U.S. aid was given in such a way that it made the rich richer and the poor poorer.”  
10 Latham, 12. 
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that ideology served as the cognitive framework, determining threats and providing acceptable 
solutions.11 He illustrated his point by examining how modernization theory helped identify the 
issues, define the goals, and determine the efforts, within the Peace Corps, Alliance for Progress, 
and Strategic Hamlet Program in Vietnam. 
Latham was first to identify modernization as an ideology but Nils Gilman has thus far 
provided the most comprehensive study of modernization theory in Mandarins of the Future. 
Gilman, an intellectual historian, first argued that modernization theory was a “manifestation of 
American postwar liberalism.”12 Gilman delineated the way in which the theory was a 
continuation of intellectual debates (i.e., the “end of ideology” debate within sociology, nature of 
democracy in political science, and consensus in history) that dominated scholarly discourse in 
the decades following World War II. To illustrate his point, Gilman traced the institutional 
development of modernization theory in “an academic think tank (the Harvard Department of 
Social Relations), a funded research committee (the Social Science Research Council), and an 
academic think tank with strong government ties (Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s 
Center for International Studies).”13  
Collectively Latham and Gilman demonstrated the way in which modernization theory 
was not only a product of the postwar period, but also a manifestation of assumptions and 
ideological traditions “deeply embedded in American culture” stretching back to  Manifest 
Destiny, the frontier thesis, and New Deal Liberalism.14 While Latham identified modernization 
theory as an ideology, and Gilman positioned it in the intellectual milieu of the postwar era, I 
intend to extend the historiography by revealing evidence of this kind of thinking in the TVA, 
Point Four Program, and occupation of Japan after World War II.  I argue that the reemergence 
of similar logic, assumptions, and beliefs demonstrates a pervasive American culture that 
resurfaced when Americans were confronted with the perceived need to modernize in the mid-
twentieth century. By examining both domestic and international projects of development, 
directed by both liberals (David Lilienthal and Chester Bowles) and a conservative (Douglas 
                                                 
11 Christopher T. Fisher, “Nation Building and the Vietnam War: A Historiography,” Pacific Historical 
Review 74:3 (2005): 443. 
12 Gilman, 4. 
13 Gilman, 4. 
14 Latham, 6, 13-14, 91, 93-94, 108, 145, 211, 220. 
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MacArthur), I hope my work will help identify the ubiquitous American culture that shaped and 
influenced theorists on development.  By identifying similar logic, assumptions, and beliefs, I 
argue that the thinking about development in the 1950s and 1960s must be understood as a 
continuation of thought spanning back to the New Deal.  Rather than view the history of thought 
on development on an administration-by-administration basis, this work suggests that it must be 
understood as a culminating effort, reflecting American thought and culture in general, not as the 
work of any specific administration. Modernization theory, as it manifested in the 1950s and 
1960s, did not exist in its totality during the 1930s and 1940s, but enough similar ideas and 
methods were present to distinguish an evolving American ideology of development present 
during these four decades.  
Scholars who focus on domestic American history may find my work helpful because a 
similar set of ideas, assumption, and beliefs can be found in domestic reform efforts such as the 
Great Society.15 Scholars of foreign policy may find my work helpful because it is an effort to 
break down analytical barriers that separate international policy from domestic culture. Latham 
started the effort of breaking down established barriers by identifying “modernization for peace” 
(the Peace Corps) and “modernization at war” (the Strategic Hamlet Program).  Historian 
Christopher T. Fisher has explained that the connection of modernization theory to the Strategic 
Hamlet Program is important because “historiography has traditionally assigned it distinctly to 
pacification, which was synonymous with both combat and counterinsurgency.”16 Latham’s 
effort breaks down the barrier between military historians and social and cultural historians as I 
hope to break down barriers between domestic culture and foreign policy. The cumulative effort 
may bring a fresh perspective to American history in the twentieth century and reveal the value 
of studying development.  
Although modernization theory certainly had novel aspects, notably the social, cultural, 
and psychological elements, much of it was simply the coalesced logic, assumptions, and 
methods acquired from previous American experiences with development including the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the Point Four Program, and the U.S. occupation of Japan 
after World War II. Examination of these three programs reveals within them some common 
                                                 
15 Christopher T. Fisher, “ ‘The Hopes of Man’: The Cold War, Modernization Theory, and the Issue of 
Race in the 1960s” (Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 2002). 
16 Fisher, 449. 
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aspects of an enduring American method of development. Modernization theorists continued the 
tradition, whether intentionally or unknowingly, by incorporating logic, assumptions, and 
methods developed in previous development schemes into modernization theory. Modernization 
theorists derived from the TVA an emphasis on democratization, decentralization, and science 
and technology as both evidence of and harbingers of modernization. TVA director David 
Lilienthal emphasized material prosperity as a prerequisite to modernization. The Point Four 
Program director in India, Chester Bowles, also argued for the necessity of material abundance 
and democracy but added a concept called the Community Development Program. Bowles’ idea 
of Community Development, in which individuals contributed to planning the program for their 
own village, not only fostered democracy and nationalism by connecting villagers to the 
government but also simultaneously sought to improve agriculture, education, health, and 
infrastructure to accelerate development. Both Bowles and modernization theorists founded their 
theories in Keynesian economics. John Maynard Keynes, a British economist that was influential 
in America during the mid-twentieth century, identified areas, such as agriculture, education, 
health, and infrastructure, which the government could improve in order to stimulate the 
economy. Modernization theorists also prescribed improvement in these specific areas.  From the 
occupation of Japan, theorists took an example of modernization imposed by a military, led by a 
single leader, Douglas MacArthur. Embedded in occupation authorities’ efforts in Japan were 
conceptions about modernity and tradition that were very similar to those later identified by 
modernization theorists.  
Development of the Third World became a major U.S. policy objective during the Cold 
War.  Historian Christopher Simpson has claimed that, “contrary to common assumptions, the 
‘ideological offensive’ has been at least as central to U.S. national security strategy since 1945 as 
the atomic bomb.”17 Although the invention of nuclear weapons escalated war’s potential scope 
and destructiveness, it also pushed policymakers toward less bellicose strategies.  Less bellicose 
strategies were important because policymakers desired some form of control over the world 
situation and from 1945 to 1960 forty independent nations, with a population of more than 800 
million, emerged from colonial rule. Within the context of the global Cold War, U.S. 
                                                 
17 Christopher Simpson, ed., Universities and Empire: Money and Politics in the Social Sciences During 
the Cold War (New York: The Free Press, 1998), xvii. 
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policymakers believed it was imperative to prevent the spread of communism into the Third 
World including the newly independent countries. Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Secretary of State, 
Dean Rusk, stated in a news conference on May 4, 1961: “If you don’t pay attention to the 
periphery, the periphery changes.  And the first thing you know the periphery is the center.”18 Or 
as Lyndon Johnson said in a speech on April 20, 1964, “surrender anywhere threatens defeat 
everywhere.”19 Policymakers sought to deny Soviet influence and turn emerging countries into 
friendly democratic nations.  Development attained strategic significance. In the global setting, 
American policymakers sought the allegiance of the greatest part of the globe. They figured that 
the more capitalist countries there were, the easier it would be to prevent the spread of 
communism, and the more isolated and weaker the Soviet Union would be.20 To achieve this 
end, the government funded academics and their research.   
Funding provided modernization theorists with the opportunity to develop their ideas.  
From 1955 to 1959 federal funding to university research doubled and by 1968 funding 
sextupled from its 1959 level.  In addition, private foundations such as the Ford Foundation, 
Carnegie Corporation, and various Rockefeller brothers’ organizations sponsored university 
research.21 Policymakers realized that nuclear weapons were impotent in the battle for the Third 
World. Therefore they provided funding to academics to formulate a nonviolent method to win 
the hearts and minds of the Third World. They also wanted to prevent socialist or communist 
nationalistic aspirations and revolutions. The result was a growing linkage of government with 
the academic community.  All three of the institutions instrumental in the creation of 
modernization theory received vast amounts of government funding.  
Inspired by a need to provide useful knowledge to their government, modernization 
theorists engaged in an effort to create a systematic blueprint of development by synthesizing all 
changes—psychological, social, economic, and cultural—that occurred in the transition from an 
agriculturally based traditional society to an industrially based modern society.  Theorists who 
were convinced that all societies develop along a universal path and converge at the exact same 
                                                 
18 Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 152. 
19 Ibid., 152. 
20 Ibid., 152. 
21 Howard Brick, Age of Contradiction: American Thought & Culture in the 1960s (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1998), 8. 
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end state were interested in what modernization theorist Daniel Lerner called “the historical 
sequence of Western growth.”22 Theorists used the categories of traditional and modern to 
measure each society’s level of development and promote modernization in areas deemed 
traditional.  Modernization theorist James Coleman characterized a modern society as one with 
a comparatively high degree of urbanization, widespread literacy, comparatively high per capita income, 
extensive geographical and social mobility, a relatively high degree of commercialization and 
industrialization of the economy, an extensive and penetrative network of mass communication media, and in 
general, by widespread participation and involvement by members of the society in modern social and 
economic processes.23 
 
Traditional society and individuals within it, by contrast, were non-scientific or 
characterized by a pre-Newtonian rationality, locally oriented, tenaciously connected with an 
extended family network, neither geographically nor socially mobile, religious, agrarian, non-
industrialized, unable or unopen to adapt, stratified along social and gender lines, respectful of 
age over merit, economically simple, holding no adherence to universal time or strict schedules, 
unconnected to national or international media, and non-participatory in politics.24 
Many of these traits that modernization theorists considered traditional had already been 
classified as such in the occupation of Japan after World War II. To identify Japanese 
characteristics in need of reform for the Japanese to become a fully modern nation, the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), Douglas MacArthur and other occupation authorities 
relied on cultural anthropologist Ruth Benedict’s The Chrysanthemum and the Sword.25  
Benedict described Japanese society as permeated by feudalism, which arrested Japan’s 
modernization. Predating but anticipating the concept of “traditional” that was used in 
modernization theory, Benedict claimed that feudalism, held together by the imperial system, 
                                                 
22 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, with an introduction by 
David Riesman (London: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1958; The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 46. 
23 Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1960), 532. 
24 C.E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1966), 9-25; Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six 
Developing Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 19-32. 
25 Olivier Zunz, Why the American Century? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 164; Ruth 
Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture, with a forward by Ian Buruma 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005). 
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stunted the growth of a scientific critical spirit, maintained a religious society, prevented a 
participatory polity, encouraged peerage, denied social and economic mobility, and maintained a 
cohesive family structure including extensive involvement with extended relatives. Each of these 
categories was, in turn, targeted for reform through revision of the Japanese Constitution. As in 
modernization theory, occupation authorities’ target was epitomized by the contemporary United 
States society, conveniently the opposite of Benedict’s Japan.  
Modernization differed from Modernism.  Modernism was a culture—a collection of 
related “ideas, beliefs, values, and modes of perception”—that emerged around the beginning of 
the twentieth century.26  Modernism included writers like James Joyce and T. S. Eliot, painters 
like Theo van Doesburg and Piet Mondrian, architects like Walter Gropius and Mies van der 
Rohe, and philosophers like Friedrich Nietzsche and William James.  Modernization, by contrast, 
was a process of development and transition. Although modernization theorists used the term 
modernism, they intended it to signify the process of becoming like the modern nations of the 
West—technologically advanced, industrialized, economically complex, and urban—not the 
process of becoming a Modernist. Western countries were “modern,” Western experts working 
on Third World development were “modernizers,” and the zenith of development was 
“modernity”; modernization was the manifestation of rather than the response to, as Gilman puts 
it, “the technological and material dimension of bourgeois society” that characterized 
Modernists. 27  While modernization theorists believed that they could uncover universal 
objective truths, Modernists distrusted most forms of definite knowledge. Victorianism, the 
culture against which Modernism rebelled, attempted to permanently dichotomize the world.  A 
person was either a savage or civilized.  The savage could acquire Victorian traits and attitudes 
but could never truly become civilized.28 Modernists sought to eliminate the 
compartmentalization of knowledge and reality. Historians Malcolm Bradbury and James 
McFarlane argue that Modernists held the threefold goal of fragmenting Victorian categories and 
absolutes, re-integrating the fragments in novel ways, and finally blending the pieces into a 
                                                 
26 Daniel Walker Howe, “American Victorianism as a Culture,” American Quarterly 27:5 (December 
1975): 528. 
27 Gilman, 7. 
28 Howe, 528. 
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seamless creation.29 In this sense modernization theorists benefited from Modernists’ effort to 
break down Victorian barriers. Savages could now become civilized.  Modernism made 
modernization theory possible.30  
If Modernism paved the way, the intellectual milieu of the postwar United States was the 
immediate spur to modernization theory. The complexity of the modernization process 
demanded a “total” theory.  To explain development fully, modernization theorists used all fields 
of knowledge including sociology, history, political science, psychology, and anthropology.  As 
a result, theorists’ ideas were in line with the prevalent trends and interpretations within each 
subject.  Theorists took from and became involved in the debate over the “end of ideology” 
within sociology, consensus history within the historical profession, and the “elite theory of 
democracy” within political science. 
The “end of ideology” debate inspired and solidified modernization theorists’ belief that 
their theory was an objective and accurate formulation.  The term first appeared in an American 
setting in Edward Shils’ paper “The End of Ideology?” describing the 1954 Congress of Cultural 
Freedom in Milan. The meeting included an amalgam of Western intellectuals devoted to 
combating ideology, specifically that of the Soviets.31  Shils, a future modernization theorist, 
borrowed the term from French philosopher Raymond Aron and used it to describe the apparent 
lack of ideological disagreement among the intellectuals in attendance. Shils interpreted the 
consensus to signify that Western-style social democracy had surpassed all intellectual discord 
over fundamental questions.  By eliminating discord, Western society proved itself to be the only 
way to properly organize society.  Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset furthered Shils’ 
logical conclusion.  Lipset argued that the West had solved all major systematic disagreements. 
He claimed: “the workers have achieved industrial and political citizenship; the conservatives 
have accepted the welfare state; and the democratic left has recognized that an increase in over-
all state power carries with it more dangers to freedom than solutions to economic problem.”32 
Bell and Lipset concluded that all remaining problems were technical and would be solved by 
                                                 
29 Daniel Joseph Singal, “Toward a Definition of American Modernism,” American Quarterly 39:1 (1987). 
30 Ibid., 7-26. 
31 Peter Watson, The Modern Mind: An Intellectual History of the 20th Century (New York: Perennial 
Press, 2001), 447-448. 
32 Gilman, 58. 
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objective social scientists and technocrats. In identifying the end of ideology, Bell was referring 
to the West.  He recognized that ideology remained prevalent in Asia, South America, and 
Africa.  He believed that the task of the West was to lead non-Western countries toward the 
inevitable final result, a post-ideological welfare democracy comprised of decentralized power, 
mixed economy, and political pluralism.33 Modernization theorists took from the debate on the 
end of ideology a confirmation that the West embodied the end state of development. They also 
thought that Western intellectuals and technocrats stood above ideology and could lead non-
Western countries toward modernity. 
In addition to drawing from sociology, modernization theorists participated in and 
borrowed from developments within the historical profession.  What was called consensus 
history dominated American historical scholarship from the late forties until the early sixties. 
The consensus interpretation of history replaced the Progressive interpretation personified by 
Charles Beard. Progressives had emphasized conflict and struggle between the haves and have-
nots as the driving force of history.  In contrast, consensus historians, including Louis Hartz, 
Daniel Boorstin, and David Potter, emphasized what unified Americans, not what divided them.  
Historians minimized major conflicts within American history and portrayed American history 
as amicable progress.  For example, in The Age of Reform, Richard Hofstadter described 
Populists not as agriculturalists with legitimate grievances but as nostalgic nativists and anti-
Semitics suffering from what psychologist Erik Erikson called an “identity crisis.” Hofstadter 
thought that the conflict that these people had experienced did not represent a truly ideological 
conflict within American history.34 Allan Nevins removed labor conflict from American history 
by transforming the image of the robber barons from avaricious businessmen to individuals 
whose contributions to American’s military power and victory in World War II far outweighed 
their shortcomings.35  Few radical interpretations appeared in the mainstream historical 
scholarship of the 1940s and 1950s. Modernization theorists accepted the conception of 
                                                 
33 Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (Glencoe: Free 
Press, 1960), 401-404. 
34 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 337-39.  
35 Ibid., 342; Allan Nevins, “Should American History be Rewritten?,” Saturday Review of Literature 38 
(February 1954): 177-78. 
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American history confidently offered by consensus historians and used it to construct the 
category of “modern” within modernization theory.  The acceptance of an American past with 
little conflict allowed modernization theorists to concoct confidently a theory of development 
free of violence and revolution.  The premise that development could be non-violent attracted 
policymakers who feared revolutions; they worried not only because revolutions could not be 
controlled by current authorities but also because revolutions might escalate into a global hot 
war.36 
One historical development that offered encouragement to modernization theorists and 
became prominent with them was the Tennessee Valley Authority.  The TVA was a New Deal 
program that constructed dams on the Tennessee River for the benefit of the valley and its 
residents. Historian David Ekbladh has claimed that most Americans considered the valley and 
its residents backward compared to the rest of the “modern” country.37 The TVA generated and 
distributed electricity, manufactured fertilizer, improved agriculture, and enhanced educational 
programs.  To modernize the region, director David Lilienthal relied on a formula combining 
science and technology, democracy, and decentralization.  After World War II, inconsistencies 
between Lilienthal’s democratic rhetoric and the actual operation of the TVA were marginalized. 
The material successes of the TVA endeared it to modernization theorists who were considering 
the problems of development of the poverty-beset Third World. The TVA became a distinctly 
American, yet supposedly universal, model of development to be emulated throughout the world.  
The increased material prosperity from the TVA resounded with modernization theorists 
such as Walt Rostow and Max Millikan because, relying on consensus historian David Potter’s 
People of Plenty,38  they believed abundance was required for a peaceful development process 
and stable end state.  Here Potter attempted to identify democracy as the fundamental element in 
American national character.  He argued that history shaped culture which in turn shaped 
                                                 
36 Hunt, 159. 
37 David Ekbladh, “Mr. TVA: Grass-Roots Development, David Lilienthal, and the Rise and Fall of The 
Tennessee Valley Authority as a Symbol for U.S. Overseas Development, 1933-1973,” Diplomatic History 26:3 
(2002): 337. 
38Gilman, 67. Historian Nils Gilman pointed out that Rostow relied specifically on People of Plenty for his 
argument in a book-length unpublished essay entitled “The Making of Modern America.” 
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national character.39  Secure in the consensus belief that there was relatively little conflict in the 
American past, Potter argued that the United States’ abundance had mitigated conflict, enabled 
social mobility and equality, and made democracy in the United States particularly effective.40   
Abundance prevented socialism and secured democracy.  Potter’s argument convinced Rostow 
and Millikan that, as historian Nils Gilman has put it, "economic growth provided the solution to 
political strife.”41   In contrast to Boorstin’s and Hartz’s arguments for American exceptionalism 
and a unique past, Potter's abundance thesis supported development programs, like the TVA, that 
aimed at augmenting material prosperity and gave a justification for a universal model for 
producing democracy, a model modernization theorists considered ideal to export worldwide. 
In addition to drawing from sociology and history, modernization theorists used ideas 
prevalent in political science in the late 1940s and 1950s.  Postwar political scientists redefined 
democracy.  They did so for two reasons: first, the rise of “People’s Republics” and “People’s 
Democracies” alarmed Americans who considered individual liberty and freedom to be the 
centerpieces of democracy; and, second, the popularity of European communist parties prodded 
political scientists to rethink the supposed “universal” appeal of democracy and decipher why 
many Europeans were turning to socialist and communist remedies. A book published during 
World War II but which gained high popularity in the postwar period among political scientists 
was economist Joseph Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942).  
Schumpeter, a leading conservative and anti-communist economist, encapsulated what would 
become known as the revisionist conception of democracy.  Schumpeter fashioned a new 
conception of democracy predicated upon the belief that it was impractical for common citizen to 
have complete participation in every aspect of the political decision-making process.  
Schumpeter believed that common citizens could not participate in everything for two reasons: 
first, because of the government’s esoteric rules and regulations; and, second, because mass 
participation could create dangerously volatile swings in policy.  According to historian Irene 
Gendzier, Schumpeter called for a “procedural rather than substantive definition of 
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democracy”42  and focused “less on the objectives of democratic systems than on the processes 
involved in their implementation.  Attention was paid to institutions, electoral processes, and to 
the nature of leadership, its [leaders’] decision making skills, and prerogatives.”43 Because 
complete participation caused capriciousness and required time and effort to educate citi
how government works, Schumpeter delegated to the polity only the responsibility to elect th
representatives with the expertise most relevant to the present situation.
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44 Politics simply b
a competition among elites, or experts, for political positions.  Upon election, representatives—
actually, members of elite groups—would make all decisions for the people.  
Postwar political scientists also reinterpreted the meaning of participati
War II scholars interpreted nonvoting as a sign of dissatisfaction with the political system
postwar scholars, including Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in The Civic Culture, interpreted 
voters’ choice to not vote as support for the political process.45   Almond and Verba believed that
if dissatisfaction existed the polity would actively participate in the political process to change 
the situation.  The revisionist scholars’ problem was that their elitist and non-participatory mod
seemed like the “People’s Republics.”  To distinguish themselves, scholars emphasized 
pluralism.  Pluralism meant that elites within a democracy did not constitute a monolithic
as they did in communist countries; instead, various elites, as Gilman put it, “would compete and
share political power.”46   The elite, non-participatory, pluralist model perfectly suited 
modernization theorists, who were convinced that a combination of qualified experts co
traditional societies through a peaceful and controlled transition toward modernity.   
A belief in pluralism also prevailed in the policies used in the American occup
notably with reference to the Japanese educational system. Modernization theorists 
recapitulated an elitist theory of democracy similar to that which authorities of the occupati
tried to create in Japan without acknowledging it. Colonel Kermit R. Dyke, the director of the 
Civil Information and Education Section (CIE), in charge of educational reform, acknowledged
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the effects of feudalism and peerage on the Japanese leadership.  At the time of Japan’s 
surrender, eighty-five percent of government bureaucrats had graduated from Tokyo Imp
University.
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47 Feudalism allowed the same families and groups to retain power generation after
generation.  Furthermore, the military had overwhelming control over the educational curriculu
and the accepted interpretation within each subject.  The interpretation of history, geography, and 
ethics was especially nationalistic and militaristic and was intended to facilitate the war effort. 
The CIE sought to remove militaristic influences and to break Tokyo Imperial University’s 
monopoly on education by increasing the number and importance of institutions of higher 
learning and by encouraging local and regional development of educational curricula.48  CI
intended not to exclude educated elites from positions of power but create pluralism by provid
a cross-fertilization of knowledge, derived from various institutions of higher learning. 
As illustrated by the impact of political science, history, and sociology on moder
 the theory was as much a product of the contemporary American intellectual milieu and 
Americans’ definitions of themselves as it was about the Third World countries they described.  
By placing America at the apex of development, theorists described all other countries by 
whether they fulfilled the theorists’ conception of America.49   
The theorists’ ethnocentrism was unconscious.  During t
ans that they alone held and promulgated the truth was particularly acute.  They believed
that the Soviets were dishonest and that they upheld a positive image of their communist utopia 
only through propaganda and the truth-repressing “Iron Curtain.” Modernization theorists 
differed little from the American public; theorists believed that only their theory represente
objective analysis while ideology tainted communist schemes for development. Modernizatio
theory developed with a “positivist persuasion” in academia in an era that University of 
 
47 Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan: September 1945 to September 1948. Report of 
Government Section: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1949), xxxi. 
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Democracy in Japan: The Occupation Government, 1945-1952, ed. Dennis Merrill (Bethesda: University 
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California Chancellor Clark Kerr termed the New Enlightenment.50  Grounded in the 
Enlightenment ideals of order, planning, and mastery—and influenced by Enlightenment 
thinkers such as Marquis de Condorcet and Jean-Jacques Rousseau—theorists believed that their 
theory, like science, uncovered universal laws of development and the existence of a master 
design. The laws were derived from the Western experience and were applicable worldwide.51  
For example, Daniel Lerner argued in 1964 that the “same basic model reappears in virtually all 
modernizing societies on all continents of the world, regardless of variations in race, color, 
creed.”52  
Modernization theorists’ claims of objectivity had financial benefits as well. The hard 
sciences, such as physics, chemistry, and engineering, were receiving the bulk of federal research 
funding because their discoveries offered tangible contributions to the Cold War effort; 
modernization theorists’ insistence on the scientific character of their own research and on its 
supposed objectivity partly came from a need to justify their contributions to the Cold War effort 
and secure federal research funding. Theorists argued that the vexing problem of development 
required an objective analysis and explanation that only they could provide. The objectivity 
argument made modernization theory appear relevant to policymakers.53 Rather than a scam to 
secure funding from the government, theorists truly believed that their theories were objective 
and wanted the government to recognize their objectivity, as the hard sciences had achieved.    
As self-proclaimed objective experts, theorists believed that they could identify the 
catalysts of progress and then peacefully, safely, and efficiently accelerate the modernization of 
traditional countries while avoiding pitfalls discovered during the West’s historical development.  
In a speech at Dobbs Ferry, New York in 1959, Karl Deutsch claimed that traditional societies 
could achieve generations’ worth of development in mere decades.  Although theorists were in 
basic harmony on the characteristics of a modern and traditional society, many differed on which 
catalyst best stimulated modernization.  Walt Rostow and Max Millikan, relying on Potter’s 
ideas about the impact of abundance, argued that modernization depended on the accrual of 
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wealth.54  They identified five areas that, with the help of the West, could be improved to spur 
modernization.  Traditional societies needed to mobilize capital, develop technical know-how to 
use efficient new technology, use science to conquer nature’s perils, expand trade to create 
surpluses, and solidify partnerships with modern societies.55  Daniel Lerner argued that 
increasing the amount of information from the mass media combined with literacy best 
stimulated modernization.  He asserted that mass media increased peoples’ awareness of their 
political and material situation, which in turn drove them to demand democracy and capitalism.  
Lerner also argued that international awareness inspired empathy among the people of the 
country and inspired them to act and formulate opinions based on modern international, as 
opposed to local, standards.56 Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith argued that industrialization and 
the impact of factory regimentation, technocracy, rationalization, and division of labor on the 
population instilled modernity.57  Although modernization theorists disagreed on what exactly 
spurred modernization, they all agreed that traditional societies were malleable and that qualified 
experts would guide the transition from a traditional to a modern society.  
Both the belief in a model of universal development and a commitment to the specific 
catalysts to hasten development that would later be outlined in modernization theory had already 
appeared in the Point Four Program.  Chester Bowles, the American ambassador and director of 
the Point Four Program in India from 1950 to 1953, had formulated a three-stage universal 
model of development. He claimed that the first stage had started in the United States around 
1800.  At that time America could best be classified as ruggedly individualistic but accepting of 
an effective federal government. America moved to the second stage during the 1860s.  The 
second stage was marked by an increased social cohesiveness ushered in by industrialism and by 
new methods of transportation and communication. America moved into the third and final phase 
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during the New Deal. The third phase was characterized by an acceptance of a strong federal 
government and public intervention in the economy.58 Bowles went on to argue that the 
American experience was “similar in many ways to what we now see being undertaken in much 
of Asia, Africa, and South America, where the social structure is beginning to feel the full impact 
of the industrial revolution which we faced a century ago.”59  
Bowles also aimed at the same pillars of tradition to accelerate development. Through the 
activities of the Community Development Program, Bowles demonstrated to both Americans and 
Indians the advantages of science and technology. Within Community Development projects, 
American technicians demonstrated how science and technology could improve agriculture, 
education, and health. Technicians also sought increase the technical know-how of Indians 
through the demonstrations and by enrolling them in educational programs. In the logic of 
Bowles and later modernization theorists, these two things stimulated and accelerated 
modernization.  The bond between American experts and Third World populations was also vital 
in both Point Four and modernization theory. 
Modernization theory relied on enlightened experts to accelerate the modernization 
process to “engender a new consciousness as well as a new society.”60  Although the people 
never held much power themselves to direct modernization, historian Nils Gilman points out that 
the little power they did have steadily eroded as modernization moved from technocosmopolitan 
to a revolutionary and finally to an authoritarian form.61 Advocates of technocosmopolitan 
modernization, which dominated immediately after World War II, believed that modernization 
could occur through existing institutions and social dynamics.62  These advocates agreed with 
the rhetoric of both Harry Truman’s and John Kennedy’s inaugural addresses that the U.S. 
should simply “help people help themselves.”  Educators should help to spread literacy, 
                                                 
58 Chester Bowles, American Politics in a Revolutionary World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1956),  ix, 12, 26. 
59 Ibid., 26. 
60 Nils Gilman, “Modernization Theory: The Highest Stage of American Intellectual History,” in Staging 
Growth: Modernization Development, and the Global Cold War, eds. David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. 
Haefele, and Michael E. Latham (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 9. 
61 Gilman, 9. 
62 Ibid., 9. 
 18
agronomists should improve crop yields, and sanitation experts should ameliorate health, all 
components of modernization, but the existing institutions should remain.  The refo
technocosmopolitanism was gradually replaced by revolutionary modernization.  The 
revolutionary modernists sought to replace immediately the antiquated organization of traditional 
society with modern Western organization.  Relying on their belief that all humans are the same, 
revolutionary modernists believed that modern organization would take root and flourish if 
immediately imposed on traditional societies.  The new state apparatus would then guide society 
toward modernity.  As the modernization process proved to be slower than expected in the high-
stakes Cold War, theorists such as Lucian Pye advocated authoritarian modernization.  Pye 
accepted authoritarianism and military dictatorships as viable methods to force traditional 
societies through a rapid transition to modernity; democracy could justifiably be deferred until 
the social, cultural, and economic setting had taken root.
rm agenda of 
                                                
63 
Pye and other theorists took MacArthur’s actions in Japan as evidence that authoritarian 
modernization could succeed. As Supreme Commander, Macarthur had full control over the 
occupation. Accordingly he instituted immediate constitutional reform to eliminate Japan’s 
feudalistic structure and rapidly accelerate Japan toward modernity. The fact that the Japanese 
had only hesitantly accepted the new constitution but later came to enthusiastically embrace its 
principles demonstrated the way in which imposed foreign concepts could flourish in a non-
modern society. The occupation lent credence to the view that Western modernity was universal 
and to a sense of how it could be achieved. 
In the turbulent times of the late 1960s, modernization theorists approved MacArthur’s 
method of politically imposing modernization; economically, theorists accepted Keynesianism 
and rejected neo-classical economic theories of purely economic development. Geographers 
Richard Peet and Elaine Hartwick have described neo-classical economists’ theories as “a 
science shorn of sociological and historical material, abstract in conception, universal in 
application, technical and mathematical in methodology.”64  Neo-classical economists such as 
W.S. Jevons, Carl Menger, Leon Walras, Friedrich von Wieser, Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk, and 
J.B. Clark used the idea of marginal utility to theorize how prices for labour and commodities 
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were set by supply and demand. Jevons, Menger, and Walras essentially argued that demand 
determined price.  Wieser, Bohm-Bawerk, and Clark accepted that demand was a factor in 
determining price, but added that production was just as important. A person’s dissatisfaction 
with work might lead him or her to reduce their hours, therefore decrease their income, and 
hence their demand for various luxury products. Despite their differences, they agreed that the 
economy could best be analyzed by model-based formalist rigor.65 Modernization theorists 
contested neo-classical economists’ argument that social factors were subordinate to economics. 
Although industrialization could be imposed on traditional societies, modern social values could 
not.  Neo-classical economists lacked a method to account for social forces and non-rational 
individuals. Talcott Parsons and Walt Rostow argued that non-rational social propensities existed 
within each society and that these propensities dictated the penetration and effectiveness of 
industrialization.  According to Rostow societies without the propensities to consume, accept 
innovations, seek material advance, or apply science for economic ends had little chance of 
achieving economic modernity.66 Historian Nils Gilman has explained that Rostow believed that 
“the economies of these largely peasants societies were inseparable from local cultures, social 
structures, and political institutions.”67  Theorists agreed with neo-classical economists that 
economic growth was vital to development, but, if they were to confidently control growth, they 
required a theory that would account for non-economic factors that hindered or stimulated 
growth. Lucian Pye explained that “economic criteria are not unimportant and certainly should 
not be casually disregarded, but they are not adequate for....our policy toward the 
underdeveloped areas.”68 Theorists required an omni-disciplinary approach to measure 
modernity, one that understood development as a conceptual whole including economic, social, 
and psychological factors.   
Modernization theorists’ confidence can also be characterized as a product of and 
response to the “Age of Anxiety.”  In 1947, Anglo-American poet W.H Auden wrote the “Age of 
Anxiety,” describing a man’s quest to discover his own identity and mission within a rapidly 
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changing and industrializing New York.  Like Auden’s character, modernization theorists 
suffered from a deep-seated anxiety as they developed and carried out their ideas.   With postwar 
Europe devastated, temporarily diminishing its ability to lead, and the Cold War under way, 
Americans believed that they were thrust into a global leadership role.  Government officials 
often depended on academics to define America’s national identity and mission within the 
postwar context.  However from the mid-forties to the mid-sixties Americans suffered from an 
identity crisis.  Americans at once embraced the image of governmental competence and 
McCarthyism, policy-creating academics and intellectual autonomy and objectivity, social 
conformity and racial conflict, promising nuclear-powered inventions and nuclear holocaust, 
increased participation in mass society and augmented individualism, and adherence to systems 
theory and anti-systemic sentiment.69 Modernization theorists, believing themselves global 
leaders and the world’s best hope, chose to highlight the positive and deny the negative aspects 
of their unstable identity.  The theorists were more influenced by the congratulatory and 
affirmative trend in postwar America than by negative self-images.  
The various works of modernization theorists coalesced into a general theory by the end 
of the 1950s. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations then used the conceptual framework 
provided by theorists as a guidepost for the Alliance for Progress, Peace Corps, and Strategic 
Hamlet Program.70 However, embedded in modernization theory were assumptions, methods, 
and logic already in existence in previous American development schemes, notably, the TVA, 
occupation of Japan, and Point Four Program.  
Modernization theorists sometimes knowingly and sometimes unintentionally replicated 
previously developed themes.  From the TVA, theorists found a model of development distinctly 
American and, in their eyes, universally applicable. The themes expounded on by Lilienthal—
democratization, decentralization, and science and technology as catalysts to development—
struck a cord with modernization theorists.  Democracy simultaneously fulfilled an essential 
characteristic of modernity, set the American theory of development apart from Soviet schemes, 
and eased the mind of former colonial subjects. America’s scientific and technological 
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wonderland was to enhance the desire of Third World populations to become more like the U.S. 
and not the U.S.S.R.  
The Point Four Program also brought American scientific and technical expertise into 
contact with the Third World population but added a plan of action. The plan, founded on 
Keynesian economics, directed Third World governments to invest public money in agriculture, 
education, health and sanitation, and infrastructure to spur economic growth. Economic 
prosperity, wrought by government spending, would provide the foundation for sustained and 
irreversible transition into full modernity.   
The structure of authority in the occupation of Japan convinced authoritarian modernizers 
of the 1960s of the likely success of similar projects in the future.  In addition, the reforms in the 
educational system during the occupation provided a means to achieve a pluralist democracy 
after the occupation ended. Rather than just being a coincidence, the re-emergence of certain 
themes may lend credence to enduring cultural assumptions about what was traditional, modern, 
and how the transition between them could best take place.
 22
  
CHAPTER 2 - TVA in the Depression Years: American Archetype of 
Grass-Roots Democracy for Global Application 
Political Scientist James C. Scott aptly described the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 
as the “granddaddy of all regional development projects.”71 Created within the chaotic first 
hundred days of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first term, the TVA was an organization designed to 
bring prosperity to an area of the United States that, according to historian David Ekbladh, was 
commonly thought of as economically backward and stagnant.72 To accomplish this goal, TVA 
directors used economic, agricultural, and educational experts to promote prosperity through the 
construction of dams, the generation of electricity, flood control, agricultural development, 
manufacturing of fertilizer, and educational improvement.  
The TVA encapsulated several themes that became embedded in postwar thinking on 
modernization and the ways to accelerate it.  The first pertained to science and technology. The 
TVA relied on an abundance of applied science and technology to shape and control nature 
toward human ends. Both the construction of dams and development of new phosphate fertilizers 
to suit the conditions in the valley required an abundance of scientific knowledge. Encouraged 
by the TVA’s success, modernization theorists posited that all modern society must be founded 
on rational science and technology. Second was grass-roots democracy. TVA director David E. 
Lilienthal argued that the people impacted by development should have control of it. 
Accordingly he emphasized that the TVA provided the tools while local people chose and carried 
out each development project. The impersonal forces of applied technology and scientific 
management were supposedly made accessible to the valley residents through democratic 
participation.  Modernization theorists also championed democratic participation to differentiate 
their development programs from communist centralized development and to gain the adherence 
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of Third World nations skeptical of colonialism. The theme of grass-roots democracy was thus 
connected to decentralization. Within the TVA structure, ultimate power resided in Washington 
D.C. but regional authorities held the power to change existing or formulate new policies. Post-
World War II theorists such as Walt Rostow, Gabriel Almond, James Coleman, and Edward 
Shils keyed in on the TVA structure as a viable method to provide programs of modernization.  
Also, the perceived flexibility of the TVA structure attracted postwar theorists who needed a 
model that would work in a variety of circumstances throughout the world. Finally, prosperity 
created by technologically advanced techniques and structures, controlled by democratic 
participation, and operated through a decentralized organization formed a distinctly American 
alternative to Soviet development.  Theorists such as Walt Rostow argued that Soviet schemes 
might provide material well-being but that communists required the people to be regimented and 
to be deprived of input in the decision-making process; in contrast, the American method gave 
the people a part in the decision-making process.  In 1949, historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., 
argued in The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom that: 
No other people in the world approach the Americans in mastery of the new magic of science and 
technology.  Our engineers can transform arid plains or poverty-stricken river valleys into wonderlands of 
vegetation and power….The Tennessee Valley Authority is a weapon which, if properly employed, might 
outbid all the social ruthlessness of the Communists for the support of the people of Asia.73 
 
American prosperity produced by technological mastery would ease social and political tensions 
while eliminating any desires by Third World leaders for radical communist redistributive 
schemes.  
From the start the TVA was an experimental project.  The drafters of the TVA act 
included no definite vision or plan other than to ameliorate the conditions in the Tennessee 
Valley for the benefit of its residents through regional development. Historian Paul Conkin has 
stated that the TVA Act “was essentially a blank check.”74  When asked to comment on what 
precisely the TVA was, Roosevelt responded that it was “neither fish nor fowl” but “whatever it 
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is, it will taste awfully good to the people of the Tennessee Valley.”75 While governor of New 
York, Roosevelt had begun to consider establishing a publically owned and controlled authority 
on the St. Lawrence River.  The St. Lawrence River project never got off the ground, but, once 
he became president, Roosevelt jumped at the opportunity to create a river authority. Expanding 
on Nebraska Senator George Norris’s idea of a regional development plan centered on the 
Muscle Shoals Dam in Alabama, Roosevelt sought to encapsulate the entire Tennessee Valley. 
As an experimental project, the TVA was controversial because it was a federally owned 
corporation. It held no legal accountability to any federal bureaucracy nor to any of the seven 
states in whose territory it operated.76 TVA directors answered directly to the President. Prior to 
the TVA’s creation the United States had few—and mainly unsuccessful—experiences with 
federally owned enterprises. For example, Woodrow Wilson nationalized the railroads on 
December 29, 1917, to assist in the mobilization for World War I.77 Once the railroads were 
under government control, Treasury Secretary and Director General of the new Railroad 
Administration William Gibbs McAdoo raised railroad laborers’ wages to “pacify the restless 
railway brotherhoods” and secure a stable workforce.  McAdoo raised railroad rates to pay for 
the $300 million wage hike, thereby mitigating the reason for the government take-over: 
affordable transportation rates. McAdoo drew vast amounts of criticism and the railroads were 
returned to private ownership after the war.78 As had been the case with the railroads, the TVA 
drew attacks from privately owned enterprises, notably utility companies. The TVA power 
program drew the most protest because it consisted of government-owned generation facilities 
selling power to government-owned distribution utilities, eliminating the need for private 
distributers of electricity such as Wendell Willkie’s Commonwealth and Southern (C&S). In two 
separate Supreme Court cases, Ashwander v. TVA (1936) and Tennessee Power Company v. TVA 
(1940), TVA attorneys successfully defended the constitutionality of the TVA’s power program 
                                                 
75 Amity Shlaes, The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression (New York: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 2007), 178. 
76 Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Kentucky, Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia. 
77 David Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1980; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 253.  
78 Ibid., 253-256. 
 25
against private utility companies. In both cases the Court ruled that the TVA had authority to 
market electricity generated from its hydroelectric dams.79 
Mired in poverty, the people of the Tennessee Valley cared more for the TVA’s potential 
to help their economic plight than the TVA’s legal battles. In November 1933, the national 
unemployment rate stood at 23.2%.  The average income of Tennessee Valley residents was less 
than half of the U.S. average.80 With few economic opportunities, the largely agrarian population 
of the valley remained relegated to a life of simple survival.  The residents’ only way of 
obtaining economic or social mobility was to move out of the valley.  Very few had the means to 
do so. Advisor to Roosevelt and agricultural economist Rexford Tugwell concluded that much of 
the farmland within the valley had been farmed too hard for too long.  He claimed that the soil 
was “approaching the limits of arability.”81  The valley held the highest concentration of farmers 
to acres of land in the entire country.  
The first phase of the TVA, from 1933 to 1944, consisted of organizing the TVA, 
creating the policy for managing the generation and sale of hydroelectric power, fighting off 
legal challenges to its publically owned power program, developing flood control procedures, 
initiating the development of fertilizer and farm demonstration programs, and other assorted 
methods of developing natural resources and improving the economy of the Tennessee Valley.82 
To accomplish these tasks Roosevelt appointed a board of three directors that answered directly 
to him.  The first was Dr. Arthur E. Morgan.83 A.E. Morgan was a former president of Antioch 
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College and had obtained experience building earthen dams while working as an engineer on an 
innovative series of dams on the Ohio River, part of a program known as the Miami 
Conservatory Project.84 With A.E. Morgan’s help, Roosevelt hired Dr. Harcourt A. Morgan85 
(no relation) as the second director of the TVA. Coming to the TVA straight from his position as 
the president of the University of Tennessee, H.A. Morgan lent credibility to the TVA. People of 
the Tennessee Valley respected H.A Morgan for his honesty and sincerity. Many have speculat
that without H.A. Morgan the project never would have gotten off the ground.
ed 
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The final, and most important, director was David E. Lilienthal. Although Lilienthal was, 
as he liked to say, the only director not named Morgan, a doctor, or a college president, he stood 
out because of his endless energy, charisma, and drive. Lilienthal’s tireless efforts to publicize 
the TVA and his contagious optimism were the major reasons for the allure of the TVA. The 
Journal of the National Education Association declared his TVA: Democracy on the March, 
which focused on the organization’s virtues, the most important book of 1944.  Lilienthal 
biographer Steven Neuse claimed that the book “is arguably the finest example of political 
rhetoric in the century.”87 Contemporaries and future readers alike took Lilienthal’s quixotic 
image of the TVA as reality.  Lilienthal himself believed that inspiration was a leader’s most 
effective instrument. He understood that the TVA required a positive image to succeed as a 
motivational tool for both TVA workers and valley residents. Without Lilienthal’s appeals to the 
 
the struggling college and instill moral righteousness A.E. Morgan established a novel work/study program.  For 
students to apply what they learned and gain valuable experience, students’ time was divided equally between work 
and school.   In addition A.E. Morgan established a moral code for students as well as faculty that forbade any non-
productive activities such as drinking alcohol or staying out past 8 pm. A.E. Morgan attempted to transform his 
highly moralistic Antioch vision onto the TVA, most clearly in the utopian town of Norris. His vision clashed with 
both H.A. Morgan’s and David Lilienthal’s vision. The conflict ended only when FDR removed A.E. from the TVA 
board in 1937.  
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nation, it is unlikely that the TVA would have held such a resilient position in the mind of 
postwar liberals. Born in Morton, Illinois in 1899, Lilienthal attended DePauw University and 
then move on to Harvard Law School, studying under Felix Frankfurter. Frankfurter later 
became a Supreme Court Justice and acquired fame for his approval of government controlled-
utilities. Throughout their lifelong friendship—and especially during the TVA years—Lilienthal 
consulted Frankfurter on the legal issues of government ownership.88 After his studies at 
Harvard, Lilienthal practiced law under labor lawyer Donald Richberg and became a member of 
the Wisconsin Public Service Commission under Wisconsin's innovative Governor Philip La 
Follette.  
As director of the TVA Lilienthal held an overriding faith that the power of science and 
technology could modernize the Tennessee Valley.  Historian Roland Stromberg has claimed 
that, unlike Europeans, Americans suffered little from the post-World War One disillusionment 
with science, technology, mechanization, progress, and Western civilization in general.  
Compared to the Europeans who experienced warfare such as the Battle of the Somme—where 
the Germans killed 60,000 British soldiers in one day—historian David Kennedy has explained 
that Americans experienced “the relatively open warfare that characterized action all along the 
front in the final weeks when the American army at last saw combat.”89  Kennedy has also 
written that Europeans “were soon made to see the skull of death beneath the smiling skin of 
life.”90 British writer H.G. Wells commented that “this civilization in which we are living is 
tumbling down, and I think tumbling down very fast.” Many Europeans lost faith in themselves 
and in the future of Western civilization.91 When Americans did experience disillusionment, 
historian Michael Adas has pointed out, “Hemingway and John Dos Passos notwithstanding, 
postwar American disillusionment was a product of the failure of the peace process more than a 
reaction against modern mechanized warfare.”92 Americans maintained their affinity for science 
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and technology and their belief in the benevolence of machines. Historian Leo Marx has asserted 
that, as America industrialized, newspapermen, writers, and politicians increasingly emphasized 
the “special affinity between the machine and the New Republic.” 93  Historian David Nye has 
claimed that by 1876 the engineer had found place at the “center of pantheon of American 
Heroes.”94 In the decades following World War I, applied science and technology pervaded 
American society more than any other society in the world. American society became saturated 
by products such as Ford vehicles, radios, telephones, motion pictures, and labor-saving devices 
such as vacuums, washing machines, toasters, and electric stoves.95  
Not only did Lilienthal accept the prevailing American belief in the benefits of science 
and technology, he did his best to further it.  Because all TVA activities required an abundance 
of and faith in technology—dam construction, fertilizer development, the generation of 
electricity, and flood control—Lilienthal understood that the best way to gain public support for 
the controversial organization was to convince the American public that the TVA reinforced 
rather than threatened America’s values, including its traditional emphasis on technology. In 
Prisoners of Myth, political scientist Erwin Hargrove has noted that “TVA leaders were 
captivated with the idea of an electric valley in which technology would produce a good life for 
all people.”96 By 1945 the TVA operated 26 dams, produced more electricity than any other 
single integrated system in the country (12 billion kilowatts per hours), and provided ten percent 
of total electricity for the war effort.97 Lilienthal explained to the American public in various 
speeches that there was “no turning back from the machine…to a simpler romantic time and 
handicraft economy.”98 He promulgated that the TVA was the best way to apply science and 
technology to society’s problems.  
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Lilienthal conceived of a modern society as one that increasingly controlled nature. In 
Lilienthal’s conception, science, technology, and organizational skills combined to harness 
nature for the material benefit of humans.  The burdens of floods, poverty, physical exhaustion, 
and a laborious existence would be eliminated.99 According to Lilienthal, the endpoint of 
development would be a scientific society with maximum predictability.  In TVA: Democracy on 
the March Lilienthal painted a picture of the rational TVA conquering nature.  The previously 
unpredictable Tennessee River that had so violently wreaked havoc on the valley residents 
through flash floods—destroying farms, crops, livestock, houses, towns, and communities—now 
bent to the will of the people. When faced with a potential flood, the TVA employees sprang into 
action: 
Day by day until the crisis was over the men at their control instruments at each dam in the system received 
their orders.  The rate of water release from every tributary river was precisely controlled.   The Tennessee 
was kept in hand.  There was no destruction, no panic, no interruption of work. Most of the water, instead of 
wrecking the valley, actually produced a benefit in power, when later it was released through the turbines.100 
 
Also experts made advancements in science and technology possible. They enjoyed 
Lilienthal’s admiration and confidence. He boldly proclaimed that “there is almost nothing, 
however fantastic, that (given competent organization) a team of engineers, scientists, and 
administrators cannot do today (parentheses in original).  Impossible things can be done, are 
being done in this mid-twentieth century.”101 To function the TVA depended on experts in public 
health, wildlife and marine biologists, geologists, agronomists, architects, foresters, chemists, 
librarians, wood technicians, accountants and lawyers.102 Experts not only held a central role 
within the TVA scheme, “but in every facet of modern living…the people are now helpless 
without the experts.”103 Lilienthal argued that “experts as well as rivers have no politics”104 and 
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that they got “beneath prejudices, dogmas, and broad generalizations, down to the facts 
themselves, the working facts.”105 He claimed that experts were apolitical. 
Although Lilienthal repeatedly spoke about technology’s ability to help bring prosperity 
to less developed areas, his confidence had limits.  He tempered his enthusiasm for technology 
by proclaiming that the physical benefits produced by science and technology may “bring no 
benefits, may indeed be evil.”106 Since the very beginning of mechanization some individuals 
feared that machines could ruin their livelihood or even enslave humans. For example, early-
nineteenth-century British artisans known as Luddites conducted a social movement protesting 
changes in textile making produced by mechanization in the Industrial Revolution.  Lilienthal 
claimed to have the same fear that technology and machines could diminish human creativity and 
ruin their livelihood.  The only way to avert such a quagmire, he argued, was to wed technology 
to democracy. 
The goal of grass-roots democracy inspired more hope than any other issue pertaining to 
the TVA. As evident by the title of his book, TVA: Democracy on the March, Lilienthal placed 
the utmost significance on democracy.  The TVA leaders thought that an imposed federal 
program would be alien and unwelcome and therefore accomplish little. Lilienthal enjoyed 
telling the story of his first meeting with community leaders in Decatur, Alabama. The skeptical 
leaders, reluctant to give up their power to an outsider, questioned Lilienthal on what he planned 
to do now that he was in charge of developing their area. Lilienthal recollected that he just sat 
back in his chair smiled, and said, “I’m not going to do anything. You’re going to do it.”107  The 
story encapsulated Lilienthal’s conception of grass-roots democracy. The TVA would provide 
the tools and technical ability; the people would devise a plan and provide labor for projects. By 
local people Lilienthal meant organizations such as federal, state and local agencies, voluntary 
private organizations, local universities, community councils, and the local residents themselves. 
He claimed that the TVA’s technical intelligentsia, guided by local people, could transform the 
devastated valley into a prosperous region.108  
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 An example of grass-roots democracy in action was the agricultural program. The TVA 
delegated administration of the agricultural program to seven land-grant colleges and the county 
agent system.109  Both were already active in the Tennessee Valley and had credibility with 
many local farmers. To bridge the gap between the experts and the locals, the colleges and 
county agents used farms of willing participants as demonstration farms to showcase new 
agricultural products and techniques. Locals were exposed to ideas such as crop rotation.  Locals 
also learned about phosphate fertilizers developed by the universities and produced at the Mu
Shoals Dam. The universities conducted soil surveys and performed scientific analysis to 
develop fertilizers that replaced nitrites specifically lacking in farms located in the Tennessee 
Valley. By 1944, 20,000 demonstration farms, located in seven states and covering nearly 
3,000,000 acres, operated under the TVA name. Others in the community learned by observat
and through advice given by those who operated the demonstration farms. When locals we
ready to experiment with the new fertilizers, the TVA ensured that an amply supply was 
available. When new products failed to match the farmers’ actual need, the farmers gave the 
technicians new criteria which their products must meet. The program was designed to have
open line of communication with information being exchanged back and forth between the 
technician and the farmer.  Lilienthal claimed in TVA: Democracy on the March that: “Scienc
if brought thus close to him, would enable the average man (on a farm or in the town) to learn
what it is that technology makes feasible, for him, what, in short, are the people’s alternatives;
without that knowledge what reality is there in the free man’s democratic right to choose?” 
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Lilienthal also claimed that decentralization augmented the TVA’s democratic structure.  
Decentralization simply meant that the overall power resided in Washington D.C., while all key 
decisions would be made by local organizations with the regional directors’ approval. The TVA 
structure did not limit the authority of the government; rather it changed the way its powers were 
exercised.111 To make his point, Lilienthal relied on one of the first persons to write about 
American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville. De Tocqueville differentiated between centralized 
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government and centralized administration.112 Centralized government is located in one place 
and maintains interests relevant to all people within the nation, such as foreign policy. 
Centralized authority resided in many locations, such as state governments, and conducted affairs 
common to that region, such as the regulations of a state park.113 Lilienthal advertised the TVA 
structure as consisting of “centralized authority with locally decentralized administration.”114 
Roosevelt described the TVA as “a corporation clothed with the power of government but 
possessed of the flexibility and initiative of a private enterprise.”115 Lilienthal declared that 
decentralization improved the effectiveness of development by connecting experts and decision-
makers directly to the people and the problems of local communities.  Founded upon the logic 
that no two problems were exactly alike, experience within the actual field or town to be 
improved was indispensable.  In a speech to the Southern Political Science Association in 1939, 
Lilienthal declared that the U.S. was a vast and diverse country and therefore a “lack of 
knowledge of local conditions” by any centralized authority was inevitable.116 To avoid the 
handicaps of an overly centralized government, Lilienthal called for decentralization of 
administration.  Unlike the centralized government in Washington D.C., local leaders in the field 
could make decisions quickly, adjusting TVA projects in order to be sensitive to each unique 
situation.  Lilienthal directed agricultural and forestry experts to live as near as possible to their 
areas of responsibility so as to become familiar with them and their distinctive characteristics.   
Lilienthal used the theme of grass-roots democracy to gain support from a wide range of 
people including international visitors, politicians, local organizations, and valley residents.  
Because TVA lawyers had to repeatedly defend the corporation’s legality and authority against 
attacks from private utilities and the Department of the Interior, Lilienthal sought to gain 
popularity as a means to secure the existence of the TVA.  He believed that, if the TVA was 
popular, the president and valley residents would defend it against anyone who threatened its 
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existence. So he included the theme of grass-roots democracy in nearly all his speeches from the 
theme’s inception in 1939 to the end of his tenure at the TVA in 1947.  
His outspoken optimism about the TVA’s grass-roots democracy was also responsible for 
creating the “myth” of the TVA, about which Phillip Selznick first wrote in his1949 book 
entitled TVA and the Grass Roots.  Selznick explained that the “myth” lay in the discrepancy 
between grass-roots rhetoric and the actual amount of authority valley residents had in the 
operation of the organization.117 Selznick pointed out that the TVA needed to produce results in 
order to gain support in Washington and in the Tennessee Valley. Accordingly several programs 
marginalized local input.  Rather than accept every farmer’s offer to become a demonstration 
farm, the agricultural colleges often chose the farms most likely to be successful. Almost always 
the colleges chose larger farms occupied by farmers willing to let the college authorities manage 
their operations.  In addition, the colleges used techniques and products too expensive or 
impractical for smaller farmers to implement. Within the power program, TVA distributors were 
governed by boards that consisted of non-elected members. States lacked the power to regulate 
TVA power policies and valley residents had no say in setting electricity rates.  
Lilienthal also used decentralization to keep the TVA out of the Department of Interior 
and away from its director, Harold Ickes.  From 1933 to 1948, Lilienthal’s relationship with 
Ickes deteriorated. Originally Ickes had helped Lilienthal and the TVA secure authority over 
public distribution of electricity. Ickes’s Department of Interior provided loans for individual 
towns and cooperatives to buy their own distribution systems in order to receive electricity 
directly from the TVA. In this way towns with distribution systems were able to circumvent 
private power companies, notably, the most powerful company in the region, Wendell Willkie’s 
Commonwealth and Southern (C&S). C&S steadily lost ground and was forced to acquiesce, 
giving the TVA full jurisdiction to distribute power in the Tennessee Valley. Shortly after the 
TVA had emerged triumphant over C&S, Ickes began to push for full control of the entire TVA 
by calling for the enlargement of the Department of Interior. He did so through Roosevelt’s 
Committee on Administrative Management, which sought to reorganize and consolidate 
executive functions.118 Ickes wanted the TVA to be under the jurisdiction of the Department of 
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the Interior. The Interior was already constructing smaller scale hydroelectric dams throughout 
the country and Ickes wanted all dam building operations within the United States under his 
control. Lilienthal and Senator George Norris confided to the president that giving control of the 
TVA to the Department of Interior would destroy the organization’s flexibility and 
effectiveness.119  Roosevelt settled the dispute by awarding control over an authority creating 
and running a smaller dam in Washington (known as Northwest Power) to the Department of 
Interior while Lilienthal maintained full control of the TVA.120 
l 
                                                
Few noticed the gap between Lilienthal’s rhetoric and the reality on the ground. In his 
book Prisoners of Myth, political scientist Erwin Hargrove explained that, “in TVA’s first 
decades, professional expertise and popular opinion were pretty much congruent.”121 During 
Lilienthal’s time at the TVA, the corporation was widely popular and few valley residents 
objected to its structure.  Historians Michael J. McDonald and John Muldowny have explained 
that even the 70,000 citizens forced to relocate from areas submerged by the new dams originally 
thought that the TVA was a worthwhile project. They dreaded relocation but understood that 
they had to do it for their country.122  Only when the TVA lost popularity in the 1970s because 
of mismanagement of the TVA nuclear program, the energy crisis, and an increasingly powerfu
environmental movement, did objections become widespread.123 The early lack of discord led 
Lilienthal to believe that the TVA was an effective means of development and he soon sought 
new areas to apply it.  
In the early 1940s, while the world remained embroiled in World War II, Lilienthal 
became very aware of the possibility of applying TVA concepts to development throughout the 
world.  By then Lilienthal had refined and perfected his skills of broadcasting the virtues and 
advantages of the TVA; but Lilienthal no longer did so solely to ensure the TVA’s survival. 
Successful court rulings over the constitutionality of publically owned utilities and the need for 
more electricity for World War II ensured that the TVA would endure. Now he undertook a 
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public campaign to convince others of the TVA’s global applicability; he spoke throughout the 
country, discussed the idea with Vice-President Henry Wallace, wrote to Roosevelt, did an 
interview with Lyman Bryson at CBS Radio, submitted writings to Bill Nichols of This Week 
magazine, and hired a promoter for his TVA: Democracy on the March.  In 1942, he concluded 
that another war would inevitably follow World War II unless the United States “participate[d] in 
the problems of the world.”124 To spread the word and convince others, Lilienthal dedicated the 
final two chapters of TVA: Democracy on the March to the TVA’s global applicability and 
visions of the future.  
Within the final two chapters, Lilienthal argued that the TVA spoke “in a tongue that is 
universal.”125 By 1942, visitors from all over the world including Western Europe, Mexico, 
China, the Soviet Union, North Africa, and the Middle East had visited the TVA and spoken 
with Lilienthal. The various meetings with world visitors convinced him that “the changes that 
are taking place here are much the same as those which men all over the world are seeking.”126 
Lilienthal’s experience may have been within the Tennessee Valley, but he claimed that “all this 
could have happened in almost any of a thousand other valleys where rivers run from the hills to 
the sea.”127 In his book he discussed the possibilities held by rivers throughout the world 
including the Amazon, Nile, Ob, Yangtze, Ganges, and Paraná.128 To augment global enthusiasm 
he had the book translated into Hebrew, Chinese, German, Norse, and French.   
Furthermore, Lilienthal claimed that, because the United States had created the TVA and 
already perfected its method of development, American policymakers and experts could 
accelerate development in lesser developed nations.  On June 24, 1942 Lilienthal confided in his 
journal that there  
seems to be a definite sequence in history in the change from primitive or nonindustrial conditions to more 
highly developed modern industrial conditions.  Whether all of those steps have to be taken and all the 
intervening mistakes made is open to question, but it makes me mad to think that there is a possibility that all 
those steps have to be gone through with. Don’t we have enough control over our destinies to short-cut those 
wasted steps?129 
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Similarly, in TVA: Democracy on the March he claimed that “the United States can in 
some way speed the process and influence its course.”130 Provided that they received proper 
training and guidance from Americans, all countries could obtain high standards of living by 
utilizing the TVA’s structure that harmonized private and public interest, grass-roots democracy, 
decentralization, and finally the democratic value from popular participation. 
Lilienthal’s campaigning failed to result in the government immediately starting new 
river authorities throughout the country. Roosevelt discussed smaller operations similar to the 
TVA on the Arkansas, Missouri, and Columbia rivers but when he died, so too did the hopes of 
the new river authorities.  
Nevertheless, Lilienthal’s promotion of the TVA did attract two groups of people: Third 
World leaders who sought a solution for their poor economies, and postwar American theorists 
on development, including many modernization theorists. Between 1950 and 1970, TVA-
inspired river authorities were started throughout the world:  the Akosombo Dam across the 
Volta in Ghana, the Pahlavi or Dez Dam in Iran, the Kariba Dam across the Zambezi, the Aswan 
Dam on the Nile, the Damodar Valley Corporation in India, the Cauca Valley Corporation of 
Colombia, the Helmand and Arghandab Valley Authority in Afghanistan, and the Puerto Rican 
Water Resources Authority.  None matched the success of the TVA. Lilienthal himself worked 
on the Iranian project but could not replicate the success of the TVA. Disagreements with the 
World Bank over loans and conflict with the Shah of Iran on the desirability of the Dez Dam (the 
largest of the dams considered within the Dez Dam project) prompted Lilienthal to depart 
midway through the project.131  
Certain TVA themes resounded with postwar theorists on development. In the 1950s 
modernization theorists including C.E. Black, Myron Weiner, Marion Levy Jr., Walt Rostow, 
Joseph Kahl, Clark Kerr, and Edward Shils attempted to identify ways to accelerate development 
in order to inoculate Third World countries against communism. Modernization theorists 
believed that non-industrialized nations were more susceptible to communism because their 
economic instability, combined with their desire for development, could lead to communist 
redistribution or development schemes. Historian Michael Hunt has explained that theorists 
                                                 
130 Lilienthal, Democracy on the March, 229. 
131 Neuse, 60-70. 
 37
thought that, if they could get Third World nations to begin democratic and capitalist 
development, at a certain point the Third World countries’ economies would “take off” into self-
sustained growth and become impervious to communism.132 The TVA was a suitable American 
model to use, but not all countries had suitable river systems. Hence theorists were unable to 
export TVA-style development wholesale. Instead they needed a development scheme that was 
universally applicable yet distinctly American. Theorists took a number of Lilienthal’s themes to 
induce American development: technology and science, grass-roots democracy, and 
decentralization. 
The idea of decentralized democratic development struck a chord with modernization 
theorists. The method of democratic development found in the TVA emerged as a key 
component of U.S. Cold War development programs. Most importantly the TVA’s democratic 
method set American development schemes apart from those of the rival communists.  It was 
true that the United States had emerged from World War II with an undamaged vibrant economy 
and augmented geopolitical power, but the corresponding rise in the Soviet Union’s power 
garnered much attention from those that theorized on development.133 Historian Nils Gilman has 
pointed out that the Soviets’ newly acquired international clout “had more influence than any 
other single factor on the manner in which American development discourse would be 
articulated over the following decades.”134 The Soviet Union had clearly claimed that, while 
capitalist countries languished in the depression of the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviets had the 
ability to rapidly industrialize and develop from a predominantly agrarian society to a world 
power.  Furthermore, in contrast to America’s experience in the Philippines and accession to 
allies’ imperialist ventures, the Soviets appeared to have impeccable anti-imperialist credentials.  
With the belief that the ideological Cold War would be settled in the decolonizing regions of the 
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world and fearing that the Soviets had provided an unassailable model of development, 
modernization theorists set out to provide an alternative model that was distinctly American.  
Modernization theorists also presented democracy as a modern form of government while 
depicting the Soviet Union as somewhat less modern.  The seemingly high level of 
modernization in the U.S.S.R. troubled modernization theorists. Nils Gilman has noted that, 
“again and again, Russia appeared as the bogey of modernity, an example of a malignant version 
of modernization—but never as anything other than modern.”135  In The Stages of Economic 
Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Rostow presented the best example of the Soviets’ lack of 
modernity.  Rostow described communism as a “disease of transition.” Instead of modernization 
from an agrarian-based traditional society to a modern society liberated from political and 
economic oppression, communist development resulted in false liberation.  Communists 
proclaimed themselves able to achieve a classless utopia but in reality communist schemes were 
controlled by a small cadre of party members enforcing and directing the modernization process. 
Rostow claimed that citizens excluded from the leadership cadre of the communist party had no 
say in the overall direction of development. Because the “disease” could only infect societies 
before they reached Rostow’s famous take-off stage, communism was never able to attain all 
characteristics incorporated in Rostow’s final stage known as the stage of high mass 
consumption: notably democratic participation and input from the masses.136  Without 
democratic institutions, Rostow argued, the Soviet society remained a deviant form of 
modernism.137  
An emphasis on democracy set the American model of development apart from Soviet 
development.  On the surface, multipurpose technical programs founded upon government 
planning appeared no different than Soviet industrialization. However only the United States 
could proclaim democratic development.138 While communists might be able to provide material 
well-being only, American programs included citizens in the decision-making process. The 
democratic and decentralized emphasis was also meant to reassure decolonizing countries 
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skeptical of Western intrusion and control.  Theorists speculated that a relationship between the 
West and the Third World founded upon participation would prevent cries of imperialism and 
colonialism because that type of relationship was “inconceivable in the colonial context.”139  
American efforts simply desired, as Kennedy pledged in his inaugural address, to “help people 
help themselves.”140 In comparison to colonial arrangements where Western nations sought to 
subordinate colonial economies to the Western powers, American efforts of development 
founded upon modernization theory portrayed an ideal world populated by equally industrialized 
and competitive nations engaged in benign trading relationships.  
The themes of grass-roots democracy and decentralized authority, developed by 
Lilienthal during his TVA years and embraced by modernization theorists, were incorporated 
into the operating structure of the Peace Corps.  The Peace Corps was an agency started on 
March 1, 1961 as one of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy’s development initiatives. Historian 
Michael Latham argues that the Peace Corps was built on an intellectual foundation provided by 
modernization theorists.141 Kennedy enlisted a number of academics and institutions including 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT) Center for International Studies (CIS) for 
multiple purposes—to define the agency’s mission, purpose, and goals, and to formulate the 
agency’s operating structure. Several prominent modernization theorists were members of the 
CIS faculty including Walt Rostow, Max Millikan, Daniel Lerner, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Ithiel 
de Sola Pool, and Lucian Pye. All advised the Kennedy administration on the Peace Corps. 
Modernization theorists’ characterization of the United States as the epitome of modern society 
and the apex of development became the goals of the Peace Corps.142 Modernization theorists 
also provided Peace Corps workers with a conceptual framework with which to measure each 
society’s level of modernity and the suggestions on how they could be “agents of change” and 
accelerate modernization.143 Volunteers were provided indices to assist them in ranking the 
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modernity of the developing nation they were sent assist. The Peace Corps was an agency that 
conducted small-scale development with the overarching goal of starting the modernization of 
Third World countries with societies that, Gilman commented, were “inward looking, inert, 
passive towards nature, superstitious, fearful of change, and economically simple,” turning them 
into democratic, egalitarian, scientific, technologically advanced, secular, and economically 
advanced societies.144   
The Peace Corps, according to Michael Latham, was designed to “provide necessary 
labor and technical skills and build bridges of friendship between Americans and the people of 
Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia.”145  The agency consisted mainly of young 
volunteers, often fresh out of college, who agreed to live in and develop Third World 
communities for at least two years. The volunteers were to be catalysts for development by 
working on projects such as eliminating illiteracy, building schools, teaching English, purifying 
water supplies, providing vocational engineering skills, and agricultural techniques and 
improving crop yields.146  Volunteers were not simply to provide skilled labor but also to 
“stimulate dormant communities to undertake self-help programs.”147 
The clearest example of Peace Corps volunteers carrying out development founded on 
modernization theory through a TVA-styled structure were the Peace Corp Community 
Development projects (CD). Peace Corps officials were unable to recruit enough specialists and 
professionals, such as teachers, engineers, and farmers; therefore, Peace Corps officials could 
assign only a limited number of specialists to each region. To remedy the situation officials 
created the role of CD volunteer, making up 25 percent of all Peace Corps volunteers.148 
Volunteers served as the link in the chain between scientific experts and unskilled natives.149  
They had a two-fold job. First, they were to act as a filter. Not all projects required a trained 
professional. Volunteers were to identify tasks that required special expertise and contact the 
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relevant professionals. Second, the volunteers were to fill the mid-level gap in manpower.150 
They conducted development projects too complex for unskilled villagers but too simple to 
require a trained professional. For example, volunteers could help construct a small school 
building without engineers and architects.    
Peace Corps officials also sent CD volunteers to alter social life by “teaching democracy” 
while conducting development on the community level.151  According to historian Gary May, 
Peace Corps literature claimed that the “protocol-minded, striped pants officials would 
supposedly be replaced by reform-minded missionaries of democracy.”152  The Peace Corps 
projects were less complex than TVA projects—Peace Corps volunteers never attempted 
anything as complex as a hydroelectric dam—but like the TVA, CDs were promoted as both 
democratic and decentralized. Volunteers did not enter a community and immediately start 
projects such as schools, roads, gardens, and septic tanks; as in the TVA, volunteers encouraged 
grass-roots democracy by promoting suggestions from villagers.  Town meetings were setup and 
villagers were encouraged to discuss their needs and problems collectively.153 The Kennedy 
administration wanted volunteers to “stimulate a new, participatory ethic, establish a sense of 
common needs, organize collective action, and assist the peasantry in carrying out a ‘self-help’ 
plan.”154  Once inhabitants identified their most urgent needs and drew plans to accomplish a 
task, the volunteer would either contact the relevant specialists or simply start on the project with 
the villagers’ help only. As Lilienthal broadcasted that the TVA provided the tools while valley 
residents carried out the actual project, Third World villagers provided the labor and ideas while 
Peace Corps volunteers provided the expertise and direction. As had been the case with the TVA, 
CDs had decentralized administration.  As TVA experts resided near their areas of responsibility 
to familiarize themselves with the local conditions, CD volunteers lived in the communities and 
among the villagers they were sent to assist.  Collaborating with local inhabitants, they could 
carry out development as they saw fit. Ultimate authority resided in Washington D.C. but the 
majority of CD projects were decided on and carried out completely within the community itself. 
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The program was designed to provide the flexibility needed to operate in any location throughout 
the world. Only larger projects that required specialists to be brought in required authorization 
outside the community. Peace Corps officials intended the decentralized democratic method to 
ease villagers’ skepticism about foreign intrusion and also change their worldview. Once 
inhabitants accomplished their agreed upon tasks, they would realize their ability to change their 
station. They could draw themselves out of their traditional passivity and develop a modern can-
do spirit. In South America some communities participating in CD projects joined together with 
up to a dozen other local communities in a more comprehensive plan. Organizing these various 
communities showed villagers how democracy from the grassroots up could accomplish great 
things. Peace Corps officials asserted that this kind of experience had positive implications for 
democracy because it helped villagers conceive of themselves as part of a larger association 
carrying out democratic development.155 If Third World citizens were convinced that the 
democratic structure of the Peace Corps could effectively accomplish development, 
redistribution schemes would become less attractive and communists would have little chance of 
spreading their ideology into the Third World.  
Like the TVA, the CDs were sometimes more democratic in theory than in fact. Some 
volunteers arrived in villages to discover that community organizations already existed which did 
not welcome volunteers’ suggestions about democratic organization.  Other volunteers became 
dismayed when their small development projects failed to instill a democratic spirit within the 
community as a whole. Still other volunteers found a community’s culture more appealing than 
their own and refused to try to change it. Historian Fritz Fischer claims, “The real development 
in community development became the development of the volunteers, rather than that of the 
host country.”156 
In addition to grass-roots democracy and decentralized administration, Lilienthal’s 
emphasis on omnipresent technology as a major instigator and indication of modernity 
reappeared in modernization theory. First, as had been the case with democratic development, 
modernization theorists posited that the use of technology separated capitalist from communist 
development. Whereas the communist solution to scarcity had been to redistribute the wealth, 
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thus eliminating the conflict between the have and have-nots, by eliminating the material 
difference as a matter of fact, modernization theorists claimed that the capitalist answer was to 
use technology to expand the economy and eliminate conflict.157 As the TVA had built 
hydroelectric dams, creating electricity where it had been non-existent and spread phosphate 
fertilizer usage, doubling and tripling crop yields, technology was intended to create new sources 
of wealth rather than redistribute existing resources.  Writing in 1966, modernization theorist 
C.E. Black contended that “an important feature of the intellectual revolution [of becoming 
modern] was the application of science to the practical affairs of man in the form of 
technology.”158 He also argued that modern societies used science to create new technology and 
apply that technology to improve areas such as agriculture, communications, transportation, 
mechanization, and medicine.159  Also, modernization theorists repeatedly emphasized that, 
compared to communist revolutions, their approach was a peaceful way to modernity. Charles 
Merriam, the founder of the Social Science Research Council, for which many modernization 
theorists such as Gabriel Almond and Lucian Pye worked, claimed: “Sound and reasonable 
planning [based on technology] is the very safeguard against what many people fear, violence, 
tyranny, and harsh repressions….sound planning is a way to prevent that.”160 Modernization 
theorists, as part of the postwar milieu that emphasized consensus over discord, looked to 
provide a peaceful way for politicians to control development, emphasized technology rather 
than conflict as the means to modernity.  
A second effect of the emphasis that modernization theorists put on technology was to 
support their argument that all societies converge on the same end state.  Modernization theorist 
Clark Kerr argued that industrialization, specifically the application of the most advanced 
technology to production, was a convergent process. He claimed that modern nations were 
technocratic nations; experts created and citizens used technology in all facets of modern life, 
i.e., agriculture, communication, industry, and transportation. As societies modernized and began 
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used the same modern technology, their social, cultural, economic, and political structures would 
adapt in the same way, forming a universal modern society. In Industrialism and Industrial Man 
(1960) Kerr asserted that nations converge on the same modern end state because there is only 
one technology and it is omnipresent in all modern societies. He claimed: “The same technology 
calls for the same occupational structure around the world….Social arrangement will be most 
uniform from one society to another when they are most closely tied to technology.”161  He 
argued that technology transcended ideology. He was like Lilienthal, who claimed that “experts 
have no politics”162 and that they got “beneath prejudices, dogmas, and broad generalizations, 
down to the facts themselves, the working facts.”163 Kerr claimed that the scientists and 
administrators who created and maintained the technocratic state had no ideology; they created 
universally applicable technology and societies changed to fit the application of that technology.  
To Kerr, the United States, and not the Soviet Union, possessed and used the most advanced 
technology and therefore was the modern state that all other countries would converge on. 
Lilienthal’s optimism and charisma extended the appeal of the TVA far beyond the 
TVA’s formative years from 1933 to 1944.  His relentless advertising of TVA themes—grass-
roots democracy, decentralization, and technology—and the TVA’s material successes—such as 
generation and distribution of electricity, and improvements in agricultural production—
convinced postwar liberals that the TVA provided a valuable American plan of development. 
Lilienthal’s optimistic rhetoric made the TVA’s faults fade into the background while its 
successes stood out as American ingenuity. TVA-style technological prosperity became the 
primary means to start Third World countries down the path of development leading to a whole 
host of elements considered part of a modern society. It also provided an attractive alternate 
means to achieve the aspirations of Third World countries instead of communist redistribution 
schemes.164 Modernization theorists took the TVA’s material achievements, such as the creation 
of electricity and increased crop yields, as proof that conflict between the haves and have-nots 
could be eliminated by creating new sources of wealth rather than by redistributing current 
resources. Also the themes of grass-roots democracy and decentralization, developed by 
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Lilienthal, resurfaced in development programs throughout the 1950s and 1960s such as the 
Peace Corps. The TVA’s democratic method made the American development schemes distinct 
from those of the rival communists. Modernization theorists emphasized that to be effective all 
development programs had to be democratic or be seeking to establish a democratic society as 
the final result. Decentralization to ensure flexibility also remained vital. 
 Although Lilienthal’s optimistic rhetoric made the TVA appear faultless, the authority 
certainly had shortcomings.  Small farmers found the new agricultural products too expensive 
and new techniques too difficult to make effective on a smaller scale. Lilienthal’s democratic 
mantra often fell well short of what was advertised.  Blacks, small-scale farmers, and farmers in 
remote areas found themselves outside the area that received TVA help and were thus unable to 
have their voice heard on the creation and implementation of TVA programs.165 Even when 
valley residents had a say in the TVA, it was only in the non-power programs including 
navigation and forestry. Engineering, power, and fertilizer divisions strictly held to professional 
standards, excluding all but the most highly educated and trained personnel.166 As Lilienthal’s 
biographer Steven Neuse points out, Lilienthal himself “never fully trusted democratic control of 
public institutions, science, and technology.”167 However to modernization theorists searching 
for an effective, distinctly American development scheme, the TVA’s faults took a back seat to 
its triumphs. As projects that developed rivers lost favor with the American public in the 1970s 
because of the increasingly powerful environmental movement and the mismanagement of the 
nuclear program, so did the positive image of the TVA.  Works highlighting the TVA’s 
democratic myth and inadequacies became popular. But for thirty years from 1940 to 1970 the 
TVA’s image remained untarnished as a successful development program to be emulated the 
world over. 
Whereas the TVA served as a technology-driven, democratic decentralized model of 
development carried out in the United States, Harry Truman’s Point Four Program, an 
international program of development, revealed a theory of political evolution and economic 
philosophy similar to those of modernization theorists.
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 CHAPTER 3 - The Community Development Program in India: 
Using Keynesian Economics to Stimulate Development 
President Harry S. Truman in his inaugural address on January 20, 1949 announced “a 
bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress 
available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.”168  Eventually known as 
the Point Four Program, it signaled the first time that U.S. policymakers championed the 
economic development of the Third World as a strategy within the Cold War. Chester Bowles,
the U.S. ambassador to India from 1951 to 1953, created a unique derivative of the Point Four 
Program that contained much of the logic that eventually became modernization theory.  Both 
Bowles and modernization theorists created a theory of political evolution derived from the 
American past that they believed to be the universal blueprint for development. In each, the 
American historical example was used as a guide to accelerate development within Third World 
countries toward an expected endpoint. Both assumed that prosperity brought democracy a
conversely that economic stagnation threatened it.  Both Bowles and modernization theorists
founded their theory on the economic theory of John Maynard Keynes. Keynes argued that
government spending in agriculture, education, health, and infrastructure would stimulate and 
improve the economy. Although all Point Four projects focused on improvement in each of these 
areas to lay the foundation for industrialization—which they considered to be the endpoint of 
development—Bowles created a unique integrated approach known as the Community 
Development Program. Eisenhower ended the Point Four Program three years after it began. 
However, Bowles’ efforts in India laid a solid foundation for what would becom
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Four to modernization theory are nearly non-existent. Most early works on the Point Four 
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Program were written by employees of the program and were intended to gain American support
(and a larger budget) for the program. Jonathan Bingham’s Shirt-Sleeve Diplomacy (1953) is an 
example. Truman, a proud supporter of the program, devoted twelve pages in his memoirs to the 
program’s virtues, in hopes that future administrations would initiate similar programs.
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169 Of the 
al works that mention the program, most allocate only a paragraph or passing sentence.170  
Exceptions exist, scholars, focusing on the debate—which became particularly acute after 
World War II—about whether the world’s resources could support the recent population flu
maintain global standards of living, have written a substantial amount about the Point Four 
Program. Two examples are Björn-Ola Linnér’s The Return of Malthus: Environmentalism
Post-War Population-Resource Crises (2003) and Sarah Phillps’ This Land, This Nation: 
Conservation, Rural America, and the New Deal (2007). Linnér argued that a number of U.S. 
and European policymakers developed an awareness of the “population-resource crisis” and i
potential deleteriously impact on world peace.171 He claimed that: “Social unrest spurred by 
resource shortage was of great concern to American security interests. Economic and political 
stability was a crucial means to curb communist, as well as fascist, revolts.”172 Truman, Linnér 
asserted, “saw the issue of natural resources as vitally important to his national security polic
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This was perhaps expressed most clearly in the aid programme –Point Four–.”173  Although 
Linnér focused on the debate after World War II, Phillips primarily concentrated on the New 
Deal. Phillips devoted a chapter of her epilogue, entitled “Exporting the New Deal,” to the Point 
Four Program. She argued that the Point Four Program was an example of Truman extending, on
a worldwide scale, the “New Conservation” ideology that had begun in the 1920s and achiev
full maturity during the Great Depression. She claimed that “a loosely connected coterie of 
engineers, politicians, intellectuals, and government officials….believed that regional planning 
of land and water resources would alleviate farm poverty, modernize farm areas, and restore the 
viability of rural living.”
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174 “They believed that proper resource use and fair resource distribu
could relieve rural poverty and raise rural inco
 this vision,” according to Phillips.175 
Although scholars have primarily focused on the Point Four Program as part of the issu
of conservation, some scholars have interpreted Point Four within the framework of the Cold 
War, notably Dennis Merrill’s Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India’s Econom
Development, 1947-1963 (1990).176 He gives the most in-depth examination of American 
policies of development in India to date. Merrill interprets them within a Cold War framewor
government-to-government interactions.  He adroitly examines each administration’s policy 
toward India, but his focus on Cold War imperatives marginalizes his study on the intellectua
foundations that undergirded and connected each policy.  Merrill states: “As Bowles pu
ahead with his plans for liberal development, however, senior officials in Washington 
implemented a global foreign aid strategy that derived from a much narrower conception of 
national security.”177 Merrill mentions that, “in many respects, the policies of the developmen
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decade [the 1960s, when modernization theory flourished] resembled those of the past,” but, 
instead of identifying Chester Bowles and his work as the director of the Point Four Program as 
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or precedent, Merrill argued that “American development strategies during the Kennedy
years largely grew our of the policies laid down by the Eisenhower administration.”178  
Although Merrill focused on political rather than intellectual connections, Nils Gilman 
and Michael Latham succinctly and explicitly cite Point Four as a predecessor to modernization 
theory. In Modernization as Ideology, Latham claims, “Kennedy also outlined a broader mission 
for American foreign aid than any presented before….Where the Marshall Plan had succ
rebuilt Western European economies and Truman’
r countries, Kennedy and his advisors set out to build entirely new nations.”179 In 
arins of the Future, Gilman comments that: 
The ideological core of modernization theory was already present in Truman’s [inaugural] address: the 
peculiarly American mix of lofty idealism and crude materialism; the emphasis on industrialization as the 
key to progress; the notion that there existed noneconomic conditions (and obstacles) to economic growth; 
the emphasis on technology as the key to economic growth; the anticolonialism; and above all, the boundles
faith in the power of American scientific knowledge and goodwill to make the world a better place from
ocial point of view. Although Point Four itself, with its limited goals of promoting e onoms
th
olicy, which would be the critical innovation of modernization theory, it indicated that henceforth the 
American government would consider development a topic of international concern.180 
 
Rather than argue against the prevailing historiography of scholars of modernization 
theory, this study elaborates on existing arguments. In line with current scholarship, the 
argument of this study is that Bowles was not a modernization theorist, rather an unkno
precursor.  As with Point Four in general, Bowles’ theory primarily focused on the economic 
aspects of development and lacked the social and psychological dimensions that made 
modernization theory distinct.  Although Bowles was not a modernization theorist, his thought 
was closer to modernization theory than was that of any other predecessor. Both Bowles and 
modernization theorists relied on a metanarrative derived from the Western historical experience
to measure the modernity of developing countries and forecast their future trajectory.  T
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izes the intellectual connections between Bowles and modernization theorists within the 
field of economics and also between their assumptions about normative development. 
Truman intended the Point Four Program simultaneously to bring prosperity to the entire 
Free World while inoculating “unstable” countries against communist infiltration, manipul
and subversion.  Point Four policymakers assumed that political instability resulted from lack of 
industrialization and economic prosperity.  They believed that communist infiltration and 
subversion fed on unindustrialized and economically stagnant societies.  Truman bold y 
proclaimed that “economic stagnation is the advance guard of Soviet conquest”181 and that the 
seeds of totalitarian regim  “spread and grow in the soil of poverty and discontent.”182  T
declared, in his 1951 State of the Union Address, that “[communists] deliberately try to prev
economic improvement,”183  thereby ripening the ground for infiltration and subversion. 
Influenced by the experience with the Versailles Treaty and Germany’s interwar economic 
tribulations, both Truman and Acheson believed that economic stagnation was also the root of 
war.  Secretary of State Dean Acheson articulated the program’s aim as the “use of m
means to a non-material end.”184 He thought that global peace and democrac
nited States could successfully use the Point Four Program to spur economic 
improvement and raise the standards of living within Third World nations.  
Point Four policymakers envisioned three types of objectives: foundational, economic, 
and strategic. Foundational efforts, in concert with Keynesian economics, included technical 
assistance to improve food, health, and education.  American experts provided the tra
education so workers could effectively build modern structures and manage modern techniq
and operations. These efforts laid the foundation for industrialization, leading to the 
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policymakers’ second objective, economic efforts.  Economic efforts included augmenting 
industrial production and maintaining global free trade to economically benefit all particip
countries. The improved economies and increased global cohesion through augmented trade 
strengthened the non-communist world and supported strategic efforts.   Strategic efforts 
included securing democratic governments, especially those with strategic raw materials, and 
containing the spread of communism.
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185  By 1953, the foundational efforts were well on the
way.  Agricultural yields were improving, literacy rates were on the rise, health and sanitation 
facilities were being built, and new infrastructure was being constructed. But Eisenhower’s 
premature termination of the Point Four Program arrested the implementat
Although the Point Four Program never progressed past the foundational efforts, as a 
program of development, it did signal a change from policies of the past.  
As Truman delivered the 1949 inaugural address his administration’s policy toward In
was ambivalent.  Historian Robert McMahon pointed out that almost every strategic appraisal, 
intelligence report, and policy paper of the late 1940s judged India to be “a region of m
although not vital, significance.”186  The Truman administration based the significance
country on the projected help it could be to the U.S. economically and militarily.  The 
administration placed primary importance on countries that had already achieved full 
industrialization such as European countries and Japan while India—a primarily agricultural 
country—remained secondary.  Because India was the largest democratic country in the world
and was positioned so near the Soviet Union, its significance stood above other Third W
nations in the minds of the administration.  Accordingly, the Truman administration’s policy 
toward India more closely resembled policies toward industrialized Europe rather than
development policies toward Third World nations.  From India’s independence on August 
1947 until October 1951, the Truman’s policy consisted of attempts to achieve major 
advance
d a U.S. wheat bill to alleviate starvation in India and India’s non-aligned diplomatic 
status. 
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The first issue, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s refusal to take sides in the Co
War, frustrated American policymakers.  The Truman administration wanted India to align
with the United States and other democratic nations.  Nehru had multiple reasons for declining
the proposals for an alliance.  First, India had just emerged from 200 years of colonial rule by 
Britain and had little interest in aligning itself with a stronger Western nation in a binding 
alliance.
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187 Second, Nehru used India’s non-aligned status to attract aid from both communist
and capitalist countries.  When India gained its independence in 1947 most of its 350 million 
people remained mired in abje
arter to one-third of the world’s poor lived within India’s borders.188  Nehru sought to 
secure aid enticements from both communist and democratic countries just to be able to feed 
India’s starving population.   
In 1950, as famine ravaged India, the Truman administration decided to try to lure India 
out of non-alignment by offering aid in the form of wheat.  Although India had suffered from
lack of foodstuffs since its independence in 1947, Nehru had refused to ask for aid.  Not 
December 16, 1949—when a combination of floods and droughts over the course of the previou
twelve months had occurred throughout India, drastically diminishing wheat harvests—did 
Madame Pandit, Nehru’s sister and ambassador to the U.S., formally ask the U.S. State
Department for two million tons of wheat aid.189 Although Truman sent the newly convened
Eighty-Second Congress a special message urging food relief on February 12, Congress balked 
at the bill. Disappointed of Nehru’s policy of non-alignment and continuous refusal to 
reciprocate U.S. aid with strategic materials, Congress increasingly resisted the aid bill. An 
initial proposal of a $190 million grant shifted to a $95 million grant and a $95 million loan, and 
then to a $
to a $195 loan payable through unspecified raw materials before both Congress and 
Nehru would approve it.190  Truman finally signed the Emergency Indian Wheat Act on June 15, 
1951.191   
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In 1951, U.S. policy toward India changed, primarily because of one man, Chest
Bowles.  Loy Henderson’s tenure as ambassador to India ended in late 1951, and Truman moved 
him to be U.S. ambassador to Iran, a position requiring an experienced diplomat because of 
Mohammed Mossadegh’s threat to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the 
detrimental effects that this would have on British oil revenues.
er 
es declared that it was time “for Point 
Four, in  
 
 
 
 
).  
eneral 
1950, and finally he served as international chairman of the U.N. Children's Appeal from 1948 to 
1951.195 It was while touring war-torn Europe in January and February 1948 for the U.N. 
192   Bowles replaced Henderson 
in India.  Bowles enthusiastically championed economic development as the best method to 
solidify a democratic and friendly India instead of bilateral exchanges such as the Wheat Act. He 
distanced himself from the more military-oriented policy set forth by National Security Council 
in NSC-68, which had been approved in June 1950.  Bowl
 Asia, Africa, and South America to become Point One, to rank equally with our program
for military defense.”193  Bowles believed that only economic development could provide a solid
foundation on which to build lasting amicable relations.   
Bowles’ interest in economic development derived from experiences both in and out of
government. Born in Springfield, Massachusetts on April 5, 1901, he attended Yale University.  
He admitted that his ambition throughout college was to work for the U.S. State Department;194
however, when his father’s business fell into financial straits, he settled for a business degree, 
graduating in 1926. Upon graduation he started the very successful advertising company, Benton
and Bowles, with William Benton.  Although he enjoyed advertising, Bowles vowed to pursue 
his lifelong dream of government service when he turned 39. In 1940, the opportunity presented 
itself when he was offered the position of director of the Office of Price Administration (OPA
From the OPA Bowles went on to work as a delegate to United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1946 and as Special Assistant to the Secretary G
of the United Nations from 1947 to 1948. He was the governor of Connecticut from 1948 to 
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Children’s Appeal that Bowles realized his life’s ambition.196 The sight of malnourished children 
three years after the end of hostiles convinced Bowles that his mission in life had to be to “crea
international understanding and encourage greater cooperation among all people regardless of 
ideology.”
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197 Although his revelation came from his experience in Europe, Bowles directed his
energy toward the Third World. He believed Europe was on its way to recovery while the real 
need resided in the periphery nations. When asked by Truman in which country he would prefer 
to serve as ambassador, Bowles immediately chose India.  To this Truman abrasively responded, 
divulging h
198  
After overcoming a formidable attempt to block his confirmation, led by Ohio Senator 
Robert Taft, Bowles zealously went to work.  With a staff of only 148 people, half those of U.S. 
ambassadors to Mexico, Italy, and Greece, and a third of that to France, Bowles set out to ensure
that he used each person as efficiently as possible. In comparison to Henderson, who primari
assigned office jobs, Bowles directed his staff to spend thirty percent of their time traveling 
throughout the country, even at the expense of assigned paperwork.  Bowles himself crossed 
India fourteen times from east to west and six times north to south.199 He visited remote villages 
and major construction sites and met with Indian people ranging from Nehru himself all th
down to farm laborers in isolated countrysides.  All staff member and their families were 
enrolled in classes on Indian history, culture, and language.200 The Bowles children—Sam, Sally, 
and Cynthia—enrolled in Ind
 to work every day.   
Bowles took over the Point Four Program in India and secured a link with Truman in 
order to maintain autonomy from other Point Four administrators throughout the world.  A
time of Bowles’ arrival in India, the Point Four Program in India, led by Clifford Wilson, 
Bernard Loshbough, and Horace Holmes, had 114 staff members.  Although assigning only 114 
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people to develop a country of almost 350 million makes it seem that Point Four directors cared
little for India, in proportion to the rest of Point Four Program, India’s staff was quite large.  By 
the middle of 1951, only 350 technicians worked for the Point Four Program throughout tw
seven countries.
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201  Although Truman had announced the program in January 1949, Point F
actually began operating on June 5, 1950 when Congress passed and Truman signed the Foreign 
Economic Assistance Bill, which became Title IX, the Act for International Development 
(AID).202  Truman delegated the responsibility to implement the program to Acheson.  
October 27, 1950 Acheson created the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) within the
State Department to administer the program and appointed Dr. Henry Bennett as its directo
November 14, 1950.203  However, technical assistance under Point Four suffered from 
amorphous authority and poorly defined jurisdiction. The TCA had to share authority with t
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs 
(IIAA).  The TCA primarily operated in India, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.  T
ECA, created as part of the Marshall Plan, operated under both Point Four and the Foreign 
Assistance Acts of 1948 and 1950.  Its primary operations were in the Far Eastern countries 
French Indo-China, Taiwan, Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines.204  The IIAA, 
because it had been conducting technical assistance similar to Point Four in Central and South 
America since 1940, was not replaced but acted as the operating arm of the TCA within its 
designated area.  Although the TCA and ECA 
ce in nearly every country receiving Point Four aid, often simultaneously.  Bowles seized 
on Point Four’s amorphous authority and jurisdiction to secure a direct line to Truman and
authority over Point Four operations in India. 
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Bowles used his extensive advertising experience to bombard Congress and the Pres
with pleas for an enlarged economic development program in India; however, his efforts 
produced very little.  In 1950 and 1951, Senator McCarthy’s domestic communist hunts and 
Chinese entry into the Korean conflict exacerbated the U.S. public’s anxiety about the threa
communism. Rather than increased economic aid, the public insisted on increased military 
preparedness.   The public’s call for increased security measures spurred Congress to reorganize 
and restructure several foreign aid organizations from 1951 to 1952. The Point Four Program 
was included. Poi
ident 
t of 
nt Four became integrated into the new Mutual Security Program (MSP) 
directed a. 
f the 
hich 
ity Development project.  
Bowles  
ther 
derived  
 
.S.   
                                                
 by W. Averell Harriman; however, Bowles maintained his total authority over Indi
Although the budget of Point Four increased, the new program favored military spending.  O
MSP’s $6.5 billion budget for 1952 only $140 million went to Point Four, $45 million of w
went to India.205 
With less than fifty per cent of his desired budget, Bowles still managed to create a 
program in India unlike any other Point Four project. Bowles’ approach differed from other 
Point Four projects because he combined agriculture, education, health, and infrastructure 
improvement into one integrated approach known as a Commun
 derived the idea from Dr. James Y.C. Yen, a Chinese citizen and Yale graduate. Dr. Yen
had discovered, as Bowles put it, “that far more could be accomplished in each of these fields if 
these three workers (food, health, and education) went as a team, entering the villages toge
and developing a broad, coordinated development program.”206 
Bowles said that he founded his development program on a theory of political evolution 
 from his “reading of American History, firsthand observation of our two political parties
in action, and thousands of talks with fellow citizens in all walks of life in most of our 48 
states.”207 Bowles made his theory public in the Godkin Lectures at Harvard in 1955.  Bowles
surmised that all nations developed along the same three-stage path already travelled by the U
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The first stage began around 1800, while Thomas Jefferson occupied the oval office
consisted of a combination of Jeffersonian republicanism and Hamiltonian federalism. Jefferson 
supported a nation founded on yeoman farmers exercising power through local governments 
while Hamilton desired a nation of commerce and manufacturing, administered by stronger 
federal government. This stage was represented by rugged individualism, poor systems of 
communications, but a general acceptance of effective federal government responsive to the w
of the people.
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208 The second phase started while Abraham Lincoln was president. Spurred on by
the Industrial Revolution, it consisted of an expansion of economic opportunities, broadening of 
civil rights, creative use of corporate institutions, and settlement of a supposedly untamed We
In this second phase, nationalism expanded and individualism weakened as Americans were 
brought together through new transportation and communication systems.209 In 1932, Franklin 
Roosevelt ushered in the third and final phase. Laissez faire economics gave way to what Bowles 
called a “general acceptance of governmental responsibility for minimum standards of living 
[and] opportunity”210 and for intervention into the economy.  Bowles claimed that the Americ
historical experience was “similar in many ways to what we now see being undertaken in much 
of Asia, Africa, and South America, where the social structure is beginning to feel the full impact 
of the industrial revolution which we faced a century ago.”211 Bowles believed development 
occurred in stages and tacitly positioned India within the American historical experience. He 
predicted that the emphasis of Community Development projects would evolve from agricultu
education, and health and sanitation concerns to village level industrialization and production
He predicted that India would be self-sufficient in food
onomic growth.”213 Bowles thought that it was possible to accelerate India through
predetermined path.  The emphasis within Community Development projects on agric
health and sanitation, and education were merely the first steps in the modernization process 
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Bowles’ opportunity to apply his theory came on January 5, 1952 when Nehru and 
Truman signed the Indo-American Technical Agreement, approving the Community 
Development Program (CDP).214   In the Community Development Program, India was divid
into development areas.  Each area consisted of between 150,000 and 300,000 people and 
revolved around a central town of 5,000 to 10,000 people.
ed 
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onal perspectives by connecting previously isolated towns and 
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215 The central town housed an 
administrative headquarters, a hospital, and a center for health, educational, and agricultura
improvement. Each center employed around 125 Indian workers and housed American experts in 
agriculture, health and sanitation, education, and administration, commissioned by the State 
Department.  To replicate America’s “second phase” of development, Bowles ordered the 
construction of roads, infrastructure, and communication systems linking the entire development 
area to the central town.  Roads and communication systems were designed to break antiquated
village allegiances and instill nati
 into regional units.  On October 2, 1952, what would have been Mahatma Gandhi’s 84th 
birthday, fifty-five Community Development projects were launched covering 17,000 villag
and nearly 11 million people.216 
The program’s emphasis on state-directed improvement in agriculture, education, health 
and sanitation, and infrastructure revealed that Point Four policymakers accepted and used 
Keynesian economics. The number of American economists exploded in the decades followi
World War II. Whereas the American Economic Association (AEA) had 3,000 members on the 
eve of World War II, only 500 more than in 1912, membership doubled within a decade after 
World War II. By 1980 AEA membership increased six-fold.217 The number of economists 
working as government advisors increased even faster. The dominant economic theory accepte
among the new economists was Keynesianism. Historian Richard Parker noted that “Keynesia
economics did ‘triumph’ after World War II and in a fashion that…did dramatically transform 
the profession (and) the function of government.”218 Keynesianism gained ascendency within 
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American economics in the latter years of the New Deal, notably after the recession of 1937.  
The recession of 1937 seemingly brought to light the inadequacies of the older form of polices 
that favored government trust-busting and the breakup of monopolies to ensure that corpo
power remained in check and that competition was guaranteed.
rate 
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ay, a 
en 
Keynes claimed that during the Depression the lack of effective demand trapped the economy in 
                                                
219  Economists who favored 
these policies maintained that government-facilitated competition would bring pro
wath of the population by eliminating concentrated power and profit. Once governm
successfully operated as the “broker” among economic interests, economists maintained, the 
private sector and market would be able to revitalize an economy stuck in a lull.  
The recession of 1937 inspired New Deal liberals and economists to entertain new 
Keynesian ideas about the role of government in the economy.  Historian Alan Brinkley states 
that, four years later, as United States became involved in World War II, the need to quickly and 
efficiently mobilize large amounts of material quieted “liberal hostility to capitalism and the
corporate world” and ushered in a prevalent acceptance of Keynesian economics.220 Brinkley ha
pointed out that John Maynard Keynes argued that “the state could manage the economy without 
managing the institutions of the economy.”221 No longer did the government rely solely on 
breaking up areas of economic concentration to ensure the ameliorative function of the market; 
Keynes argued that the government could spur the economy by supplementing market forces and 
leaving most corporations intact. Keynes disagreed with Say’s Law, after Jean-Baptiste S
nineteenth-century French economist, that both overproduction and high unemployment could 
not occur at the same time. Say argued that production created its own demand and demand th
created employment because businesses needed to hire additional employees to increase 
production. Keynes argued that a portion of profits was saved, withdrawing it from reinvestment 
and increased production, thereby slowing demand. The entire process could slow down, and 
eventually stop, possibly trapping the economy in overproduction or high unemployment.222 
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an equilibrium consisting of a low-level of production and high unemployment, and 
consumer spending nor business investment was capable of snapping the economy out of this 
funk.”
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223 Keynes’ theory afforded government an enlarged role.  Keynes supported 
countercyclical policies—policies that acted against the business cycle. Rather than view defici
spending—government spending during recessions when money was tight— as bad, Keynes 
supported spending and unbalanced budgets.  Government spending, such as for public work
projects, was to be the catalyst that would spur consumption and therefore economic growth.
The labor required for the projects would provide employment and income for thousands of 
unemployed citizens. The citizens would spend their salaries on various goods and services 
within the community, increasing consumption, thereby improving other sectors of the economy. 
Keynes’ “multiplier effect” stated that the effects would continue to radiate outwards, until t
entire economy had been jumpstarted back into growth.225 Once the economy had recovered 
progressed into a boom period, the government would raise taxes in order to curb too rapid 
growth and consequent inflation. Higher taxes would also correct the overspending that ha
d during the recession. Therefore Keynes tried to reduce the amplitude of swings between
recessions and boom times and settle the economy on a path of steady-sustained growth. 
Although Keynes wrote little on Third World nations themselves, development theoris
and policymakers applied his theories to economic development in the periphery.  Policymake
interpreted Third World economies as stuck in a long-term recession.  To facilitate economic 
growth, policymakers working on the development of the Third World from the 1940s to the 
1960s relied on Keynesian ideas.226 Historian Dennis Merrill claims that in addition to
works projects, Keynes identified specific key variables that “governments could manipulat
order to induce economic growth and plan economic performance.”227 Investment by 
government in areas including 
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ucture—typically marginalized by profit-seeking private businesses—would facilitate 
growth in the private sector.   
Growth was promoted in several ways. First, improvements in these specific areas 
provide a work force that was well fed, healthy, and educated, essentially constituting an 
investment in “human capital.” Second, well built infrastructure would facilitate efficient 
importation of supplies and distribution of products.  Third, the increased money supply from 
surplus agricultural yields would provide the population with the financial ability to consume 
more. Citizens would purchase new products and help sustain new businesses. Fourth, Keynes 
emphasized psychological aspects. Keynes devoted much attention to the argument that the 
perception of future profits—which Keynes termed the marginal efficiency of capital—m
as much as the current physical reality. Keynes argued that a “fundamental psychological fac
was “the psychological expectation of future yield from capital-assets.”228 Government 
investment in agriculture, education, health and sanitation, and infrastructure would provide 
confidence and convince investors to invest and consumers to consume, spurring economic 
growth.  The combination of these four phenomena would propel the country down the road o
development, eventually leading to self-sustained growth.  However, until Third World count
could achieve self-sufficiency, foreign aid programs would provide the crucial money for the 
initial investments.  Government relied on private business to carry on the economic growth 
begun by government investment. Historian David Hart explains that Western economists and 
experts would “calibrate the budget deficit or surplus to nudge aggregate economic indicato
onto the right track.”229 Historian Nils Gilman has asserted that, convinced by the Marshall Plan 
and its successful rehabilitation of European economies after World War II, policymakers 
working on the development of the Third World believed that “a mixed private-public eco
rated by professional economists trained in macroeconomic theory, represented the b
way to relieve the transitory and chronic poverty of much of the world’s population.”230
Given sufficient time and money, Truman and Bowles believed that the Point Four 
Program could economically strengthen the Third World; however, Point Four’s initial 
objectives were limited because it was a small self-help program.  Point Four policymakers 
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agreed that a substantial amount of investment in agriculture, education, health and sanitation
and infrastructure would accelerate Third World nations toward industrialization; but they w
also aware that both the United States’ financial resources and the unindustrialized nations’ 
absorptive capacity, or ability to effectively use financial aid, were limited.
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231  In contrast, 
America’s technical skills and the Third World populations’ ability to learn were limitless. 
Truman proclaimed, in his 1949 inaugural address, that “The United States is pre-eminent among
nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques. The material resources whic
we can afford to use for assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources 
in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible.”232 American experts in 
each of the designated development areas (e.g., agriculture) could provide technical assistan
relatively cheap compared to military spending—to Third World nations. By providing training 
and education, American experts could increase th
trialized nations could effectively absorb. Title IX, the act that originally created the Point 
Program, stated that the program could help 
the efforts of the peoples of economically underdeveloped areas to develop their resources and improve thei
working nd living conditions by encouraging the exchang  oa
of investment capital to countries which provide conditions under which such technical assistance and capita
can effectively and constructively contribute to raising standards of living, creating new sources of wealth, 
increasing productivity and expanding purchasing power.233 
 
In addition, a 1950 State Department brochure explained that “the Point IV Program calls 
for an intensification of existing efforts (technical assistance) to foster the international flow o
capital.”234 Once the Third World population had acquired the requisite skills and know
each area of development they would be able to effectively use financial aid. For example, a
modern asphalt road would be nearly impossible for untrained people to construct. The 
uneducated laborers would be unable to use effectively funds designated for this particular 
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infrastructure improvement.  American engineers could demonstrate which materials were 
needed and the most effective techniques in the process of road construction. Once educated and 
trained in modern road construction, the local population would be able to put financial ai
effective use throughout their region. They could effectively absorb more capital inv
d to 
estment.  In 
India, C
nd stage 
ity 
n may 
 
he 
re 
lds 
ves 
we are going to need three or four years from today if we are going to maintain the maximum 
ommunity Development Centers served as hubs, housing American experts who 
demonstrated modern techniques and products to help local people use foreign aid.  
Bowles viewed the improvements in agriculture, education, health and sanitation, and 
infrastructure—spurred by investment from the government and facilitated by technical 
assistance—as the first steps in the modernization process. Bowles believed that the seco
would consist of industrialization. The Indo-American agreement itself stated that Commun
Development was “to lay the proper foundation for the industrial and general economic 
development of the country.”235 As Dean Acheson pointed out in extemporaneous remarks 
delivered to the press shortly after Truman announced the Point Four concept, “In those areas 
where economic life is primitive and stagnant, a basic improvement in health and educatio
well be prerequisite to increased production and improved standards of living.”236  In Bowles’ 
mind, as improvement in agriculture, education, health and sanitation, and infrastructure 
occurred, industrialization would start at the local level. He pointed out that privately produced
consumer goods, such as “textiles, clothes, shoes, small-unit agricultural by-products and many 
other products,”237 would appear.  Rather than endear citizens to communist development, t
appearance of consumer goods would inspire capitalist modernization. Citizens’ desire to acqui
the new products would drive them to increase crop yields for the purpose of earning more 
disposable income.  The drive to form a profitable consumer market and increase crops yie
would form a symbiotic relationship, propelling each other down the road of development.  
Bowles explained that “such an undertaking could open immense possibilities for village 
industries, which in turn could provide the goods which would give the cultivators the incenti
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production which our technical efforts make theoretically possible.”238 Not only did Bow
envision the possibilities that Keynesian economics could produce domestic
les 
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ed what a domestically prosperous India could do on a global level. 
Focusing on the agricultural aspect of domestic prosperity, Bowles sought to improve 
India’s balance of payments by lowering its need for imports of food. Bowles believed that h
could strengthen the entire free world through developing Indian agriculture. India had few 
available non-strategic exports and, as the leader of a non-aligned country, Nehru refused to 
trade India’s profitable strategic materials, i.e., manganese, monazite, and beryl.239 Nehru had to 
purchase the immense quantity of wheat by liquidating sterling reserves.  To compensate,
was forced to take out hefty foreign loans and accrue substantial interest. India’s interest 
payments strained its economy and reduced standards of living—creating an environment that, in
American policymakers’ minds, was ripe for communism.240  In a special message to Cong
Truman declared: “The present food crisis, if permitted to continue, would magnify these 
difficulties and threaten the stability of India.”241 Bowles sought to use improved crop yields 
lower food import levels and free up precious currency for other imports from Europe or the 
United States.242  Europe and the United States would prosper domestically as levels of industrial
production rose to meet increased demand from India.  Truman explained that “an improvement 
of only two per cent in the living standards of Asia and Africa would keep the industrial plants of 
the United States, Great Britain, and France go
ed demand for goods and services.”243  
In Truman’s and Bowles’ logic, international trade was not a zero-sum game.  The United
States, Europe, and India would all prosper through mutually beneficial trade.  This proposition 
                                                 
238 Merrill, Bread and the Ballot, 85. 
239 Rotter, 95-108. 
240 George C. McGhee, “Indian Request for Food Grains,” to Dean Acheson (Washington D.C.: 30 January 
1951), in FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6, Asia and the Pacific Part 2, ed. Fredrick Aandahl (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1977), 
2100-2101.  
241Harry Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on the Famine in India”; available from 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=241&st=Special+Message+to+the+Congress+on+the+Fa
mine+in+India&st1=; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.  
242 Bowles, Ambassador’s Report, 161. 
243 Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, 238. 
 65
revealed that Point Four policymakers’ economic logic may have been domestically Keynes
but, in the earlier stages of Point Four, internationally classical. A major contributor to classic
international trade theory was David Ricardo. Ricardo advanced the theory of comparative 
advantage.  He argued that an international division of labor would benefit all nations. In the 
words of Richard Peet and Elaine Hartwick, each nation would produce (and then trade) “those 
commodities that it was best fitted to produce by virtue of natural or historical circumstances
Third World countries would specialize in the production of raw materials while the U.S. and 
Europe produced finished products and all could equally profit in a trading relationship. As 
countries in th
ian 
al 
.”244  
e Third World developed past the early stages of development, they would begin 
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strialize, becoming more like the West, and rely much less on the production of raw
materials.     
Although economic factors undoubtedly were major reasons for the direction and 
operations of
griculture, education, and health and sanitation helped facilitate the transition into 
modernity.  
The improvement of agriculture helped ease fluctuations of the population associated
with development.  In early 1951 Dr. Henry Bennett, the original director of the Technical 
Cooperation Administration (one of the three organizations that administered the program), 
pioneered a successful agricultural improvement program in Etawah, India under Point F
became the prototype for later projects.  He argued that the key to sound economic developmen
was food production because improved health and sanitation exponentially enlarged the 
population by increasing life expectancies and lowering infant morality rates.245 The enlarged 
population required more food.  Second, Dr. Bennett accepted the proposition set forth around 
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population would dissipate improvement in living conditions, returning living standards to
original low equilibrium.
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246  However, Bennett differed from Malthus in that he believed 
economic development and improved living standards could be made permanent.  D.S. Brooks
the president of the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, even coined the term “stomach 
communism” to explain the assumption among Point Four policymakers that starving people 
were most likely to choose radical amelioration schemes.247 Once again advocating economic 
over military aid Bowles declared, “A hungry and depresse
n American troops and a hundred atom bombs.”248 
Within his first month in India, Bowles visited the Etawah project and decided to adopt 
as the model for his development program.  The provincial government of Etawah, a province
located in northern Indian in Uttar Pradesh on the Gangetic Plain, had requested help to raise 
agricultural yields.  Albert Meyer, the Point Four advisor assigned to Etawah, recruited Horace 
Holmes, another Point Four agricultural technician and former Tennessee county agent, to help 
in Etawah.  A veteran of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNR
in China, Holmes, suggested using a new wheat seed known as Punjab 591.  Because most
Etawah farmers lived on the edge of starvation, they were hesitant to risk an entire year’s 
harvest. Holmes convinced a select number of farmers near the village of Mahewa to experim
with the new seed. When their yields rose twenty-six percent, others became convinced an
planted Punjab 591. With a secure food supply, Point Four technician Jonathan Bingham
claimed, the pe
on.”249 
The Indian Point Four Program under Bowles emphasized education because it provid
the widespread technical ability required by an industrialized society. At the most basic level 
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Bowles sought to eliminate illiteracy.  Although Point Four had a student exchange program
more advanced subjects like engineering and medicine, the exchange program had trouble 
reaching average agricultural villagers who could not leave the land for an extended time.
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250  
Bowles brought in Frank Laubach, an American literacy expert, to create a literacy program tha
gave “down-to-earth information” to reach even India’s poorest citizens. Bowles believed that 
the British had created the Indian university system to produce “little brown Englishmen.”251 
The Indian scholar was too disconnected from the day-to-day life of the people.  Bowles 
explained that, because the university system often trapped these scholars between the future a
the past, they often reacted with deleterious nostalgia or radical political philosophies. To 
remedy this situation, policymakers created village-based schools that reached the maximum 
number of people with practical information.  Bowles expressed the view that “perhaps the bes
fruit of all is that the projects are bringing together educated India with village India.”252  
Education also assisted the process of democracy. Bowles explained: “There are hundreds
millions of very wise villagers who have never had a chance to read and write, but who kn
how to talk intelligently about their problems and to cast a thoughtful vote.”253 Bowles believe
that illiteracy created a political system ripe for manipulation and tampering.  If all persons could 
y cast their own votes, the democratic process would improve and attract more 
In addition to agriculture and education, Point Four policymakers emphasized 
improvement in health and sanitation. Point Four technicians focused on sanitation over heal
because they believed it created more advantageous long-term results while curing sickness 
produced only short-term relief.  The elimination of diseases rampant in India such as malaria, 
yaws, and yellow fever increased the energy of citizens and increased the number of hours each
could work in a day.  The Point Four Program in India financed American doctors, nurses, and 
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marked recessions in living standards, in order that we may at one and the same time develop 
                                                
 engineers to construct health facilities for the administration of vaccinations and sanitary 
structures, such as water purification systems. 
Bowles believed that his Community Development concept provided a rock-solid method
to develop India.  Guided by his own theory of political evolution derived from America’s 
historical experience, Bowles sought to create the necessary conditions to usher India down the 
road of development.254  Technical assistance would provide India with the necessary skills to 
able to absorb and effectively use foreign aid.255  Improvements in agriculture, education, healt
and sanitation, and infrastructure would provide the necessary foundation and environment to
sustain industrialization and a new consumer market.  Profit from higher crop yields, spent by 
farmers on the expanded consumer market, would increase the income of a large number of 
Indian entrepreneurs.256  Prosperous entrepreneurs would invest profits in new technology 
spend money on additional consumer products, spreading prosperity to a wider swath of th
population.  An India self-sufficient in food would free up precious foreign exchange and 
increase the diversity of imports, improving the economy of all countries participating in 
trade.257  In addition, agriculture, education, and health and sanitation would feed the growin
population, narrow the gulf between educate
ing of the population.  Everything would combine to jump-start the Indian economy 
down the path to self-sustained prosperity. 
Although Bowles had unending confidence in his development scheme, Eisenhower d
not. Bowles’ Community Development projects in India had only been in operation for thre
months when Eisenhower took office in January 1953. The ascendency of an administration 
more conservative than Truman’s put Bowles on the defensive. In June 1953, Eisenhower 
terminated the Point Four Program. Eisenhower called for a balanced budget and a reduction in 
expensive open-ended foreign aid programs.  Eisenhower claimed that “it is not easy to convin
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backward countries and relieve starvation, while bearing the expenses and costs of battle in the 
more fortunate countries.”258  
Eisenhower, during his first term, rejected programs of development. He thought that the 
programs were too expensive.  He claimed that they “could alter the very nature of American 
society, either through the debilitating effects of inflations or through regimentation in the form 
of economic controls.”259  Eisenhower distrusted Keynesian economists such as Leon 
Keyserling, Truman’s economic advisor, who argued that government spending could spur 
economic growth and create additional sources of profit, thereby offsetting in the future the 
deficit spending done during recessions. Eisenhower was unconvinced that the government 
needed to spend more to earn more.  He saw overspending as a risky and unsound policy.260 
Historian John Lewis Gaddis has argued that Eisenhower believed that a costly defense strategy 
ran the risk of ruining the sole thing it was meant to sustain, the American way of life.261 
Eisenhower thought the best strategy was a fiscally conservative one.   
However, the absence of contact between the administration and advocates of foreign 
economic aid only lasted a short while.  In 1954 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles directed 
C.D. Jackson, his special assistant for international affairs, to set up an informal meeting on how 
the U.S. could promote free trade and maintain geopolitical security.262  The meeting took place 
in Princeton and eventually became known as the Princeton Inn Conference. Jackson invited 
businessmen, labor leaders, government officials and academics, including future modernization 
theorists Max Millikan and Walt Rostow.  Rostow later explained that “in the peaceful setting of 
Princeton Inn a rough-and-ready consensus did emerge that an enlarged global initiative by the 
United States in support of development was required.”263 Jackson enlisted Rostow and Millikan 
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to write a report stating the conclusions of the conference. Rostow and Millikan entitled their 
report Objectives of the United States Economic Assistance Programs (1954). 
In Objectives Rostow and Millikan called for a shift in emphasis from military to 
economic aid. Economic aid entailed financial and technical aspects. Financially, the U.S. would 
provide grants to non-communist countries throughout the world to end economic stagnation and 
spur worldwide economic growth through industrialization. Technically, America would 
disseminate technical and scientific knowledge to help poverty-stricken areas effectively use 
economic aid and overcome roadblocks to the development process.  
Eisenhower knew of Rostow and Millikan’s report but remained unconvinced. 
Eisenhower maintained his belief that economic aid programs were too expensive. He remained 
in tune with fiscally conservative allies such as George M. Humphrey, Herbert Hoover, Jr., and 
Joseph Dodge.264 
Undiscouraged by Eisenhower’s decision, Rostow and Millikan spent the next three years 
expanding and sharpening their argument. The result was the 1957 publication of A Proposal: 
Key to an Effective Foreign Policy. Rostow later enthusiastically described it as “a book that had 
some impact on policy”265 (italics mine). Rostow admitted that “the protracted debate on foreign 
aid for development purposes was, in a quiet way, one of the most dramatic strands in the 
Eisenhower administration.”266 As the 1950s wore on economic development became somewhat 
of an intellectual fad. Russell Edgerton, a political scientist and Rostow’s and Millikan’s 
contemporary, explained that “nothing else on the scene in Washington rivaled the grand scale of 
the Millikan-Rostow proposal nor the sophistication of its presentation…as the different parts of 
the Executive and Congress launched reappraisals of aid in different directions with different 
motives, Millikan and Rostow supplied them all with a common theme.” 267 A Proposal did 
indeed have an impact on policymakers, including soon-to-be-President John Fitzgerald 
Kennedy, but the authors’ conception of development, and the U.S. role in accelerating it, 
resembled that of Point Four policymakers’ conception.  
                                                 
264 Rostow, Concept and Controversy, 211; Gaddis, 132-133, 146. 
265 Rostow, Concept and Controversy, 188. 
266 Ibid., 207. 
267 Ibid., 198. 
 71
A Proposal was founded on many of the same assumptions about development and ways 
in which the U.S. could induce economic modernization such as the Point Four Program in India. 
Like Bowles with his theory of political evolution, Rostow and Millikan also relied on a 
metanarrative derived from the Western historical experience to measure the modernity of each 
developing country and forecast its future trajectory. Fellow modernization theorist Daniel 
Lerner explained that developing countries would follow “paths to the present already marked 
out by the historical experience of modernization of the West” and that “modernizers will do 
well to study the historical sequence of Western growth.”268  Mark Haefele has claimed that 
“Rostow provided a system that imposed order on this chaos because, in his model, all nations 
were merely at different points on the same development path.”269  Like Bowles, they figured 
that development occurred slightly differently everywhere but that each society did go through 
the same stages of development and end at a universal modern stage.  Modernity was not a 
heterogeneous culmination of all the world’s cultural, political, and economic traditions in a 
higher order containing the best of each society. Rather it was a phenomenon outlined by the 
contemporary United States.  As made clear by the United States, modern society, as Gilman 
pointed out, was “cosmopolitan, mobile, controlling of the environment, secular, welcoming of 
change, and characterized by a complex division of labor.”270 
In A Proposal, Rostow and Millikan placed all past events into three, later expanded by 
Rostow to five, stages of development. No longer were historical events isolated occasions that 
occurred because of unique circumstances; now events were evidence of a country’s current 
stage of development. Rostow and Millikan formulated three stages: preconditions, take-off, and 
self-sustained growth.  The preconditions stage started with agriculturally based nations using 
low-productivity techniques.  Each country then began to develop along the path of 
development: education broadened, both internal and external commerce widened, capital 
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expanded, and transportation, communication, and health care improved.271  To Rostow and 
Millikan, the U.S. had gone through the preconditions stage from 1790 to 1840.  Rostow and 
Millikan posited that a country reached take-off when the national rate of saving reached around 
10 percent and the country pushed forth toward a phase of sustained and irreversible growth.  
The authors argued that “a new class of businessmen emerges and acquires control over the key 
decisions determining the use of savings.”  Technology spread to nearly all facets of the 
economy, generating rapid increases in production. The United States’ take-off occurred between 
1840 and 1860.272  Finally, Rostow and Millikan asserted that the stage of self-sustained growth 
consisting of a “long period of regular if fluctuating progress” where “10 to 20 per cent of the 
national income is steadily plowed back into expanding productive capacity.”273  The economy 
constantly changes and adapts to new technology and techniques. Furthermore the domestic 
economy becomes interwoven with the international economy.  
In the two years following the publication of A Proposal Rostow published The Stages of 
Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.274 Although both A Proposal and Stages were 
filled with economic terms, Rostow and Millikan recognized that development also had social 
and political dimensions. The dissatisfaction with modernization schemes that primarily focused 
on the economic aspects, to the detriment of cultural, social, and psychological aspects, set 
modernization theory apart from previous models of development.  Rostow emphasized the 
impact of a given country’s propensities on the development process. He specified six 
propensities: “the propensity to develop fundamental science; to apply science to economic ends; 
to accept the possibilities of innovation; to seek material advance; to consume; and to have 
children.”275  Rostow emphasized propensities to create a more comprehensive and, in his mind, 
superior theory to his self-proclaimed rival Karl Marx. Rostow argued that Marx gave too much 
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attention to the economic structure and failed to recognize the impact of political, social, and 
cultural systems on economic modernization. The concept of propensities gave Rostow a way to 
include political, social, and cultural aspects.  He argued that a change in propensities occurred 
concurrently with economic modernization. At times they helped, such as when the propensity to 
seek material advancement drove entrepreneurs to improve the economic state of the country; 
and, at times they hurt, when the propensity to have children drove individuals to withdrawal 
from material advancement to focus on spending more time with and raising their children.  
Because all six propensities could not be maximized at once, they created a never-ending 
tension, slowing or accelerating economic modernization.276 
Although modernization theorists were dissatisfied with development theories based 
solely on economics, they accepted that economics was still a major component of 
modernization. Far from disappearing, the economic foundation of development theory remained 
more or less intact. Both Millikan and Rostow held Ph.Ds from Yale, Millikan in economics and 
Rostow in economic history. Not surprisingly economics was a major component of their 
development theories. Rostow and Millikan explained: “Not only is economic growth a 
prerequisite for political, cultural, and social improvement, it can also be an engine of such 
improvement.”277  They stressed the centrality of economic factors in development: 
Most cultural, educational, and social issues are directly related to economic problems.  Village education 
requires schools, equipment, and the support of teachers; public health requires medical services, better 
nutrition, and better housing; social justice frequently depends on land redistribution and community 
services; a wider communication of ideas demands roads, radio, films and, about all, literacy and the written 
word that then comes to life.278 
 
As made apparent by their comment, they identified primary growth sectors that were very 
similar to those identified in Keynes’ economic theory and Bowles’ efforts in India.  Millikan 
and Rostow admitted the continuity of their economic thought with that of the past: “The tasks of 
the preconditions period (e.g., in Black Africa) remain as they have long been: the buildup of 
infrastructure, the education of a generation of modern men, the creation of institutions which 
can absorb technology and mobilize capital; the expansion of agriculture to permit the growing 
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cities to be fed; and the generation of increased export earning capacity.”279 Both realized that 
the private sector could do only so much. They viewed the lack of development that had existed 
in traditional countries for centuries as a failure of the private sector to jump-start modernization. 
To remedy the problem, both put forth proposals that—building on Keynesian economics—
relied on government spending to set modernization in motion.280  Government spending in areas 
such as agriculture, education, infrastructure, and health and sanitation all propelled traditional 
countries toward modernity in important ways.  
As had been the case in the Point Four Program in India, improvement of agriculture held 
primacy in Rostow’s Stages. Because the population of traditional societies predominantly relied 
on agriculture as their means for livelihood, Rostow understood that it must be the cornerstone of 
any modernization theory. In his 1955 essay, “Marx was a City Boy, or Why Communism May 
Fail,” Rostow argued that Karl Marx created a faulty theory because he failed to fully consider 
agriculture in development. Rostow noted that “agricultural development is vastly more 
important in modernizing a society than we used to think” and, like industry, modernizing 
agriculture required “that the skills of organization developed in the modern urban sectors of the 
society be brought systematically into play around the life of the farmer.”281  Differing little from 
the logic of Bowles, Truman, Acheson, and Bennett, Rostow identified three major purposes 
agricultural improvement would serve: provision of food for the growing population, the 
accumulation of capital for development from increased productivity, and the freeing up of 
foreign exchange.  
The belief that poverty and all its repercussions, such as malnutrition, created a setting 
ripe for communism remained an important component of Rostow’s logic. He stated: “Success in 
resisting the combination of subversion and guerilla operations depends directly on the political, 
economic, and social health of the area attacked. A substantial part of American and Free World 
policy must be devoted to eliminating or preventing those circumstances under which subversion 
can succeed.”282 Because starvation held political as well as physical repercussions, the 
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modernizing country’s growing population required a food supply to match. Self-sufficient 
farmers became inadequate in a developing country. During transition the urban population 
disproportionally grew in comparison to the rural populace. The burden of feeding the urban 
population fell directly on the farmers. Fewer farmers were expected to feed the rapidly 
increasing urban population.  Better seeds and techniques became imperative.283 Better crop 
yields eased modernization.  
As already mentioned, in addition to feeding the population, Rostow believed that 
agriculture played a key role in development as a source of capital.  As had been made evident in 
the development of the West, predominantly agricultural societies were sure to make the 
transition into industrial societies dominated by industry, communications, trade, and services.284 
The immense cost of launching the transition could not be met by profits from a nascent 
industrial sector; it could only be met by improvement in agriculture. Rostow argued that the 
most efficient way to acquire the capital needed was to apply quick-yielding changes in 
agricultural productivity.  New seeds, fertilizer, and irrigation techniques could quickly increase 
crop yields. Although Rostow never mentioned the introduction of Punjab 591 in Etawah, India 
under Point Four, it was a striking example of how Rostow proposed to rapidly increase 
productivity. Also, in agreement with Keynes’ multiplier effect, Rostow theorized that farmers 
would spend their newly-acquired profits on consumer goods, invest a portion in items of capital 
for agriculture such as chemical fertilizers, farm machinery, and diesel pumps, and increase their 
private savings rates.285 Each action would stimulate other sectors: the consumer market would 
become more lucrative and expand, the farming industries would grow, and private saving would 
provide capital for a whole host of development ventures. Previously idle laborers would find 
employment in the expanded areas. Rostow stated: “In short, an environment of rising real 
incomes in agriculture, rooted in increased productivity, may be an important stimulus to new 
modern industrial sectors essential to the take-off.”286 
In Stages increased productivity in agriculture could also bring international prosperity.  
In agreement with Truman’s and Bowles’ logic for the Point Four Program, Rostow viewed 
                                                 
283 Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, 22, 142. 
284 Ibid., 18-19. 
285 Ibid., 23, 52. 
286 Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, 23. 
 76
agricultural exports as a catalyst for modernization. Not only would selling agricultural surpluses 
bring in money, it would also free up precious capital and improve the trade balances of 
developing countries. Without the need to import food, developing countries would be able to 
import the capital and supplies needed for development; Rostow stated that a “major new and 
rapidly enlarging export sector which, in turn, [will] serve to generate capital for internal 
development.”287 The developing country would prosper domestically while fellow capitalist 
countries would profit from selling their manufactured products abroad.  
 In both A Proposal and Stages Rostow and Millikan realized that, although new seeds 
and fertilizers could help bring increased prosperity, permanent material prosperity could not be 
exported whole; the technical skills needed to maintain self-sustained prosperity must also be 
acquired. As had been the case in the Point Four Program, they understood that “it does little 
good to supply money to build plants if there are no skilled workers to operate them, no 
competent administrators to manage them….take-off into continuing growth cannot occur until 
certain minimum preconditions of education, skills and attitudes….have been established.”288 In 
other words, the people of developing countries were unable to effectively use—or in Rostow 
and Millikan’s term “absorb”—foreign aid and resources without the necessary skills and 
techniques.289  They envisaged that the U.S. could supply the know-how through a world 
program of technical assistance, similar in many ways to the Point Four Program. The program 
would be carried out on a nation by nation basis and initially consist of basic education and 
demonstration, optimally progressing to advanced training in subject such as in engineering, 
medicine, administration, and economics.290 American experts would calculate the absorptive 
capacity of each country by evaluating “the technical and a managerial capacity available, the 
size, stability, and motivations of the nonagricultural labor force, the level of skills and 
education, the development of markets, the state of basic facilities for transport, communications, 
power, and community services.”291 Countries considered to be in the traditional or pre-
conditions stages required more technical assistance and less capital investment while countries 
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at the take-off stage and beyond required the opposite.  Once modernizing countries acquired 
technical abilities, their capacity to effectively absorb capital investment would rise. 
Development programs would shift from technical assistance to material aid.  
In both their books and their comments throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Rostow and 
Millikan testified to the importance of keeping India non-communist. They invoked 
modernization theory as the best method to secure India for the Free World. Although their form 
of modernization theory rested on the same logic and assumptions held by Point Four 
policymakers such as Bowles, Truman, Acheson, and Bennett, Rostow and Millikan never 
mentioned Point Four as an influence as they formed and elucidated their theory. The absence of 
acknowledgment does not indicate an absence of connection. It more likely reveals a common 
thread in thinking about development running from the 1940s through the 1960s. Both Bowles 
and Rostow and Millikan defined development as a linear phenomenon exemplified by the 
United States’ historical development. Both accepted that the process could be accelerated 
through American efforts abroad. Both relied on Keynesian economic theory and prescribed 
government intervention and assistance to jump-start development. Both ordered technical 
assistance to increase the capacity of developing countries to absorb government aid. Both 
identified agriculture, education, health and sanitation, and infrastructure as the best sectors 
through which to start the modernization process. Because both shared the same logic and 
assumptions when identifying a continuum from traditional and modernity and the engines to 
accelerate that progress, they both fell into the same pitfalls when applying their theories.  
Although he worked tirelessly and cared deeply for India, Bowles fell into the same 
faulty assumptions as modernization theorists.  Both assumed that American-style capitalism 
could be implanted into India.  Both also failed to consider the friction to the modernization 
process created by India’s entrenched abject poverty, caste system, socioeconomic hierarchy, 
immense population, and restrictive land policies.292 Each placed too much confidence in the 
ability of experts and technology to transform a foreign society.   Finally, each equally accepted 
the proposition elucidated by David Potter that prosperity inherently led to democracy.  Historian 
Michael Hunt explained that they assumed that “sophisticated science and technology would 
push aside primitive agricultural and handicraft techniques and create new wealth and 
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prosperity,”293 invariably leading to democracy. Historian Andrew Rotter claims that Bowles 
stood as “the most successful American diplomat in India during the Nehru period.”294 Bowles’s 
enthusiasm and devotion to India led him to champion economic development.  Yet, as the first 
Cold Warrior to seriously theorize about development, he faced the arduous task of transforming 
theory into practice without lessons and guidance from other Cold War development 
experiments. Bowles was unable to carry his theory to fulfillment in action because Eisenhower 
prematurely ended both the Point Four Program and Bowles’ ambassadorship in 1953. However 
Bowles’ logic and efforts reappeared in economic development efforts a decade later. Given 
more time and money Bowles’ program and theory might have become more comprehensive, 
containing the social elements that made modernization theory unique; however, Congress’ 
marginalization of Point Four ensured that Bowles’ efforts only laid the foundation which upon 
modernization theorists built an all encompassing theory of development.
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 CHAPTER 4 - Consistent Conceptions of Modern and Traditional: 
The Occupation of Japan as an Antecedent to Modernization 
Theory  
On May 5, 1951, testifying before a Senate joint committee, General Douglas MacArthur 
declared: “If the Anglo-Saxon was say 45 years of age in his development, in the sciences, the 
arts, divinity, culture…they [Japanese] would be like a boy of twelve.”295 MacArthur had just 
completed five and a half years as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) in the 
occupation of Japan after World War II.  Inherent in MacArthur’s comment was his belief that 
societies, like humans, develop from childhood to adulthood. MacArthur believed the United 
States had achieved maturity while the Japanese remained underdeveloped and immature.  
MacArthur’s comments also revealed an assumption underlying the U.S. occupation: that the 
Japanese had independently begun development and only needed guidance through the final 
stages.  The occupation and its authorities held similarities to and served as an example for 
modernization theorists who formed their theory of development in the following decade. The 
occupation authorities identified the same traditional and modern characteristics as 
modernization theorists, they provided an example of a successful authoritarian/military 
modernization but differed from modernization theorists because they lacked a systematic theory 
of transition, the hallmark of modernization theory.  
Authorities believed that feudalism was still present in Japan even at the end of World 
War II, and they aimed to eliminate its vestiges in Japanese traditions.  Japan’s feudal society 
was stratified based on ascription, without widespread suffrage or political representation, and it 
was also controlled by religion. The characteristics identified by the authorities as feudal were 
the same as the characteristics within the “traditional” category formulated by modernization 
theorists. The occupation authorities’ ideal society—democratic, secular, stratified by merit, and 
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rational—also was the same as the society envisioned as “modern” in modernization theory.  
Accordingly the General Headquarters (GHQ), SCAP focused on accelerating the Japanese move 
into full maturity through reform in areas such as democratization, meritocracy, secularization, 
and civil rights. Without the luxury of time, MacArthur attempted to impose rapid American-
style modernization onto Japan. To accomplish this he ordered American authorities to rewrite 
the Japanese Constitution in one week without Japanese input. During the 1960s, modernization 
theorists faced with countries thought to be lethargic in the modernizing process, increasingly 
advocated modernization in the manner of MacArthur during the occupation. They believed that 
benign authoritarians could help traditional countries achieve modernity—as MacArthur had 
helped Japan—and prevent the spread of communism. As the Cold War rivalry between the 
United States and the Soviet Union intensified in the late 1940s, GHQ undertook a “reverse 
course” and tried to fashion Japan into a stable Cold War ally through economic rehabilitation.  
The “reverse course” marginalized social, cultural, and political modernization but emphasized 
the economic preconditions modernization theorists considered vital to lasting democracy.  
Consequently, SCAP pushed for social, cultural, and political modernization through revision of 
the constitution from 1946 to 1947 and for a prosperous economy by resurrecting the prewar 
economic pillars from 1948 to 1952, but never at the same time. In contrast, modernization 
theorists saw the transition from “traditional” to “modern” as a systematic process requiring 
simultaneous change in the political, social, cultural, and economic structure of a given society.   
There is little scholarship connecting the thoughts of the American policymakers in the 
occupation of Japan with those of modernization theorists. Historian Sheldon Garon has 
explained that “Modernization theory profoundly influenced Japanese studies in the United 
States during the late 1950s and 1960s.”296 However, scholars in the 1950s and 1960s who 
studied modernization theory in Japanese history were more like “fellow travelers” of 
modernization theory than critics forming an alternative theory about development. Rather than 
evaluate American efforts during the occupation in light of what would become modernization 
theory, these scholars, such as Edwin O. Reischauer, Marius Jansen, John W. Hall, and Ronald 
Dore, viewed Japanese history through the prism of modernization theory. They argued about 
                                                 
296 Sheldon Garon, “Rethinking Modernization and Modernity in Japanese History: A Focus on State-
Society Relations,” The Journal of Asian Studies 53:2 (1994): 347. 
 81
when Japan had attained the various stages of modernization, outlined by Rostow and Millikan, 
rather than examine the concept of modernization itself. They focused on Japan rather than on 
the intellectual and cultural foundation of the theory within American history. Their scholarship 
was also almost exclusively on pre-occupation Japan. When modernization theory came under 
attack in the late 1960s and 1970s, nearly all scholars dropped it as an analytical tool.  
Of the scholars who focused on the occupation period, other than modernization theorists 
themselves, none that I know of used modernization theory as an interpretative lens. Instead they 
celebrated the occupation as a splendid chapter in American history, appraising it as an absolute 
success for the Americans and Japanese alike.  This interpretation stood into the 1980s within 
works such as Sentimental Imperialists (1982) by James Thomson, Jr., Peter Stanley, and John 
Curtis Perry.297 Works in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, such as John Dower’s Embracing Defeat 
(1999), have challenged the interpretation of the occupation as benevolent and altruistic. Dower 
identified American efforts as a “neocolonial revolution” and examined the censorship of the 
Japanese press, “showcase justice” for Japanese leaders in World War II, and compulsory 
revision of the Meiji Constitution. Dower’s most important addition to the historiography of the 
occupation was his examination of the experience from the Japanese point of view. He examined 
how the Japanese reacted to and altered the American efforts of reform as they became codified 
into the Constitution and embedded in Japanese culture.298   
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As modernization theory reemerged as a popular historical subject in the 1990s and 
2000s, a few works connecting the theory to the occupation appeared. Some alluded to a 
connection without elaborating. For example, Odd Arne Westad claimed in The Global Cold 
War that “it was the restructuring of Japan that formed the main model for future American 
initiatives outside Europe.”299 Others, such as Olivier Zunz in Why the American Century?, 
devoted an entire chapter to the impact of ideas about modernization on the occupation. 
Although Zunz specifically discussed a few modernization theorists, such as Rostow, he used the 
term modernization largely to mean “Americanization.” His main focus was on how 
Americans—businessmen, scientists, engineers, professors, and government officials—tried to 
export their images of America and Americans. Those images were identified during the interwar 
years within an “institutional matrix,” concocted by corporations, research universities, 
government agencies, foundations, and the military.  He claimed: “Japan became arguably 
almost a laboratory for duplication of America aboard.”300  
Whereas Zunz identified how the ideas that Americans exported had been developed 
during the interwar years, this study examine the ideas about America society and culture in the 
1940s continued and resurfaced in modernization theory in the 1950s and 1960s. This study 
concentrates on the U.S. authorities’ original intentions rather than on how policies were altered 
and then embedded in Japanese culture. Hopefully by identifying connections between 
occupation authorities’ and modernization theorists’ conceptions of modernity and tradition, this 
study will provide a new way to interpret the occupation. Future scholars will hopefully interpret 
the occupation, not only as an unprecedented attempt at foreign reform, but also a predecessor to 
later models of development.   
In August 1945, the Americans entered a debilitated Japan. Around 2.7 million Japanese 
citizens, or 3.75% of Japanese total population, had been killed. Japan’s cities and infrastructure 
had suffered from three years of conventional, incendiary, and atomic bombs. Forty percent of 
Japan’s sixty-six largest cities had been destroyed.  The length and severity of the war had 
damaged Japan’s agriculture. Bombing had diminished domestic food production, while the U.S. 
Navy’s destruction of the Japanese merchant marine had made the importation of relief 
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foodstuffs impossible. At the time of surrender most of the population was suffering from 
malnutrition. Fifteen million Japanese were homeless, inflation was rampant, prices were 
soaring, and prostitution and the black market were flourishing.   The Japanese people were 
disillusioned from their long struggle and abysmal defeat. Americans, by contrast, entered Japan 
as exuberant victors, confident in themselves and their government. 
The United States had full control over the occupation.  Two international advisory 
committees had been set up to influence the occupation but, as historian John Dower observes, 
“The United States alone determined basic policy and exercised decisive command over all 
aspects of the occupation.”301 Truman wanted to avoid dividing Japan as Germany had been after 
V-E Day.302  Truman secured American control over Japan in exchange for Soviet control of the 
Kurile and Sakhalin Islands off the Japanese mainland. Because of the Truman administration’s 
Eurocentricism, Truman had “made up [his] mind that General MacArthur would be given 
complete command and control after victory in Japan.”303 The Japanese referred to MacArthur as 
the “blue-eyed shogun,” and his monopolistic title of Supreme Commander properly conveyed 
his stranglehold on power.  
Three papers guided MacArthur’s initial actions during the occupation.  First, the 
Potsdam Proclamation; second, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee’s (SWNCC) directive 
entitled “United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy Relating to Japan”; and, finally, JCS 
1380/15, a comprehensive military directive outlining postwar policy from the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff to SCAP. The foremost goal articulated in the policy papers was the demolition of Japan’s 
war-making capacity through democratization and demilitarization.  As expressed in the Potsdam 
Proclamation: “The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and 
strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of 
religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights, shall be 
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established.”304 U.S. policymakers believed that the zaibatsu, large Japanese business 
conglomerates that American policymakers believed served as belligerent collaborators with 
Japan’s military and government during World War II needed to be broken up.  In JCS 1380/15 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed occupation forces to implement economic democratization and 
demilitarization through “policies which permit a wide distribution of income and of ownership 
of the means of production and trade.”305  
MacArthur had little knowledge of the Japanese to guide reforms. While in Japan, he 
made no effort to gain any personal knowledge of the country.  As fellow occupation official and 
historian Theodore Cohen explained: “He made himself virtually unapproachable…the only 
thing MacArthur saw of Japan physically was on the automobile route between the Daiichi 
Building and his quarters at the American Embassy, a distance of about a mile.”306 MacArthur 
never installed a phone in his sixth floor office and only the Emperor, prime minister, and the 
three divisional secretaries could speak with him. He mainly derived his understanding of 
Japanese society, culture, and politics from Ruth Benedict’s The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, 
a book heavily influential to American policymakers.  
In 1944, the U.S. Office of War Information (OWI) turned to cultural anthropologist Ruth 
Benedict to understand the causes of Japanese militarism. According to historian Olivier Zunz, 
“Benedict’s interpretation became, directly or indirectly, the accepted wisdom among those 
American policymakers and Army personnel whose charge it was to reform a part of the world 
that seemed so alien to their own habits.”307  As made evident in her first book, Patterns of 
Culture (1934), Benedict believed that each culture acquired a select few characteristics from the 
“great arc of human personalities” and those characteristics became dominant within the culture. 
Benedict subordinated personality to cultural and social systems.  For example, the Pueblo 
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culture of the American Southwest was dominated by restraint.  The individual agency of Pueblo 
citizens became lost in the cultural explanation of behavior or action. Because Japan and the 
United States were at war in 1944, when Benedict started writing and researching The 
Chrysanthemum and the Sword, she was unable to take a field trip to Japan.308 To uncover 
Japan’s leading characteristics she relied on Japanese literature and Westerners’ personal 
accounts and scholarship on Japan. Benedict’s interpretation that feudalism permeated Japanese 
culture had a major impact on the occupation. A major goal of the occupation became the 
removal of feudalistic society and all its ramifications. In a public response to a 1949 Fortune 
article MacArthur stated: “In the very nature of the Occupation’s task the reform of the prewar 
feudalistic structure of Japan merited and received primary attention.”309  Benedict contended 
that the system of feudalism produced a rigidly hierarchical, nearly caste, structure on society.310  
The Japanese ordered everything by hierarchy “age, generation, sex, and class dictated proper 
behavior.”311 The prescribed role of each citizen influenced that citizen’s interactions with all 
others.  Benedict stated that the “Japanese were said to behave in accordance with situational or 
particularistic ethics, as opposed to so-called universal values as in the Western tradition.”312 
Benedict acknowledged the Meiji Restoration—that from 1868 to 1912 brought Western 
technology and ideas to Japan—but denied that Western ideas about social structure impacted 
Japan;313 suffrage and political representation remained limited, education remained strictly 
hierarchal, familial relationships remained patriarchal and  hereditary, social stratification 
remained ascriptive, religious doctrine remained obligatory, and the scientific spirit remained 
constrained.  She contended that a feudalist mentality remained: “the extreme explicitness of the 
Japanese hierarchal system in feudal times, from outcast to Emperor, has left its strong impress 
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on modern Japan.”314 Benedict argued that the only way to eliminate feudal society would to be 
to replace the hierarchical social structure of Japan with a social structure based on equality, like 
that created by the U.S. Constitution.  
Occupation authorities accepted Benedict’s interpretation that feudalism caused a lack of 
scientific spirit and a rigidity of religious doctrine. In 1946, the Ministry of Education released 
New Educational Guidance and explained that the Japanese had “learned how to use trains, 
ships, and electricity, but did not sufficiently develop the scientific spirit that produced them.”315 
The authors of the pamphlet argued that the Japanese lack of scientific spirit had resulted from 
their strict adherence to the religious doctrine of the state: Shinto. The Japanese lacked a 
scientific, rational, and critical spirit because established authority and Shinto went unquestioned 
in feudal society.  Popularized in a report by the British Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
the Japanese people were often referred to as the “obedient herd” because of their perceived lack 
of individuality and self-direction.316  Religious leaders were obeyed, not questioned. GHQ 
believed that the Japanese viewed the emperor as their divine leader.317 Authorities pointed to 
the imperial rescript on education of 1890 that pronounced him “coeval with Heaven and 
Earth.”318 All mandates handed down by the emperor had the aura of religious doctrine. 
Accordingly, the Japanese had been complacent before government-inspired ultra-nationalism
and militarism. Even Japanese intellectuals were unable to fully develop the critical spirit 
because Shinto doctrine was unassailable. The emperor obligated intellectuals to confirm
question, established do
 
, not 
ctrine.319 
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Occupation authorities also accepted that feudalism instilled a social hierarchy 
approaching a caste system.  Each person in feudal Japan had an established position and role in 
society.320 Deputy Chief of the Government Section (GS) Charles Kades argued that the Meiji 
restoration had entrenched, not eliminated, feudal structure. A highly centralized government 
replaced the decentralized feudal lords. The new system had prefectural, municipal, and 
neighborhood branches, enforced by a strong police force.321  Rigid social stratification 
prevented the emergence of a modern society predicated upon social and economic mobility. 
Citizens died in the position into which they were born. Stratification and hierarchy also 
impacted family arrangements. Age trumped merit, and patriarchal arrangements subjugated 
women to men.322  Authorities of the occupation believed that the American family consisted of 
the nuclear family (father, mother, and children) while Japanese households, in addition to the 
nuclear family, consisted of the extended family network (grandparents, aunts, uncles, spouses of 
children and cousins).   
Although cultural anthropology and psychology seemed to give credibility to these 
characterizations of the Japanese, they actually reaffirmed old theories based on biological 
determinism. The new theories differed in that they argued that “national character” was 
malleable.  In their eyes, misguided cultures could be corrected. During the war, theories that 
there were superior and inferior examples of “national character” may have fostered killing, but 
they promoted paternalism in the postwar period.323 Benedict compared the Japanese with 
“American adolescent gangs.”324 John Dower has pointed out that “Western social scientists had 
used childishness in precise academic ways to diagnose the pathology of the Japanese: they were 
collectively blocked at the anal or phallic stage; their behavior as a people was equivalent to 
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adolescent behavior amount Westerners.”325 MacArthur’s comment that the Japanese were like a 
twelve-year old boy revealed his belief in Japan’s arrested development or evolutionary 
backwardness.  Both displayed a belief that societies, like people, invariably developed from 
children to adults. Their belief in the malleability of national character gave credence to the 
viability of progress toward maturity, embodied by the United States.  
To simultaneously bring the adolescent Japanese to modern “maturity” and achieve the 
objectives set by the three policy papers initially guiding the occupation, MacArthur relied on 
revision of Japan’s Meiji Constitution.  While MacArthur had begun social, cultural, and 
political modernization through various SCAP directives in the fields of land reform, education, 
political freedom, religion, press, speech, and assembly,326 the Constitution codified the reforms 
into a document that would outlive the occupation. The initial policy—revision of the 
constitution—gave priority to changing Japan’s social, cultural, and political structure while 
downplaying economic revival and development. The three policy papers guiding the occupation 
forbade MacArthur from reviving the Japanese economy. The drafters of each policy paper 
believed that demilitarization and democratization could only be successful if Japan’s industrial 
power remained limited. A 1945 directive from Washington bluntly stated: “You will not assume 
any responsibility for the economic rehabilitation or the strengthening of the Japanese 
economy.”327 The Supreme Commander did not believe the argument that social, cultural, and 
political change required economic change.  Throughout the occupation MacArthur rejected that 
economic stagnation led to communism while economic prosperity invariably led to democracy.  
Unconvinced that the Japanese could reform their own country, MacArthur saw no 
problem with grafting onto Japan a U.S.-styled constitution and democracy. In October 1945, 
MacArthur announced his intention to revise the existing Meiji Constitution and called for 
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recommendations from the Japanese. From then until March 1946, GHQ received proposals 
concerning the constitution from twelve groups including the Communists, Liberals, 
Progressives, Socialists, Conservatives, and Kempō Kondankai (Constitutional Discussion 
Group). MacArthur and aides from the Government Section (GS) of the occupation rejected all 
Japanese proposals.  Many amounted to little more than slight amendments to the Meiji 
Constitution while others were radical proposals, out of line with U.S. goals. For example, the 
Matsumoto Committee submitted a new constitution that, like the current constitution, was 
steeped in German political theory and was authoritarian in nature. Comprised of men who held 
power and wealth within the existing system, the committee sought to uphold conservative rule, 
not overthrow it. In contrast, the communist party submitted a plea for the complete elimination 
of private property.   
The Supreme Commander therefore took it upon himself and the occupation government 
to revise the constitution.  Although Benedict, as a cultural anthropologist, believed that all 
cultures differed and that culture was nontransferable, MacArthur believed in universalism. He 
thought that one false dogma often expressed was “that the East and the West are separated by 
such impenetrable social, cultural and racial distinctions as to render impossible the absorption 
by one of the ideas and concepts of the other.”328 In a revealing speech about his certainty of the 
applicability of American democracy in Japan, MacArthur later claimed: 
Our experience…reformation of Japanese life, where in reshaping the lives of others we have been guided by 
the same pattern from which is taken the design to our own lives, offers unmistakable proof, however, that 
while American in origin and American in concept, these tenets underlying a truly free society are no less 
designed to secure, preserve and advance the well-being of one race than they are of another—and given the 
opportunity to take root in one society they will flourish and grow as surely as they will in any other society. 
The lesson from the past and contemporary events is that they are no longer peculiarly American but now 
belong to the entire human race—and that their firm adaptability in the pattern of human life is by no means 
governed by ethnological considerations…many voices were raised against the planned implantation here of 
ideals and principles and standards underlying American democracy, for it was contended that Japanese 
tradition, Japanese culture, and Japanese experience would not permit their assimilation in Japan’s redesigned 
social system.  Never was a statement more erroneous and unrealistic.329  
 
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Kades, the man who directed the revision of the constitution, 
explained that, left to the Japanese, political evolution would take decades.  Because the 
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occupation could not last that long, he suggested immediate revision of the constitution to 
accelerate development.330 Understanding that revision of the constitution would not 
immediately generate a modern society and eliminate feudalism, GHQ reasoned that the 
codification of so-called universal laws, upon which modern society was built, would accelerate 
development.  The Japanese would avoid the arduous and time-consuming task of developing 
modern institutions and laws because the West had already done the legwork. The Japanese 
could avoid the pitfalls of development and needed only to live up to the standards already set.331  
In a letter to his friend Charles Englishby, MacArthur stated: “There is no need to experiment 
with new and yet untried, or already tried and discredited concepts, when success itself stands as 
the eloquent and convincing advocate of our own.”332 Utah Democratic senator and member of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations Elbert D. Thomas urged Americans to “introduce in a few 
years the non-material aspects of hundreds of years of western culture—the fruits of the 
Renaissance, political liberalism, Christian humanism—in short, all those ideals and spiritual 
values which have tempered the material advance of the West.”333 
MacArthur assigned the task of revising the constitution to the Government Section (GS) 
of the occupation. As Chief of the Government Section, Brigadier General Courtney Whitney 
assigned Kades to direct the revision. Including Kades, fifteen men and one woman comprised 
the drafting committee. According to John Dower, the membership was comprised of “New 
Dealers, leftists, and Asia specialists more associated with China than Japan.”334 The committee 
members held the same conviction as MacArthur that democratic ideals were universally 
applicable and desirable.  None of the members had extensive knowledge of Japan; in fact, the 
top three American experts on Japan—Joseph Grew, Eugene Dooman, and Joseph Ballantine—
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had been ousted because they were unconvinced of the applicability of democracy in Japan.335 
The experts on Japan preferred a constitutional monarchy to maintain a semblance of the past.   
On February 3, 1946, MacArthur laid out three principles that he required be followed in 
drafting the new constitution. The Supreme Commander demanded completion in seven days 
because it was reported that a Far Eastern Commission (FEC) comprised of four nations—
Britain, U.S., U.S.S.R., and China—would be formed in February.  The FEC might challenge 
MacArthur’s authority in Japan.336  MacArthur resisted any outside influence and therefore 
ordered the completion of the constitution before the FEC could be organized and its policies 
enacted.  SCAP emphasized as the three essential principles: the emperor shall remain the head 
of state but be responsible to the people; the abolition of war; and the abolition of the feudal 
system. 
Within MacArthur’s seven-day deadline, the GS produced a new constitution based on 
the U.S. Constitution. The GS sought to use the document as a means to eliminate Japan’s feudal 
society and usher in modern society. The feudal society closely resembled what modernization 
theorists would later identify as a traditional society. Likewise, the society the GS sought to 
create was very similar to that of the “modern” category in modernization theory. Influence from 
the Declaration of Independence, Gettysburg Address, and Constitution were particularly acute 
in the preamble: “We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the 
National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of 
peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land…do 
proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people.”337 John Dower has pointed out that the 
GS’s “constitutional convention” relied on three major tenets: popular sovereignty, pacifism, and 
the protection of individual rights.338 The constitution was comprised of one hundred and three 
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articles grouped into eleven chapters. Each of MacArthur’s three mandatory principles received 
its own chapter in the new constitution. 
Chapter One established that the emperor was “the symbol of the State and the unity of 
the people.”339 The GS retained the emperor because the bedrock of the occupation’s policy was 
what historian John Dower called the “respectful appraisal of the emperor’s benign potential and 
virtually totalitarian spiritual control over the Japanese psyche.”340 GHQ sought to retain the 
emperor but demystify his status and role.  No longer did the emperor perform esoteric spiritual 
rituals in the Imperial Palace but ventured out before the public to interact and receive 
suggestions from the people. The retention of the emperor convoluted GHQ’s emphasis on 
meritocracy and apprehension to hierarchy. However the occupation authorities believed that the 
Japanese people would only accept and abide by the constitution if it retained the emperor. The 
retention of the emperor depended on a successful effort by GHQ to drive a wedge between the 
emperor and responsibility for the war.  Saved from culpability, the emperor remained atop the 
Japanese social structure. GHQ solidified his permanence by making his position hereditary.  
Chapter Two, drafted by Kades with instruction from MacArthur, renounced “war as a 
sovereign right of the nation.”341 Chapter Two consisted of only one article: Article IX. The GS 
insisted that the “no war clause” be given its own chapter for emphasis.  The second paragraph of 
Article IX obligated Japan to renounce the maintenance of an army, navy, or air force. Kades left 
the possibility of rearmament for national defense especially vague by removing the clause “even 
for preserving its own security,” setting the stage for decades of controversy. 
The “constitutional convention” codified thirty civil and human rights within chapter 
three.  Historian John Dower points out that chapter three “was, and remains, one of the most 
liberal guarantees of human rights in the world.”342  Using chapter three the GS took aim at all 
the feudal characteristics of Japan.  In Articles XIV and XXII the GS sought to eliminate social 
and cultural hierarchy.  To ensure modern mobility, Article XXII guarantees each person’s right 
to choose his or her own occupation while Article XIV states: “All of the people are equal under 
the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, or social relations because of 
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race, creed, sex, social status., or family origin… peers and peerage shall not be recognized.”343 
The GS secularized the Japanese government by separating “church” and state and guaranteeing 
freedom of religion in Article XX.  Article XV ensured widespread political participation by 
securing universal adult suffrage and declaring that “the people have the inalienable right to 
choose their public officials and to dismiss them.”344 Article XXIV established equality of the 
sexes in marriage and eliminated, as John Dower put it, the “legal underpinnings of the 
paternalistic family system.”345 The core family became a father, mother, and their children 
while the linkages to the extended family weakened.346 One of the more telling attacks on 
feudalism and support of democracy came in Articles XIX, XXIII, and XXVI, pertaining to the 
field of education. 
The Civil Information & Education Section (CIE), in charge of the reorientation of 
Japanese education, explained: “In any long range policies and plans for the democratization of 
Japan, education necessarily plays a fundamental role.”347 The only direction given to 
MacArthur and the CIE within the field of education from the Potsdam Declaration, “United 
States Initial Post-Surrender Policy Relating to Japan,” and JCS 1380/15, was the removal o
militaristic nationalism and the “gradual introduction of new educational patterns to ensure the 
development of schools and the training of young people and teachers for a democratic 
Japan.”
f 
 
                                                
348 To accomplish these two goals MacArthur brought to Japan thirty prominent 
American educators to study the current state of Japanese education and suggest reforms. The
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educators focused on methods to re-educate the Japanese population, edit current textboo
educational administration practices, and expand higher ed
ks, alter 
ucation.349  
form 
llege.   
                                                
Guided by the suggestions of the thirty educators, Colonel Kermit R. Dyke, the original 
chief of CIE, released preliminary directives in late 1945 and early 1946 pertaining to military 
nationalism, educational structure, wartime texts, and gender education. The Japanese had 
traditionally attached great significance to education. They had nearly 100 percent literacy, and 
the first six years of education were compulsory and free.350  However less than one percent of 
elementary graduates attended university. Furthermore a select few universities including Tokyo 
Imperial University dominated the system.  At the end of the war eighty-five percent of 
executive bureaucrats were graduates of Tokyo Imperial University.351 The military had a grip 
on education; military generals often served as ministers of education. Textbooks reflected 
military priorities. Colonel Dyke ordered a purge of all militaristic teachers and officials from 
Japanese education. Upon learning of Dyke’s directive, 115,778 educators resigned.352 Dyke 
then moved on to the structure of the education system. CIE restructured the Japanese to con
to an American system.  Japanese students now attended six years of elementary school, three 
years of junior high school, three years of high school, and then had the option to attend co
Revision of textbooks followed the restructuring of the school system. Colonel Dyke and 
the CIE called for an elimination of all textbooks that inspired ultranationalism, perpetuated 
Shinto teachings of the past, or exalted the state over the individual.353 Dykes asked that 
textbooks “indicative of progressive ideas be issued.”354 Until new textbooks could be 
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introduced, CIE required students to carefully read each text, with the help and guidance of their 
teachers, and systematically blacken out all parts deemed militaristic, nationalistic, or 
undemocratic. Educators specifically focused on history, ethics, and geography: the three 
subjects most permeated by military nationalism.  “Blackening out” left an indelible mark on the 
memory of a generation of Japanese students.  The exercise not only eliminated military 
nationalist passages but also revealed the relativity of knowledge.  Occupation authorities were 
convinced that Japanese educational methods used during the war consisted of rote learning. CIE 
emphasized modern reason over traditional rote. Students analyzed and criticized texts rather 
than memorize them. Teachers instructed students to challenge the status quo rather than confirm 
it. Unassailable truths were suddenly dethroned and new answers became not only possible but 
encouraged.   CIE wanted to instill the critical spirit that had eluded Meiji Japan.355  
 By providing first-hand experience with the process of reinterpretation and assessment, 
Japanese students were to experience a crash course in modern liberal education.  No longer 
were answers handed down from a hierarchical organization to be memorized and used to create 
servants of the state, education was to be democratic. CIE encouraged local school districts to 
take control of their own curricula.356  The old hierarchical organization took a further blow 
when the CIE installed measures to place educators and students on more of an equal basis. 
Knowledge was to be derived from a give and take between the instructor and student, not 
handed down to be memorized. CIE emphasized education through research and facilities to help 
individuals formulate new knowledge. Occupation authorities reorganized the entire educational 
process to promote individualism over regimentation and orthodoxy. 
Democracy mandated equal opportunity.  Traditionally Japanese boys and girls had been 
separated from fifth grade on. CIE promoted “coeducational egalitarianism”357 and abrogated 
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gender segregation in all levels of education.  For the first time in history Imperial universities 
admitted women.  Women became principals and officials. Simplified textbooks previously used 
for girls were eliminated.358 To further facilitate equality CIE issued a directive calling for the 
simplification of language use in education.  Japanese education had traditionally used kanji, 
hiragana, and katakana for its system of writing.  Kanji, hiragana, and katakana were systems 
of writing consisting of borrowed symbols, Chinese in origin. The difficulty of learning these 
systems proved to be an obstacle to widespread education.  CIE instigated a form of romaji, or 
Roman alphabet to expand educational opportunities and make language “a highway and not a 
barrier.”359 A new lexicon of borrowed American terms and neologisms quickly appeared. 
Words such as “Karikyuramu, gaidansu, homūrūmu, hōmu purojekuto, cōsu obu sutadei, kurabu 
akutibiti—that is, curriculum, guidance, home room, home project, course of study, and club 
activity”360—became common.  CIE also brought expanded opportunities for university 
education to the public.  Night classes, correspondence courses, an improved extension system, 
holiday courses, and an expansion of library and museums all took place within the first years of 
the occupation.  
In addition to expanding educational opportunities, CIE secularized education to ensure a 
modern democratic Japan. Occupation authorities believed that state Shinto “had occupied an 
extremely important part of the national school program and formed the core of 
ultranationalism.”361  In addition, Shinto handed down acceptable programs of study and 
material.  To break free of religion, deemed traditional, and foster modern liberal education, CIE 
cut all ties between Shinto and education.   
Education was an example of the logic, goals, and assumptions that MacArthur and his 
fellow policymakers shared during the first two years of the occupation.  The general guidelines 
of demilitarization and democratization became more specific as the first two years progressed. 
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Knowing little about Japan, policymakers relied on the interpretation of Japan society and culture 
held by liberal scholars such as Ruth Benedict.   
Between the time the new Japanese Constitution became law on May 3, 1947 and the end 
of 1948, the American policy shifted to the “reverse course,” a term created and popularized by 
the Japanese media.362 The reverse course policies gave priority to economic revival and 
recovery over demilitarization and democratization. Although the initial policies pertaining to 
social, cultural, and political reform gave way to policies favoring economic resuscitation by 
1948, similar logic, goals, and assumptions would resurface in modernization theory. 
The near universal obsession with the Japanese feudal system and mentality revealed a 
trend that would become a key in the logic of major modernization theorists.  In 1955, historian 
Louis Hartz published The Liberal Tradition in America, a book that reflected the prevailing 
interpretation of American history at the time.  As a consensus historian Hartz stressed historical 
harmony over the discord emphasized by the progressive historians of the first half of the 
century. Hartz argued that America had been settled by Europeans fleeing feudal oppression. 
Settlers’ flight was “the American substitute for the European experience of social 
revolution.”363 In Hartz’s eyes, the absence of feudalism and lack of need to overthrow the 
ancient régimes made America exceptional.364 Without a feudal past, Hartz contended, America 
never developed the dialectic of class and therefore remained impervious to socialism and 
communism. The Pilgrims merely established a liberal community under the influence of John 
Locke.  All Americans had therefore been “born free,” and affluence prevented any political 
persuasion other than Lockean liberalism from developing.  
Rather than being empowered by his interpretation of America’s past, Hartz believed that 
America’s lack of ideology had blinded Americans to what true revolutions entailed; however, 
modernization theorists accepted Hartz’s interpretation of American society and history as a 
constant account of conservative liberalism and used it as “the basic vision for…what a healthy 
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modern polity should look like.”365 In The Stages of Economic Growth Rostow stated: “The 
United States, again to use Hartz’s phrase, was ‘born free’—with vigorous, independent land-
owning farmers, and an ample supply of enterprising men of commerce, as well as a social and 
political system that took easily to industrialization.”366 Consequently, the U.S. “never became 
so deeply caught up in the structures, politics, and values of the traditional society.”367 In 
contrast to Japan’s need to overcome feudalistic society, America’s transition to modernity wa
“mainly economic and technical.”
s 
, 
ent of a 
ciples.”370   
                                                
368 Occupation authorities also took America’s absence of 
feudalism as proof that America operated under a modern ideology while Japan remained 
imprisoned by an archaic political philosophy.  Lt. Colonel Kades, when referring to feudalism
claimed: “That way of life was the antithesis of the democratic way.”369 Occupation authorities 
saw their task to be the elimination of the traditional Japanese culture and the developm
modern representative government—embodied by the universal American example—and the 
“way of life attuned to its prin
Modernization theorists had to deal with how Japan had maintained its feudalistic society 
despite modernizing their industrial and military sector. In The Dynamics of Modernization 
(1966), modernization theorist C.E. Black provided the answer.  He argued that Japan had 
engaged in limited or defensive modernization.371 The Japanese began modernizing on their own 
initiative—without any change in their territory or population—to prevent foreign intrusion and 
disruption of their traditional society. Japanese leaders reformed their bureaucracy and military 
using advice from foreign—mainly German—military and political leaders. The bureaucracy and 
military received modern equipment and training while Japanese society remained unchanged. 
Thus Black argued that “it was an essential feature of these reforms, however, that they were 
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designed not to transform the traditional system but to strengthen it against foreign pressures.”372  
The military ensured that the elites maintained their positions of power and the way of life of the 
peasants—who constituted eighty percent of the population—remained unchanged.373 
Black contended that the American occupation had shocked the Japanese into a 
revolution of modernity.374 The Americans’ defeat of the Japanese convinced the Japanese that 
their traditional society was no longer viable, that modernity was inevitable, and that they should 
embrace the American reforms.  However, until the occupation, the Japanese had been able to 
withstand the powerful modernizing forces from abroad and preserve their integrity and 
traditional identity.  
Black described a traditional society that shared many characteristics described by 
Benedict and accepted by occupation authorities as elements of Japan’s feudal society. In 
addition, Black depicted a process of modernization similar to what authorities of the occupation 
tried to institutionalize through the revision of the constitution.   First, Black explained that 
modernization entailed the establishment of a critical spirit and dethronement of religious 
justification.375 He asserted that the Japanese must discard religious (Shinto) dogmas and 
establish a modern, scientific, universal, and secular spirit in society.376 Theological systems and 
religious beliefs were based on “earlier conceptions of the nature of the world” and were ill-fitted 
to modern thought because they subjugated man and his well-being to unworldly promises in an 
afterworld.377 In agreement with measures such as Article XX of the revised Japanese 
Constitution—which separated “church” and state, and therefore eliminated any obligation to 
carry Shinto beliefs into intellectual pursuits—Black contested that modernization mandated 
secularization. He believed that religion could not supply the government a paradigm or guide on 
how to conduct itself domestically and internationally.  
 In ways similar to those of authorities of the occupation, Black also theorized about 
modernization and its impact on family arrangements. He defined the modern family as a 
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household occupied by a nuclear family detached from the extended family. According to 
Black’s argument, Japan’s family arrangements were traditional. He contended that 
modernization included a “significant transformation of the family from the larger kinship units 
normally associated with agrarian life to the much smaller nuclear family consisting only of 
parents and younger children.”378 Black, convinced that the typical American family consisted of 
a husband, wife, and their children, predicted that all non-modernized societies would eventually 
move in the same direction. Consequently, it remained only a matter of time before the bonds of 
family within traditional societies weakened and the nuclear family arrangement became 
prevalent.379 
Social stratification and peerage, other feudal characteristics that Benedict had identified 
and that the occupation authorities had tried to eliminate, resurfaced as a focus of criticism in the 
works of modernization theorists.  Both modernization theorists, such as Alex Inkeles and David 
H. Smith, and occupation authorities believed that a modern society was based on achievement 
over ascription. According to Inkeles and Smith ascription was social status derived from birth 
while achievement signified status attained by technical and intellectual ability. Evident in 
occupation authorities’ attempt to replace the Japanese feudal structure through Articles XIV, 
XXII, and educational reform, achievement and ascription reemerged in Toward a General 
Theory of Action (1951), edited by Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils. Shils and Parsons, both 
modernization theorists, were sociologists who dominated their field in the 1950s and 1960s. In 
Toward a General Theory of Action, Parsons and Shils created “pattern variables.” Pattern 
variables were “dichotomous pairings of value orientations that collectively constituted a system 
that allowed actors to determine the meaning of a situation.”380 The authors centered on five 
pattern variables: affectivity and affective neutrality, self-orientation and collectivity-orientation, 
particularism and universalism, diffuseness and specificity, and, most importantly, ascription and 
achievement.381  To Parsons and Shils, the former variable of each pairing was essentially 
traditional while the latter of each pair was modern. Embedded in the authors’ logic was the idea 
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of universality; the population of all societies would at one time or another travel from the 
former of each pair to the latter. As arguably the most influential American social scientist of the 
Cold War era, Parsons exerted immense influence on other modernization theorists. Alex Inkeles 
and David H. Smith identified ascription as a traditional characteristic and achievement as a 
modern characteristic in their book Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing 
Countries (1974). Inkeles and Smith contended: “Traditional societies are generally defined as 
having closed class systems, in extreme cases possessed of the rigidity of a caste structure.”382 
They continued that within traditional societies mobility is at a minimum—children are born into 
a profession and die in that same profession. Modern societies, by contrast, predicate movement 
into different social status by means of education and technical ability. Each person always holds 
the possibility to change station, for better or for worse.383 
The occupation was an attempt to replace an ascription-based society with one based on 
achievement five years before Parsons and Shils made their theory explicit. Authorities of the 
occupation clearly held the same logic and assumptions that modernization theorists later 
developed about the nature of social relationships and about economic and social mobility. 
Modernization theorists never overtly admitted influence from occupation policies on 
ascription—Parsons even expressed his dismay over Ruth Benedict’s cultural relativism—but 
both modernization theorists and policymakers of the occupation operated under the same 
mentality.384  
Valuing achievement over ascription was also connected to pluralist democracy and the 
elite theory of democracy. Modernization theorists took from the “end of ideology” debate in 
1950s sociology the idea that the West had advanced past ideological disagreements and 
influence.  Because only technical problems remained, objective experts could effectively lead 
society. Modernization theorists never denied that experts and educated elites should lead each 
country, but, to set themselves apart from communist ruling cliques, they emphasized pluralism. 
Pluralism meant that the educated elites, rather than a monolithic group, competed and shared 
power within government. The American effort to reform and expand the university system in 
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Japan provided an undeniable example of an attempt to create pluralism. The occupation 
authorities believed that the feudal nature of pre-occupation Japan had stifled the possibility that 
common citizens could advance to a leadership role based on their intellectual and technical 
ability.  As stated before, eighty-five percent of Japanese governmental bureaucrats had 
graduated from Tokyo Imperial University and the military elite had a grip on the educational 
system.  Col. Dyke and members of the Civil Information and Education System agreed that 
educated elites should run the country but sought to provide opportunity to lead groups outside 
the imperial university system. Occupation authorities attempted to expand non-imperial 
institutions of higher learning and encourage local and regional educational curricula. CIE 
authorities hoped to break Tokyo University’s monopoly on education.  
A curious aspect was that both MacArthur and modernization theorist supported 
imposing a democratic society by authoritarian means. Historian John Dower has explained: 
“While the victors preached democracy, they ruled by fiat; while they espoused equality, they 
themselves constituted an inviolate privileged caste.”385 The American occupiers wrote the new 
Japanese Constitution without Japanese input. MacArthur rejected all Japanese suggestions and 
proposals. Under the assumption that “laws of political morality are universal,” a phrase 
eventually incorporated into the preamble, MacArthur sought to impose an American-styled 
society on Japan. MacArthur and Lieutenant Colonel Kades understood that the occupation could 
not last for decades; they, therefore, introduced a constitution heavily influenced by the 
American Constitution and expected the Japanese to live up to its social and political 
arrangements. MacArthur’s authoritarian modernization served as a shining example to 
modernization theorists desperate to rapidly modernize traditional societies. In the high-stakes 
Cold War of the 1960s, modernization theorists became dismayed by the lethargic pace of 
modernization in traditional societies. Believing that all traditional countries desired 
modernization in the American form and pushed by the perceived necessity to accelerate their 
move toward it, theorists advocated drastic measures. It became justifiable to defer democracy to 
achieve rapid modernization. Certainly democracy remained the goal, but transformation in the 
economic, social, and cultural arenas could be accelerated to provide a suitable setting in which 
democracy could flourish.  Modernization theorist Lucian Pye explained that “The military may 
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provide an opportunity and a basis for cooperation, but the objective must remain the 
development of stable representative institutions and practices.”386  In August 1959, Pye 
elaborated on the potential of authoritarians and military dictatorships to modernize non-modern 
countries in a speech delivered in Santa Monica at RAND Corporation.  First, Pye claimed that 
authoritarians could eliminate the disorienting elements of the modernization process by 
providing structure and direction. Instead of being held to the time-consuming majority rule and 
compromise that beset democratic rule, authoritarians would clearly promulgate a goal and 
ensure progress towards it. Second, the military could act as a modernizing organization by 
providing stability while society modernized. Political scientist Samuel Huntington pointed out 
that “violence and other destabilizing events were five times more frequent between 1955 and 
1962 than they were between 1948 and 1954.”387 The threat of destabilization prompted 
modernization theorists to prescribe rule by the military as a remedy, to ensure a safe transition 
to democracy. Pye explained that “The experience of breaking from the known and relatively 
sheltered world of tradition and moving into the more unknown modern world is generally an 
extremely traumatic one. In contrast to the villager who is caught up in the process of being 
urbanized, the young army recruit from the village has the more sheltered, the more gradual 
introduction into the modern world.”388  Third, the military could also provide an example of a 
rational, orderly, merit-based, and technologically modern organization to be emulated by the 
society at large.389  He claimed: “a military establishment comes as close as any human 
organization can to the type for an industrialized and secularized enterprise.”390  Mimicry could 
produce modernization. Pye and modernization theorists in general viewed the Japanese 
occupation as an encouraging example of controlled modernization, imposed by a military 
occupation, and led by MacArthur, a military autocrat.  Without a doubt, modernization theorists 
thought, the success of the occupation was attributable to the Japanese population; however, they  
saw MacArthur’s controlling hand and guiding spirit as responsible for the achievements of the 
                                                 
386 Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1966), 187. 
387 J. Timmons Roberts and Amy Hite, eds., From Modernization to Globalization (Malden: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2000), 148. 
388 Pye, 180. 
389 Gilman, 185-190. 
390 Pye, 175. 
 104
occupation.391 As such, the model embodied in the occupation solidified the belief of 
modernization theorists that a similar successful modernization could be carried out by 
American-backed autocrats throughout the world. 
Modernization theorists also viewed the occupation as an example of how a foreign 
penetration could act as the catalyst for modernization.  As Rostow stated in Stages of Economic 
Growth, “as a matter of historical fact a reactive nationalism—reacting against intrusion from 
more advanced nations—has been the most important and powerful motive force in the transition 
from traditional to modern society.”392 Rostow argued that modern societies could accelerate the 
modernization of traditional societies by encroaching on their sovereignty. Inspired by a 
common enemy, locals would coalesce—augmenting nationalism—and become motivated to 
establish their own autonomy.  Rostow asserted that the only way traditional societies could gain 
international credibility and authority would be by adopting modern ways and using modern 
tools. To Rostow this meant that traditional societies would undoubtedly develop themselves into 
modern societies—as outlined by the West—to expel the foreign power.  In Japan, Rostow 
argued that “Commodore Perry’s seven black ships….cast the die for modernization,” but the 
occupation finally brought Japan into full maturity.393  Of all the nations Rostow claimed to have 
achieved maturity, Japan was the only non-white country.  In the minds of modernization 
theorists, the occupation, and specifically the revision of the constitution, undoubtedly played a 
key in Japan’s attainment of modernity.  
It is possible to identify programs created and administered by the U.S. in the 1960s—
when modernization theory dominated—that were meant to instill similar cultural values by 
similar methods that were described above (democratic, secular, and rational society stratified by 
merit, created by authoritarians and their military while encroaching on a “traditional” society’s 
sovereignty). An identical program was never created. Within the programs that did exist, it is 
difficult to pinpoint actions that were specifically intended to instill these cultural values because 
most modernization programs started at the village level and never successfully progressed to the 
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later stages of development, where large-scale transitions were mainly to factor in.  The closest 
example, though arguably more draconic, was the Strategic Hamlet Program in Vietnam. 
Begun by the Kennedy administration and Diem regime in 1961, the program was an 
effort to defeat North Vietnam by separating the South Vietnamese rural population from the 
North Vietnamese and Vietcong guerrillas. Convinced that the guerillas relied on the South 
Vietnamese villagers’ support, the Kennedy administration sought to eliminate contact between 
the two. The rural population, formerly scattered throughout the countryside, was relocated by 
the military into more densely populated villages. Each village was surrounded by various types 
of barriers (e.g., barbed wire or chain-link fences) that were guarded by armed soldiers.  Roger 
Hilsman, the director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and 
the most enthusiastic advocate of the program, claimed that strategic hamlets could achieve more 
than simply separating the guerrillas from the farmers. According to Latham, Hilsman asserted 
that “they could also ignite a powerful, nationalistic sense of affinity between a formerly 
apathetic rural population and the South Vietnamese government.”394 The achieve this, 
policymakers attempted to provide the farmers with an opportunity to participate in the 
functioning of government by extending democracy and state power down to the local level.395 
They did this, according to Latham, because Lucian Pye had influenced the Kennedy 
administration.396 Pye, in his most influential work entitled Guerrilla Communism in Malaya 
(1956), argued that developing nations lacked a national identity—much like a teenager facing 
an identity crisis—and by involving all citizens through democratic institutions policymakers 
could help create “an inner coherence of values, theories, and actions for the entire polity.”397 
With a national identity and influence in the decision-making process, the democratically 
empowered citizens would seek to uphold and strengthen the South Vietnamese government 
rather than side with the guerrillas and try to overthrow it. Eugene Staley, a theorist on 
development, charged with drafting a national financial plan for U.S. economic assistance to 
Vietnam, claimed, the new politically active citizens would be “shaken from their ancient, static 
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ways of life….[and] pull[ed] out of the mire of ancient customs.”398 The “traditional” peasants 
would abandon their “filial piety,” “religious justification,” and “political passivity,” and become 
“modern” citizens.399 
 In addition to the modernizing force of democracy, the Kennedy administration believed 
that the military presence in each hamlet would accelerate the development of modern values. 
“Contact with modern military forces, experts believed, would stimulate self-defense efforts as 
well as an identification with the larger national government structure beyond the boundaries of 
peasant lives,” according to Latham.400 Pye explained that: “In large part, this is a reflection of 
the basic fact that in much of Southeast Asia the bureaucracy and the army are positive actors in 
the political process and not neutral instruments of policy.”401 Pye described how the military 
presence in Southeast Asia could accelerate modernization by providing stability during 
transition and an example of a rational, ordered, merit-based organization to be emulated by the 
peasants. 
 Similar to the American experience in the occupation of Japan, the Strategic Hamlet 
Program was in reality authoritarian modernization. American policymakers failed to recognize 
the arbitrariness of their actions. Referring to Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Secretary of State, Dean 
Rusk, Latham asserted, “The United States, in his terms, was not cooperating with a repressive 
regime, forcibly moving peasants off their ancestral lands, demanding their labor, or controlling 
the intimate details of their lives. It was instead providing the guidance necessary for South 
Vietnam to become more like America and helping that country take an honored place among 
modern nations.”402 Without popular support—as had been the case in Japan—the Strategic 
Hamlet Program failed. Nevertheless, examining the Strategic Hamlet Program and the 
occupation of Japan reveals within each program ideas about modernization and about what 
constituted “traditional” and “modern” society and how to transition from the former to the 
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latter.  Although policymakers of the Strategic Hamlet Program held nearly identical ideas as 
modernization theorists, authorities of the occupation had at least one major difference. 
The authorities of the occupation and modernization theorists were generally in harmony 
about the social, cultural, and political aspects of a traditional and modern society. They agreed 
that traditional societies were hierarchically based on ascription, were religious, had limited 
suffrage, had hierarchical education, had family relationships based on heredity and patriarchy, 
and lacked critical thinking and a scientific spirit. In contrast, modern societies were mobile, 
secular, democratic, rational, and egalitarian.  Although they basically agreed on the 
characteristics of a traditional and modern society, they had one major area of contention when it 
came to the transition: economics. MacArthur and fellow authorities of the occupation believed 
that the strongest countries were economically vibrant ones; however, without the authority to 
resuscitate Japan’s economy, they maintained that social, cultural, and political modernization 
could occur without economic change.  In contrast modernization theorists argued that transition 
was a systemic process. Changes in one area were related to and affected changes in the other 
areas. Modernization theorist Daniel Lerner explained that all elements of modernization were 
highly associated “because, in some historic sense, they had to go together.”403 Social and 
cultural change required economic change and vice versa. The “reverse course” represents the 
best example of MacArthur’s view on economic development and how it differed from the 
modernization theorists’ view.  
From late 1948 through the end of the occupation in 1952, GHQ completely reoriented its 
policies and goals in Japan.  Whereas the pre-1948 GHQ emphasized democratization and 
demilitarization, after 1948 it attempted to economically resuscitate the Japanese economy and 
prepare the country to become part of the U.S.’s effort to contain the Soviets.  While social, 
cultural, and political modernization had taken precedence over economic development before 
1948, economic modernization now became occupation authorities’ foremost concern. Social 
and cultural factors—family structure, religion, social stratification, and suffrage—received little 
attention compared to economic resuscitation and the Cold War.  
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Cold War imperatives motivated authorities in Washington D.C. to change policy.  Four 
hundred and forty-five days passed from the completion of the English version of the 
constitution on February 13, 1946 until it formally became law on May 3, 1947.  Translators 
converted it to Japanese and Japanese cabinet members, Japanese parliament, and parliamentary 
committees had to debate and ratify it. Meanwhile Soviet-American antagonism intensified. In 
1947, Truman issued the Truman doctrine sending $400 million aid to Greece and Turkey to 
maintain antiauthoritarian governments. From June 1948 to May 1949, Stalin ordered troops to 
carry out the Berlin Blockade, effectively blocking the overland route connecting West Berlin to 
West Germany.  The U.S.-supported Kuomintang (KMT) led by Chiang Kai-shek steadily lost 
ground throughout the late 1940s, eventually losing all control of mainland China in 1949. 
Washington needed a new Asian ally. Global circumstances prodded American policymakers to 
abandon their “soft policy,” defined negatively as denying Japan to the Soviets and, as historian 
John Dower has observed, enacted a “hard policy, which sought to transform Japan into an active 
integrated ally against communist forces.”404  
The logic of the “reverse course” was founded on the belief that economic stagnation 
made Japan, as well as the other non-Communist Asian nations, susceptible to communist 
takeover.  Postwar American policymakers generally believed that World War II had been 
started because of German’s economic plight imposed by the disadvantageous Versailles Treaty 
and its drafters’ demand for war reparations from Germany. Occupation authorities extended that 
logic to argue that the best way to make Japan a strong ally would be to revive its economy. An 
economically strong Japan could better defend itself from Chinese or Soviet aggression, provide 
the West with industrial and military resources, provide a potential base for Western military 
power in Asia, and encourage other non-Communist nations to fight the spread of 
Communism.405   To accomplish this goal, GHQ sought to augment production and trade by 
reinstating the zaibatsu conglomerates.  MacArthur had originally viewed the zaibatsu as main 
pillars of feudalism and militarism.  In December 1947 he had sent legislation to the Diet for the 
dissolution of the zaibatsu.  The Supreme Commander designated 325 large firms to be 
evaluated and possibly dissolved.  However the ascendancy of reverse course economics had 
                                                 
404 John Dower, Japan in War & Peace: Selected Essays (New York: New Press, 1995), 162.  
405 Ibid., 187-188. 
 109
already begun as debate took place in the Diet, impacting the dissolution law.  In the end, only 
eleven companies were dissolved.  In total, only 28 out of 1200 firms considered were actually 
dissolved. All major banking institutions avoided dissolution and they provided a framework for 
the recovery of the zaibatsu.   
Using the zaibatsu, SCAP replaced the free economy with a directed one that 
championed “priority production.”406 Certain key industries with high-priority received scarce 
labor and resources, government subsidies, and Reconstruction Finance Bank (RFB) loans.  
Industries with high priority included basic energy producers (coal and electric power), heavy 
and chemical industry (iron, steel, and fertilizer), and shipbuilding companies.407 The RFB 
directed eighty percent of their loans to only ninety-seven companies, most within the high 
priority category.  As promulgated in NSC 48/1, GHQ envisioned that Japan could strengthen 
other non-Communist Asian nations through a mutually beneficial triangular trading 
arrangement predicated on comparative advantage and neo-classical international trade theory.  
The triangular trading relationship operated this way: Third World Asia nations, such as India, 
would provide raw materials to Japan; Japan would produce second-rate products, including 
“Oriental” specialties, not manufactured in the U.S. or labor-intensive products to be sold in the 
U.S. and Asia; and finally the U.S. would specialize in manufactured goods to be sold 
throughout North America, Asia, and the rest of the third world. There existed an overriding 
belief among American policymakers that each side of the triangle would equally benefit. This 
belief eventually turned out to be faulty, and Japan’s economic recovery actually relied on the 
boom caused by the Korean War and on its production of highly specialized and scientific 
products.  
The logic underlying the reverse course resembled modernization theory but did not yield 
a systemic theory.  Both modernization theorists and authorities of the occupation predicted that 
democracy could best survive and prosper within countries enjoying a vibrant economy; 
however, occupation authorities failed to connect the social, cultural, and political considerations 
of development to the economic factors. Once “reverse course” logic became policy and practice 
occupation authorities viewed economic development as a suitable goal in and of itself to win the 
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Cold War.   Unlike modernization theorists, they failed to view development as a systemic 
process.  Modernization theorists considered the economic impact on social, cultural, and 
political factors, and vice versa.  Walt Rostow elucidated the impact of economic prosperity on 
social, cultural, and political factors. Citing historian David Potter’s People of Plenty, Rostow 
argued that a democratic society was untenable without economic prosperity.408 Theorizing 
about development in the opposite direction, modernization theorists including Talcott Parsons
and Edward Shils focused on the social, cultural, and psychological aspects that hindered or 
helped economic development. Modernization theorists were motivated by the perceived 
inadequacies of neo-classical economic theory and its focus on rational individuals and absenc
of cultural factors in their mathematical formulas. Occupation authorities never made an explicit 
connection between social, cultural, and political factors and econom
 
e 
ic factors.  
                                                
The occupation of Japan differed from the kind of action envisioned in modernization 
theory because policymakers started with democracy and ended with economic development 
while modernization theorists advocated the opposite: the initial policy of the occupation favored 
social, cultural, and political modernization and marginalized the economic aspects while the 
reverse course gave priority to economic modernization to the detriment of social, cultural, and 
political aspects.   Although occupation authorities including MacArthur, Gen. Whitney, Lt. Col. 
Kades, Col. Dykes, and Col. Fellers never formulated a theory, they had a clear conception of 
how traditional and modern societies differed.  Founded on their understanding of a modern 
United States and Benedict’s interpretation of Japanese society, authorities delineated feudalism 
and its ramifications as the main factors constituting a traditional society.  Feudalism created a 
rigidly stratified social structure relegating individuals to hereditary occupations.  The social 
structure forbade upward mobility, and dependence on absolute power from the top down 
produced a passive polity.  Government influenced by religion stunted the growth of a critical 
spirit.   Initially lacking authority to resuscitate the Japanese economy, GHQ relied on revision of 
the Constitution to modernize Japan.  Accordingly the Constitution was comprised of articles 
guaranteeing a representative democracy, pacifism, gender and racial equality, freedom of 
religion, speech, press, and assembly, the right of workers to bargain collectively, and the right 
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of citizen to have a free education predicted upon intellectual freedom.  All resurfaced in the 
modern category of modernization theory.  The occupation conducted by the military with 
MacArthur on top provided modernization theorists of the 1960s with a suitable example of how 
an autocrat could effectively accelerate modernization.  As Cold War antagonisms intensified, in 
the late 1940s, policymakers enacted a reverse course. The logic underlying the reverse course 
proposed that increased economic prosperity would fashion Japan into a strong Cold War ally.  
Hence policymakers aimed at resuscitating the Japanese economy while giving lower priority to 
the social, cultural, and political ramifications entailed. However while modernization theorists 
elucidated an explicit theory connecting economic, social, cultural, and psychological factors, 
occupation authorities pursued the modernization of each aspect  at different times, never 
creating a systemic justification for their actions. 
 CHAPTER 5 - Conclusion – Toward an Understanding of Historical 
Change 
 
Historian Michael Latham has pointed out that modernization theory came to the 
forefront in “tandem with growing official interest in the nature of development and its strategic 
significance.”409 Decolonization after World War II had strategic implications; nearly 450 
million people from 45 countries were becoming liberated from the imperial control of Britain, 
France, Portugal, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United States.  The 
combination of decolonization, Europe’s decline in power, the breaking up of European trading 
blocks, and the United States’ augmented geopolitical power led U.S. policymakers to reason 
that they were now responsible for the future and direction of the global capitalist system. 
Furthermore, the overriding concern with containment of the Soviet Union and Communism 
prompted U.S. policymakers to try to prevent decolonizing countries from seeking communist 
solutions to their widespread poverty.  
U.S. policymakers’ attention to the Third World and its development became particularly 
acute during the Kennedy administration. In January 1961, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev 
declared his support for “wars of national liberation,” leading policymakers to focus on the Third 
World as the new battleground of the Cold War. Kennedy himself played down Eisenhower’s 
strategy of nuclear deterrence and focused on development of the Third World as a means to win 
the Cold War. In his inaugural address on January 20, 1961 he pledged: “to those new states 
whom we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge our word that one form of colonial control 
shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny….we pledge our 
best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required” and that “we shall pay 
any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the 
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 survival and the success of liberty.”410 In the same year Kennedy told Congress that “widespread 
poverty and chaos lead to a collapse of existing political and social structures which would 
inevitably invite the advance of totalitarianism into every weak and unstable area.”411  
The shift in focus predicated a need for a distinctly American theory of development, 
superior to that of the Soviets, to counter decolonization, the erosion of Western empire, and 
rising Third World nationalism.412 Historian Odd Arne Westad has argued that “the need was felt 
to be urgent: instead of the clear-cut Marxist theory of social change, the Western experience 
was a messy, drawn-out series of unheroic social processes, with few concrete points of 
reference that could enflame young Third World intellectuals.”413  A new theory would need to 
be both liberal and capitalist and convince Third World countries that the American method 
could eliminate poverty and bring economic prosperity better than the Marxist alternative. The 
theory would help strategists take an active stance rather than simply reacting to changes on the 
periphery.  
Modernization theory became the dominant theory used by policymakers working on the 
development of the Third World in the 1960s.  The argument of this thesis has been that, 
although modernization theorists claimed that their theory was novel and grounded in rigorous, 
empirical analysis, there were antecedents to their theory. The scale of programs of development 
was grander and policymakers’ attention to development was greater, but the programs were not 
unprecedented. The existence of similar logic, assumptions, and methods suggests that 
receptivity to modernization theory was augmented because it fell within the cultural and 
intellectual milieu of mid-twentieth century America. Modernization theorists’ works gained 
widespread acceptance because theorists organized their thinking in a framework that reinforced 
Americans’ perceived ideals, history, and mission.  Michael Latham has pointed out that, as an 
ideology about development, modernization theory made “sense out of apparent chaos and rapid 
change” and ordered “complex information and events into meaningful, intelligible 
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relationships” that resonated with mid-century Americans.414 The rise of modernization theory 
can best be described as the culmination of ideas that had been in existence since at least the 
New Deal.  Modernization theorists’ ideas confirmed rather than refuted the prevailing 
intellectual and cultural trends of the time. Because modernization theory was a manifestation of 
the American intellectual and cultural milieu—therefore larger than the policies of any single 
presidential administration—it must be understood in light of the changes in American culture.  
The ostensible novelty of modernization theory or “change” from past policies sheds light 
on how change occurred in thinking about development from the New Deal of the 1930s through 
the full maturity of modernization theory in the 1960s. Modernization theory flourished in the 
1960s because theorists incorporated assumptions and logic prevalent in American culture and 
because theorists expanded on ideas already developed in previous decades.  
John Lewis Gaddis has claimed that “John F. Kennedy attached even greater importance 
than usual to the task of putting ‘distance’ between himself and his predecessor.”415 Kennedy, 
during his 1960 presidential campaign, criticized the Eisenhower administration for falling 
behind the Soviets, both economically and militarily.  As the Democratic candidate, he promised 
to “get America moving again.”   As president, this took the form of more publicly proactive 
stance to foreign policy, launching the “development decade” and programs such as the Peace 
Corps and Alliance for Progress.   
Whereas Kennedy’s new emphasis revealed the way in which change was prompted by 
political considerations, factors outside of the government shaped the final form of that change. 
In a deeper sense, Kennedy’s programs, founded on modernization theory, manifested the way 
they did because of the cultural and intellectual milieu of mid-twentieth century America. 
Assumptions, logic, and methods prevalent in American culture when Kennedy took office did 
not guarantee that U.S. policy would naturally move toward the development of the Third World; 
however, when global and political circumstances prompted the administration to think about 
development, certain themes within that culture emerged to determine the shape of policies of 
development. Many of the themes had existed throughout American history and had already 
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manifested in previous programs of development, including the TVA, Point Four Program, and 
the occupation of Japan after World War II. 
The first theme was the technocratic faith that envisioned nature as a standing reserve of 
resources to be tamed and harnessed for human ends.416 Technocratic projects such as the dams 
of the Tennessee Valley Authority represented the pinnacle of man’s triumph over nature and 
served as a template for postwar development projects, such as the Alliance for Progress, which 
sought to use technology to transform nature for the benefit of humans.  Evident in works such as 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), but not gaining widespread national support until the late 
1960s and 1970s, the environmentalist movement ushered in the emphasis on the need for 
harmonious coexistence between man and nature. The environmentalists offered an alternative 
conception of nature compared to the faith in a human-centered world and the technocratic faith. 
No longer was nature to be conquered and made to bend to the will of science. Now preservation 
and co-existence became imperatives. However, Kennedy’s and modernization theorists’ 
confidence in technology as a tool to accelerate modernization confirmed the prevailing view of 
their time. 
A second theme shared by modernization theorists and the American culture at large was 
a belief in cultural assimilation. Rather than accept cultural pluralism, Americans expected 
immigrants and minority groups to assimilate into the “white” American culture.417  As pointed 
out earlier in this thesis, both General Douglas MacArthur and modernization theorists believed 
that the elements of American culture were universally applicable to all societies of the world 
and the epitome of modernity. They argued that all cultures would eventually converge on the 
American model, steadily eliminating what came to be called multiculturalism.  The rise of 
movements in the 1960s for Native American rights, La Raza, and Black Power signaled an end 
in the idea that assimilation was desirable or even feasible. In the 1980s and 1990s the American 
culture at large celebrated multiculturalism over assimilation and universalism.  Nevertheless, 
modernization theorists confirmed the prevalent assumptions about cultural and racial 
assimilation.  
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 A third shared theme was deference to authority. In the mid-twentieth century—
augmented by the U.S. government’s and military’s handling of World War II—Americans 
generally accepted that the government was competent and could effectively improve the lives of 
its citizens. This general support of government and support of the expert opinion of its advisors 
surfaced in Lilienthal’s reliance on experts, Bowles’ reliance on technicians, and the reliance on 
qualified volunteers within community development projects of the Peace Corps.  Odd Arne 
Westad has added that “All postwar American administrations up to Ronald Reagan were much 
more willing to use state power for social development purposes than any of their predecessors 
had been.”418 Third World development appeared like a new vexing issue in the 1960s but by 
that time the prescribed solution was familiar to and resounded with most Americans.   
As the 1960s progressed, various events signaled and caused the waning of deference to 
authorities. In 1964, during the Free Speech Movement at the University of California, Berkeley, 
student leader Mario Savio challenged university officials who banned on-campus political 
activities. He claimed that students should have a voice in university policies and not simply be 
parts of “the machine.” Savio claimed:  
If this is a firm [the university], and if the board of regents are the board of directors, and if President Kerr in 
fact is the manager, then I tell you something — the faculty are a bunch of employees! And we’re the raw 
material! But we’re a bunch of raw materials that don’t mean to have any process upon us, don’t mean to be 
made into any product.419 
 
In 1968, the Tet Offensive in Vietnam damaged the credibility of government and 
military authorities. During the Tet Offensive, North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops 
simultaneously invaded nearly every South Vietnamese village. Prior to the event, government 
and military officials had repeatedly made optimistic assessments about their conduct and the 
future trajectory of the war, specifically denying tha the enemyh was capable of major 
widespread operations in South Vietnam. Historian Robert Schulzinger has claimed that, as a 
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 result of the offensive, “A ‘credibility gap’ opened between what government officials said and 
what the public believed about the war in Vietnam.”420  
The rise and fall of modernization theory happened in tandem with the swing in the 
American intellectual and cultural milieu. When the Kennedy administration focused on 
development, modernization theory appeared credible because it coincided with the intellectual 
and cultural trends that had been developing and had become dominant within the American 
society at large. When an intellectual and cultural shift occurred in the 1960s and 1970s—
environmentalism became increasingly powerful, assimilation gave way to celebrations of 
multiculturalism, and authorities’ credibility began being questioned—modernization theorists’ 
ideas lost favor within the government and with American society in general. For the remainder 
of the Cold War, presidents supported aid to the Third World in the form of food and medical 
supplies, but not larger programs of development founded on modernization theory.  
The history of modernization theory helps shed light on a wider debate between 
historians over how change happens. Its history suggests that change in foreign policy is often 
shaped by changes in intellectual and cultural milieu of America.  Foreign policy cannot be fully 
understood without examining the domestic culture. The strength and pervasiveness of the 
culture were evident in how it permeated domestic (the TVA) and international (the Point Four 
Program, the occupation of Japan, and the Peace Corps) projects of development, directed by 
both liberals (Lilienthal and Bowles) and a conservative (MacArthur).  On the other hand, it is 
just as dangerous to rely solely on intellectual and cultural interpretations of history. Change 
does happen for political reasons. Kennedy purposely separated himself from Eisenhower’s 
policies to get elected. The limited number of new interventions into the Third World after the 
Vietnam War resulted from the lack of popular support and presidents’ unwillingness to risk 
their constituencies’ support. Government officials are influenced by both political 
considerations and non-governmental forces. When examining change over time, both aspects 
need to be considered or interpretive validity will be sacrificed.  
116 
                                                 
420 Robert A. Schulzinger, A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 217. 
 
 Bibliography 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Volume 1, National Security Affairs, Foreign 
Economic Policy.  Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976. 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Volume 1, National Security Affairs, Foreign 
Economic Policy. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976. 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Volume 2, The United Nations, The Western 
Hemisphere. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976. 
 
Almond, Gabriel A. and James S. Coleman eds. The Politics of the Developing Areas. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1960. 
 
Bell, Daniel. The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties. Glencoe: 
Free Press, 1960. 
 
Benedict, Ruth. The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture. With a 
forward by Ian Buruma. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005. 
 
Bennett, Henry G. “Papers of Henry G. Bennett.” Truman Presidential Library, Independence, 
Missouri. 
 
Bingham, Jonathan B. Shirt-Sleeve Diplomacy: Point 4 in Action. New York: The John Day 
Company, 1953. 
 
Black, C.E. The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History. New York: 
Harper Torchbooks, 1966. 
 
117 
 
 Bowles, Chester. Ambassador’s Report. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954.  
 
--------. American Politics in a Revolutionary World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1956. 
 
--------. Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life 1941-1969. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 
 
--------. A View From New Delhi: Selected Speeches and Writings 1963-1969. Bombay: Allied 
Publishers, 1969. 
 
Boyer, Paul. By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the 
Atomic Age. New York: Pantheon, 1985. 
 
Brick, Howard. Age of Contradiction: American Thought & Culture in the 1960s. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1998. 
 
Brinkley, Alan. The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War. New York: 
Vintage Books, 1995. 
 
Cohen, Theodore. Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal. Edited by Herbert 
Passin. New York: The Free Press, 1987. 
 
Collins, Robert. "David Potter’s People of Plenty and the Recycling of Consensus History.” 
Reviews in American History 16:2 (1988). 
 
De Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. New York: Everyman’s Library, 1994. 
 
Dower, John. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: The New 
Press, 1999. 
 
--------. Japan in War & Peace: Selected Essays. New York: New Press, 1995. 
118 
 
  
Ekbladh, David. “Mr. TVA: Grass-Roots Development, David Lilienthal, and the Rise and Fall 
of the Tennessee Valley Authority as a Symbol for U.S. Overseas Development, 1933-
1973.” Diplomatic History 26:3 (2002). 
 
Engerman, David C., Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, and Michael E. Latham, eds. Staging 
Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War. Amherst and Boston: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2003. 
 
Finn, Richard. Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan. Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1992. 
 
Freidell, Theodore Donald. “Truman’s Point Four: Legislative Enactment and Development in 
Latin America.” Ph.D. Diss., University of Missouri at Kansas City. 1965.  
 
Fischer, Fritz. Making Them Like Us: Peace Corps Volunteers in the 1960s. Washington D.C.: 
Smithsonian, 1989. 
 
Fisher, Christopher T. “Nation Building and the Vietnam War: A Historiography.” Pacific 
Historical Review 74:3 (2005). 
 
Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National 
Security Policy During the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
 
Gilman, Nils. Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America. Baltimore 
and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. 
 
Gendzier, Irene L. Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1985. 
 
119 
 
 Hardy, Benjamin. “Papers of Benjamin Hardy.” Truman Presidential Library, Independence, 
Missouri. 
 
Hargrove, Erwin C. Prisoners of Myth: The Leadership of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 1933-
1990. Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1994. 
 
--------. TVA: Fifty Years of Grass-Roots Bureaucracy. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1983. 
 
Hart, David M. Forged Consensus: Science, Technology, and Economic Policy in the United 
States, 1921-1953. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. 
 
Hartz, Louis. The Liberal Tradition in America. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 
1955. 
 
Hogan, Michael J. The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western 
Europe, 1947-1952. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
 
Howe, Daniel Walker. “American Victorianism as a Culture.” American Quarterly 27:5 (1975): 
7-26. 
 
Huntington, Samuel P. “Political Development and Political Decay.” World Politics 17:3 (1965). 
 
Hunt, Michael. Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987. 
 
--------. The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained & Wielded Global 
Dominance. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007. 
 
Inkeles, Alex and David H. Smith. Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing 
Countries. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974. 
 
120 
 
 Inkeles, Alex. Exploring Individual Modernity. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.  
 
Kennedy, David. Over Here: The First World War and American Society. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004. 
 
Kennedy, John Fitzgerald. Inaugural Address. Accessed December 13, 2007; available from 
http://americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkinaugural.htm; Internet. 
 
Keynes, John Maynard. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. Amherst: 
Prometheus Books, 1997. 
 
Kitchell, Mark. Berkeley in the Sixties. Produced and directed by Mark Kitchell. 117 min. First 
Run Features, 2002. DVD. 
 
LaFeber, Walter. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006, 10th ed. Boston: McGraw-
Hill, 2008. 
 
Latham, Michael E. Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation 
Building” in the Kennedy Era. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2000. 
 
Lerner, Daniel. The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East. With an 
introduction by David Riesman. London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. 
 
Lilienthal, David. TVA: Democracy on the March. New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1944. 
 
--------. The Journals of David E. Lilienthal: Volume 1, The TVA Years. New York: Harper & 
Row Publishers, 1964. 
 
Linnér, Björn-Ola. The Return of Malthus: Environmentalism and Post-War Population-
Resource Crises. Isle of Harris: The White Horse Press, 2003. 
121 
 
  
Marx, Leo. The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America.  New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1964. 
 
McDonald, Michael J. and John Muldowny.  TVA and the Dispossessed: The Resettlement of 
Population in the Norris Dam Area. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1981. 
 
McMahon, Robert J. Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994. 
 
Merrill, Dennis. Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India’s Economic Development, 
1947-1963. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990. 
 
Merrill, Dennis, ed. Documentary History of the Truman Presidency: Volume 27, The Point Four 
Program: Reaching Out to Help the Less Developed Countries. Bethesda: University 
Publications of America, 1999. 
 
--------. Documentary History of the Truman Presidency: Volume 5, Creating a Pluralistic 
Democracy in Japan: The Occupation Government, 1945-1952. Bethesda: University 
Publications of America, 1996. 
 
Millikan, Max. “Economic Thought and Its Application and Methodology in India.” 
The American Economic Review 46:2 (May 1956). 
 
Neuse, Steven M. David E. Lilienthal: The Journey of an American Liberal. Knoxville: The 
University of Tennessee Press, 1996. 
 
Ngai, Mae M. Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004. 
 
122 
 
 Novick, Peter. That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical 
Profession. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
 
Nye, David. E. American Technological Sublime. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996. 
 
Paterson, Thomas G., ed. Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1989. 
 
Parker, Richard. John Kenneth Galbraith: His Life, His Politics, His Economics. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005. 
 
Parsons, Talcott and Edward A. Shils, eds. Toward a General Theory of Action. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1951.  
 
Pearce, Kimber Charles. Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid. East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 2001. 
 
Peet, Richard and Elaine Hartwick. Theories of Development. New York: The Guilford Press, 
1999. 
 
Pells, Richard. Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals in the 1940s and 
1950s, 2nd ed. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1989. 
 
Phillips, Sarah. This Land, This Nation: Conservation, Rural America, and the New Deal. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
Potter, David. People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1954. 
 
Pye,  Lucian W. with Mary W. Pye. Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of 
Authority. Cambridge: Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1985. 
123 
 
  
--------. Aspects of Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1966. 
 
Roberts, J. Timmons and Amy Hite, eds. From Modernization to Globalization. Malden: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2000. 
 
Rosenberg, Emily S. Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural 
Expansion, 1890-1945. New York: Hill and Wang, 1982. 
 
Rostow, Walt Whitman. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 2nd ed. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960. 
 
--------. Concept and Controversy: Sixty Years of Taking Ideas to Market. Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 2003. 
 
Rostow, Walt Whitman and Max Millikan. A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy. New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. 
 
Schulzinger, Robert A. A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997. 
 
Scott, James C. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. 
 
Selznick, Phillip. TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization. 
New York: Harper Torchbooks. 1966. 
 
Simpson, Christopher ed. Universities and Empire: Money and Politics in the Social Sciences 
During the Cold War. New York: The Free Press, 1998. 
 
124 
 
 Singal, Daniel Joseph. “Toward a Definition of American Modernism.” American Quarterly 39:1 
(1987). 
 
Shlaes, Amity. The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression. New York: Harper 
Collins Publishers, 2007. 
 
Stromberg Roland. European Intellectual History Since 1789, 6th ed. New Jersey: Pearson 
Education Company, 1994. 
 
Truman, Harry S. Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Volume 2, Years of Trail and Hope. 
 Garden City: Doubleday & Company Inc. 1955. 
 
--------. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1945-1953. Accessed February 4, 
2008; available from http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php; Internet. 
 
U.S. Department of State. Point 4: What it is and How it Works…Department of State 
Publication 4868, Economic Cooperation Series 39. Washington D.C: Division of 
Publications, 1953. 
 
U.S. Government Section. Political Reorientation of Japan: September 1945 to September 1948. 
Report of Government Section: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Washington 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949. 
 
Watson, Peter. The Modern Mind: An Intellectual History of the 20th Century. New York: 
Perennial Press, 2001. 
 
Westad, Odd Arne. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our 
Times. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
Zunz, Olivier. Why the American Century? Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
 
125 
 
 126 
 
 
